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KATJA VALLI: Threat Simulation. The Function of Dreaming?
ABSTRACT
Dreaming is a pure form of phenomenality, created by the brain untouched by 
external stimulation or behavioral activity, yet including a full range of phenomenal 
contents. Thus, it has been suggested that the dreaming brain could be used as a 
model system in a biological research program on consciousness (Revonsuo, 2006). 
In the present thesis, the philosophical view of biological realism is accepted, and 
thus, dreaming is considered as a natural biological phenomenon, explainable in 
naturalistic terms.
The major theoretical contribution of the present thesis is that it explores dreaming 
from a multidisciplinary perspective, integrating information from various fields of 
science, such as dream research, consciousness research, evolutionary psychology, and 
cognitive neuroscience. Further, it places dreaming into a multilevel framework, and 
investigates the constitutive, etiological, and contextual explanations for dreaming. 
Currently, the only theory offering a full multilevel explanation for dreaming, that 
is, a theory including constitutive, etiological, and contextual level explanations, 
is the Threat Simulation Theory (TST) (Revonsuo, 2000a; 2000b). The empirical 
significance of the present thesis lies in the tests conducted to test this specific 
theory put forth to explain the form, content, and biological function of dreaming.
The first step in the empirical testing of the TST was to define exact criteria for 
what is a ‘threatening event’ in dreams, and then to develop a detailed and reliable 
content analysis scale with which it is possible to empirically explore and quantify 
threatening events in dreams. The second step was to seek answers to the following 
questions derived from the TST: How frequent threatening events are in dreams? 
What kind of qualities these events have? How threatening events in dreams relate 
to the most recently encoded or the most salient memory traces of threatening 
events experienced in waking life? What are the effects of exposure to severe waking 
life threat on dreams? 
The results reveal that threatening events are relatively frequent in dreams, and that 
the simulated threats are realistic. The most common threats include aggression, 
are targeted mainly against the dream self, and include simulations of relevant and 
appropriate defensive actions. Further, real threat experiences activate the threat 
simulation system in a unique manner, and dream content is modulated by the 
activation of long term episodic memory traces with highest negative saliency. To 




The TST presents a strong argument that explains the specific design of dreams as 
threat simulations. The TST also offers a plausible explanation for why dreaming 
would have been selected for: because dreaming interacted with the environment in 
such a way that enhanced fitness of ancestral humans. By referring to a single threat 
simulation mechanism it furthermore manages to explain a wide variety of dream 
content data that already exists in the literature, and to predict the overall statistical 
patterns of threat content in different samples of dreams. 
The TST and the empirical tests conducted to test the theory are a prime example of 
what a multidisciplinary approach to mental phenomena can accomplish. Thus far, 
dreaming seems to have always resided in the periphery of science, never regarded 
worth to be studied by the mainstream. Nevertheless, when brought to the spotlight, 
the study of dreaming can greatly benefit from ideas in diverse branches of science. 
Vice versa, knowledge learned from the study of dreaming can be applied in various 
disciplines. The main contribution of the present thesis lies in putting dreaming back 
where it belongs, that is, into the spotlight in the cross-road of various disciplines. 
Keywords: Dream Content, the Function of Dreaming, the Threat Simulation 
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Sleep and dreaming are the most often naturally occurring altered states of 
consciousness, involving dramatic changes in overt behaviour, physiological 
responses and subjective experiences. The ability to have subjective experiences 
during sleep is one of the most puzzling features of human nature. Dreams are 
experienced by most individuals, and in all cultures. Thus, the brain’s capability 
to produce subjective hallucinatory experiences during sleep seems to be part of 
our biological machinery, a trait genetically passed on in successive generations. 
Nevertheless, despite rigorous empirical research and theorizing, it is still far from 
clear whether dreaming serves any function, and if it does, the specific function of 
dreaming has not been satisfactorily explained. 
This thesis explores dreaming from a multidisciplinary perspective, by drawing 
together contributions from various fields of science. These fields include philosophy, 
consciousness research, dream research, evolutionary psychology, and cognitive 
neuroscience. In the following, I will first explain how different ideas from these 
fields are integrated in this thesis, that is, by using an explanatory model adopted 
from biological sciences: the Multilevel Framework. I then move on to reviewing 
how various theories put forth to explain the form, content or function of dreaming 
fit into the framework. I will focus especially on the Threat Simulation Theory 
(Revonsuo, 2000a) because of all the suggested dream theories it fits most elegantly 
to the multilevel framework. 
The empirical part of this thesis focuses on testing the Threat Simulation Theory, 
an evolutionary psychological theory of the function of dreaming. I will explain the 
content of the main method developed for the empirical testing of the TST, the 
Dream Threat Scale, and its theoretical background assumptions. Then, I summarize 
the results we have acquired by using the scale in the samples of Finnish and Swedish 
university students’ dreams, and traumatized and nontraumatized Palestinian and 
Kurdish children’s dreams. A reinterpretation of the results is also offered.
The discussion is devoted to evaluating the TST in the light of the results of the present 
thesis and of other research relevant in the context of the TST. I aim also to point 
out the strengths and the weaknesses of the TST, and propose future guidelines for 
the empirical testing of the theory. Finally, I will return to the multilevel framework, 
and summarize how the TST manages to explain dreaming within this model, and 
why a multidisciplinary approach is needed for a full explanation of such a complex 
phenomenon as dreaming.
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2. THE MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO DREAMING
The biggest one of the main contributions of the present thesis lies in the integration 
of various fields of science, that is, philosophy, consciousness research, dream research, 
evolutionary psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. Thus far, dreaming has been 
either independently explored within these sciences or ignored altogether. I argue 
that without merging the most valuable contributions from each field, we will never 
be able to satisfactorily explain such a complex phenomenon as dreaming. Next, I 
will elucidate what are the most insightful contributions that these fields can offer 
to the explanation of dreaming, and how the views merge in the present thesis.
2.1. Consciousness research and Biological realism
The roots of the present thesis lie in the philosophical assumption that subjective 
consciousness is a real natural biological phenomenon in the brain. This approach 
is called ‘biological realism’ (Revonsuo, 2001; 2006). Biological realism is only one 
approach to explaining consciousness, and there are a number of other contemporary 
approaches, with varying philosophical commitments. An approach very close to 
biological realism is biological naturalism, proposed by Searle (1992), and in this 
approach, consciousness is also considered as a biological phenomenon. Regardless, 
in philosophy biological views to consciousness are in the minority, and the 
mainstream approaches differ significantly. 
First, there are views that deny the existence of phenomenal consciousness altogether 
(Dennett, 1976; 1991), or deny that experiences have qualitative properties (O’Regan 
& Noë, 2001). Thus, these views also deny dreaming as a form of phenomenal 
consciousness, or deny that dreaming has qualitative features. Second, some views 
accept phenomenal consciousness, but locate it outside the brain (Dretske, 1995; 
Noë & Thompson, 2004a; 2004b; Thompson & Varela, 2001; Tye, 1995). These 
externalist views face problems in explaining how dreaming as a form of phenomenal 
consciousness can occur in the absence of external referents. Panpsychism (Chalmers, 
1996; 2000; Lehar, 2003) goes even further than externalist views by claiming that 
consciousness can be everywhere as it is a fundamental feature of the physical 
universe. Everything is more or less conscious, and the real question concerns only 
the degree of consciousness. Thus, in these latter views dreaming is considered a real 
phenomenon, but we should not say that it is located in the brain or that it can be 
fully explained by brain activity.  
By contrast, biological realism treats subjective consciousness as a biological 
phenomenon embedded in the brain. Consequently, it follows that subjective 
consciousness requires a fully naturalistic explanation, similar to the explanation of 
other biological phenomena. As dreaming resides at a particular level of biological 
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organization in the brain, dreaming could and should be explained with naturalistic 
terms.
Biological realism ties the explanation of consciousness into biological sciences, where 
the underlying explanatory strategy is ‘multilevel explanation’ (Bechtel, 1994; Bechtel 
& Richardson, 1992; 1993; Craver, 2001; Craver & Darden, 2001). In multilevel 
explanation, the phenomenon or system under investigation is first identified and 
described at one level of organization, and the next step involves trying to figure out 
what the components of the system are. With various research instruments, the system 
or the phenomenon is broken down into subsystems or microcomponents that help in 
building an idealized multilevel model of the system (Revonsuo, 2006).  
Biological realism interprets consciousness as a phenomenal level in the brain, 
and places the overall explanation of consciousness into the multilevel framework 
(Revonsuo, 2006). In the framework, the explanation of mental phenomena can be 
broken down into several smaller explanatory tasks; constitutive (the downward-
looking), contextual (the upward-looking), and etiological (the backward-looking) 
explanations (see Figure 1.). Constitutive explanations involve looking at smaller-
scale phenomena or a spatio-temporally lower level of organization, that is, they 
aim at decomposing the phenomenon under investigation to its constituent 
parts, and describing the lower level mechanisms that causally contribute to the 
emergence of the phenomenon. Etiological explanations focus on the causal history 
of the phenomenon, that is, aim to trace back in time the causal chains that lead 
to an occurrence of the phenomenon. The etiological or causal explanations can 
be divided into 1) the immediate or proximate causes of the phenomenon, 2) 
the ontogenetic developmental causes of the phenomenon, or 3) the ultimate or 
evolutionary causes of the phenomenon. Contextual explanations, in contrast, aim 
to describe the role of the phenomenon at higher level of organization where it is 
just one element or subsystem in a complex mechanism. Each line of explanation, 
forming now a subproblem in the 
overall explanation of explaining 
consciousness, can then be separately 
investigated by a dedicated science 
or with a particular method.
Fig. 1. The multilevel framework for the 
investigation of mental phenomena. Modified 
from Revonsuo (2006).
18
THE MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO DREAMING
2.2. Dreaming in multilevel framework
Revonsuo (2006) suggests that dreaming provides consciousness research with a 
unique model system which could yield valuable information on how the brain 
produces phenomenological reality. During dreaming, the brain creates a rich 
phenomenological reality completely independent of the external world. Phenomenal 
consciousness during dreaming includes a full range of subjective contents, with 
similar overall form as phenomenal consciousness during wakefulness. As dreaming 
occurs in isolation from external stimuli, in the absence of sensory input and motor 
output, it can be regarded as a special and pure form of consciousness (Revonsuo, 
2001; 2006). Yet, in consciousness research dreaming has been mostly ignored as a 
model system for the explanation of consciousness. 
By placing dreaming into a multilevel framework, it is possible to divide the research 
problems we face in explaining the phenomenon into smaller sub-problems. Once 
identified and described, each component can then be studied independently, by the 
relevant field of science. When we have sufficient answers to our research problems 
from all or most levels of the framework, we can begin to build an idealized 
multilevel model of the system. In the end, if we have managed to find the right 
answers and build a multilevel model of dreaming, even if an idealized one, we have 
also managed to explain the phenomenon under study, at least to some degree. 
2.2.1. Dreaming as the phenomenon under investigation
Dreaming as a phenomenological form of consciousness can be inserted into the 
multilevel framework as described in Figure 2. First, the phenomenon itself, dreaming, 
needs to be identified and described in detail. The accomplishment of this task is 
the goal in dream research, and thus the contribution of dream research into the 
explanation of the phenomenon under investigation lies in identifying or defining 
dreaming, and in describing dreaming with systematic, normative, statistical studies of 
dream phenomenology and content. 
Consequently, dream research is in a 
central role in this thesis. After fully 
explaining the multilevel model of 
dreaming, I will present the answers 
and the main contributions that 
dream research has provided to the 
identification and description of 
dream phenomena. 
Fig. 2. The multilevel model of dreaming. 
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2.2.2. Constitutive explanations for dreaming
The constitutive explanation of dreaming aims at decomposing it into its constituent 
parts, and describing the lower level mechanisms dreaming is composed of or 
whose activity together produces the phenomenon. In the context of dreaming, the 
problem arises whether dreaming resides only on the phenomenal level, or whether 
nonconscious mental or cognitive processes are involved as well. The question that 
follows from this problem is whether the underlying levels of the phenomenal level 
are only neural or also cognitive level processes. For example, binding sensations 
and perceptions into a unified whole can be explained in terms of cognitive level 
informational processes or in terms of underlying neural level processes. Thus, in the 
context of dreaming, the downward-looking explanation involves finding out what 
are the mental, cognitive, and neural nonconscious mechanisms that contribute to 
dreaming. These tasks belong to the scope of psychology, cognitive science, and 
cognitive neuroscience.
Cognitive neuroscience has been described as the empirical science developed to 
close the explanatory gap between biological processes and processes of the mind 
(Gazzaniga, 1995), seeking global theoretical integration between the biological and 
the mental, the latter primarily understood as ‘cognition’. Nowadays, however, also 
consciousness is included into the scope of cognitive neuroscience. Thus, the aim in 
cognitive neuroscience is to explain the neural mechanisms underlying cognitive 
and conscious phenomena. Only a minority of neuroscientists have devoted their 
efforts to revealing the neural basis of consciousness, not to mention dreaming.
Nevertheless, cognitive neuroscience can greatly contribute to the investigation of 
constitutive explanations for dreaming. When the phenomenon is first described in 
detail (as is the aim in dream research), cognitive neuroscientists can then explore 
the neural mechanisms behind, that is, correlates or constituents of, specific types 
of subjective experiences. Most of the theories in dream research aim to explain 
the form and content of dreaming, and would thus predict specific brain activation 
patterns responsible for the form or content of dreaming (although these predictions 
are seldom clearly outlined). This is also called a top-down approach: dream research 
provides data that lead to predictions of which brain areas should be activated 
during dreaming and which should not. Cognitive neuroscience, in contrast, adopts 
a bottom-up approach to dreaming. It provides empirical data of which brain areas 
have been observed to be activated or deactivated during dreaming. These top-down 
and bottom-up approaches should be compatible and predict findings from the 
opposite approach. Consequently, as results from cognitive neuroscience can be 
combined with empirical findings in dream content studies, cognitive neuroscience 
can contribute to theoretical models of dreaming as well as be used to empirically 
test predictions of various theories and models on dreaming. At the moment, the 
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main research problem posed by dreaming to cognitive neuroscience is to find out 
the dream generator mechanisms in the brain.
2.2.3. Etiological explanations for dreaming
An etiological explanation aims to explain the causal history of the phenomenon, 
that is, to trace back in time the causal chains that lead to an occurrence of the 
phenomenon. The causal explanations can be divided into 1) the immediate or 
proximate causes of the phenomenon, 2) the ontogenetic or developmental causes 
of the phenomenon, or 3) the ultimate or evolutionary causes of the phenomenon. 
In the context of dreaming, these explanations involve both neural level and 
psychological level causes. 
The proximate causes of dreaming in the neural level should describe how the 
preceding stimuli, such as internal brain activation during sleep, cause dreaming to 
occur. These proximate explanations again belong mostly to the scope of cognitive 
neuroscience. Psychological level proximate explanations should describe how 
cognitive level preceding causes, such as the activation of memory sources (both 
long term memory activation and day residues), emotional state and activity, 
hyperassociativity, memory consolidation, attention, stimulus incorporation, and 
self-awareness, participate in producing dream phenomena. These psychological level 
causal explanations are investigated mainly in psychology and cognitive science. For 
example, Foulkes (1999) has formulated a cognitive theory of dreaming, addressing 
psychological level proximate explanations to dream formation (see section 2.4.3). 
However, as each psychological level phenomenon has its unique constitutive level 
in the brain, cognitive neuroscience is also involved. 
The ontogenetic or developmental explanations in the context of dreaming aim to 
clarify how, during individual development, the brain became wired up so that the 
dream generator systems of the brain mature and how the mind develops cognitively 
and psychologically so as to gradually produce adult-like dream experiences. 
This task is enormously complex, and requires united efforts from fields such as 
developmental and cognitive psychology, biology, and even genetics. Nonetheless, 
one developmental explanation for dreaming has been suggested by Foulkes (1982; 
1985; 1999). His theory offers an interpretation of how psychological processes are 
involved in dream production, and will be reviewed later in section 2.4.3.
The ultimate or evolutionary explanations look even further back in time, and aim 
to elucidate how, at some point in the evolutionary history, the brain evolved the 
ability to produce dreaming. Evolutionary explanations try to figure out how the 
first dream generators appeared in some distant ancestors of ours, perhaps in the 
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first humans, perhaps in the first mammals. Did dream generators first appear as 
a nonfunctional epiphenomenon of other sleep-related mechanisms (a so-called 
spandrel; Gould & Lewontin, 1979), but as they later proved to be functional in the 
biological sense of the word, were thenceforth selected for their survival-enhancing 
properties? Evolutionary explanations try to find out whether the dream generator 
has any or had any survival-enhancing consequences or not. Did dreaming promote 
the reproductive success of those who were able to dream in the evolutionary 
environment? Thus, the ultimate explanations are researched in evolutionary biology 
and evolutionary psychology. 
During the last fifteen years or so, evolutionary psychology (EP) has evolved into 
a popular approach to understanding psychological phenomena. Evolutionary 
psychology attempts to explain psychological traits as adaptations, that is, as the 
functional products of natural or sexual selection. Adaptationist thinking about 
biological mechanisms, such as the immune system, is common in evolutionary 
biology, and basically, evolutionary psychology applies the same thinking to 
psychology. Evolutionary psychologists see much of human psychology and behavior 
as having foundations in psychological adaptations that evolved to solve recurrent 
problems in human ancestral environments.
Tooby and Cosmides (1992; 1995) define adaptations as mechanisms crafted 
by natural selection to solve the specific problems posed by the environments 
encountered by ancestral populations during the course of the species’ evolution. 
One of the main criteria for an adaptation is that it shows clear design for a function, 
that is, it seems to be specifically engineered to solving a specific adaptive problem. 
Thus, an evolutionary analysis of a psychological mechanism includes an analysis of 
the adaptive problems that existed in the human evolutionary environment and an 
explanation of how the psychological mechanism helped ancestral humans to solve 
some of those problems.
Some dream researchers have applied the EP metatheoretical framework to 
the explanation of the function of dreaming. When evolutionary psychological 
reasoning is extended to dreaming, the following questions immediately 
emerge: Is it conceivable that the process of dreaming or dreaming about 
particular contents was functional in the biological sense in the ancestral 
world - that somehow our ancestors had better chances of surviving or 
reproducing because they regularly dreamed during the night, and especially 
because they regularly dreamed about particular things? Could dreaming have 
given any kind of selective advantage for our ancestors and if yes, what kind of 
advantage? Does dreaming fulfil the main criterion for an adaptation, in other 
words, does dreaming show a clear design for a specific function, and does 
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it seem to be specifically engineered to solving a specific adaptive problem. 
All the evolutionary psychological theories seek answers to these ultimate 
questions about dreaming. In that way, the EP approach has made a significant 
contribution to modern dream theories. 
2.2.4. Contextual explanations for dreaming
The contextual explanation describes the role of the phenomenon at a higher level of 
description. How does dreaming relate to or affect other psychological or conscious 
phenomena? What consequences does the dream generator system have for learning, 
memory, emotion regulation, perception, and ultimately, overt behavior? If dreaming 
has a function, it must have some useful effects at the contextual level, that is, it must 
modify waking consciousness or behaviour in some way.
 The approaches to dreaming on the contextual level can vary greatly depending 
on the perspective. For example, in neuropsychology we can ask questions such 
as whether dreaming as a neurobiological process, or dream content as subjective 
experience, affects long term memory consolidation, or modifies subsequent waking 
behavior. In clinical and personality psychology research we could seek answers to 
how dreams are interpreted by people, or what kind of personal meanings dreams 
carry. We could investigate dreaming in social psychology by looking at how and 
under what circumstances people engage in dream sharing, or explore the role 
of dreams in cultural contexts with methods available in sociology.  Contextual 
explanations tie dreaming to other subjective and psychological phenomena on a 
more general level, which are intra- or interindividual level, overt behavior, and 
organism-environment interaction. In the contextual level, mental phenomenon is 
one of the etiological explanations for observable behavior.
2.3. Dreaming as the phenomenon under investigation: Identification and  
description of dream phenomena
Dream research is the field of science aiming to identify, describe and explain, at least 
partially, the phenomenon of dreaming. Identif ication of the phenomenon includes 
providing clear definitions for what does or does not account as dreaming, and gives 
the empirical criteria for the presence and absence of dreaming. The systematic 
description of dreaming involves elucidating the phenomenology of dreams, and 
this is accomplished with systematic collection of large samples of dreaming data 
and detailed content analysis studies on dream content. The explanations for 
dreaming (that is, for the statistical patterns found in the data on dream content and 
its correlations to other phenomena) involve various theories and hypotheses of the 
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constitutive or etiological pathways underlying dreaming, or contextual descriptions 
of the effects of dreaming. 
In this section, only the definition of dreaming, a summary of methods for 
describing dream content, and description of dream phenomena are presented. 
Similarly, the relationship between sleep and dreaming is briefly reviewed. The 
constitutive, etiological, and contextual explanations for dreaming are brought up 
later in section 2.4.
2.3.1. Definition of dreaming
Even though the scientific and empirical study of dreams began in the 19th century, 
thus far the mere identification of the phenomenon has proved to be problematic. 
At the moment, researchers do not even concur on how exactly to define dreaming. 
This, in turn, affects how the phenomenon is described.
Currently, researchers seem to agree that all conscious mental events that occur 
during sleep can be categorized as ‘sleep mentation’. However, not all sleep 
mentation comprises as dreaming. In the 1970’s, Snyder stated that dreaming refers 
to the subjective conscious experiences during sleep, and it consists of complex 
and organized mental images that show temporal progression or change. He thus 
excluded static, simple, and unimodal imagery, such as static visual images, thinking, 
reflecting, bodily feelings and fragmentary impressions, from the definition of 
dreaming. To Snyder, dreams were like stories or at least like scenes from a story 
(Snyder, 1970). While Snyder’s (1970) definition does not state anything about the 
actual content of dreams, Hobson (1988), and Hobson, Pace-Schott, and Stickgold 
(2000) emphasize the qualitative features of dream content in their definition of 
dreaming. They list the following set of features most often present in dreams as 
definitional features of dreaming: hallucinatory perceptions, delusions, narrative 
structure, hyperemotionality and bizarreness. Furthermore, according to Hobson 
(1988) and Hobson et al. (2000), dreams usually lack self-reflection, stability, and 
volitional control. 
Revonsuo (2006) recently suggested that instead of strict definitions and 
categorisations, we should consider dream phenomena as a continuum. At the one 
end of the continuum resides full-blown dreaming, defined as complex, organized, 
temporally progressing, multimodal contents of consciousness during sleep that 
amount to a simulation of the perceptual world, and at the other end there is sleep 
mentation, that is, simple contents of consciousness during sleep that show a low 
degree of complexity and organization. Even though in this definition dream 
phenomena is considered as a continuum, it might be difficult to draw the line 
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between what types of dream contents amount to world simulation and what do 
not. Thus, the two main categories, dreaming and sleep mentation, still exist.
2.3.2. Methods for acquiring descriptions of dreaming
Early dream research in the 19th century was characterized by the use of introspective 
reports and explorations on dream phenomenology (Schwartz, 2000). Despite 
advances in research and data collection methods, introspective reports are still the 
main tool in the investigation of dreams. 
2.3.2.1. Data collection methods
Reports of dreaming can be collected and analyzed in various ways. The most cost-
effective method is to use questionnaires, as they allow quick data collection from 
large samples (Farthing, 1992), but questionnaires offer a very limited access to the 
richness of dream phenomena. In addition, forgetting and memory bias interferes 
with acquiring accurate and detailed information (Farthing, 1992). 
A more laborious method is to collect systematic and detailed descriptions of 
dream content immediately after awakening, either in the home or laboratory 
setting. These methods share some common features. First, the subjects or 
participants are aware that their task is to recall dreams, as opposed to unexpected 
retrospective inquiry in questionnaire methods. Second, the participants are 
usually given detailed instructions on how to report the dreams. Systematic 
recording of remembered dream content decreases memory bias, but is slow and 
demanding for the subject. Thus, the participants are often strongly motivated to 
recall and report their dreams. Both home and laboratory setting dream report 
collection methods also involve a practice-effect: the more the participants pay 
attention to their dreams, and to recalling and reporting dreams, the better the 
dream recall (Beaulieu-Prévost & Zadra, 2005; Schredl, Wittmann, Ciric & 
Götz, 2003), and likely, the more detailed the dream descriptions.
In home dream diaries, the participants can recall and report the dreams in the 
privacy of their own homes. In addition, home dream diaries allow the anonymity 
of the participant, thus minimizing censorship (Farthing, 1992). Analysis of dream 
journals kept for different reasons reveal that dream content has great consistency 
over time (Domhoff, 1996; 2003). Thus, home dream reports form a representative 
sample of the phenomenon. Nevertheless, in home dream diaries only dreams 
recalled upon awakening are recorded, and the experimenter cannot control for 
the physiological sleep stage the dream report originates from. Technical advances, 
however, offer a solution to these problems. The ‘Nightcap’ is a portable device 
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that can detect small eye movements, and thus distinguish between non-rapid 
eye movement (NREM) and rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. The data from 
sleep stages can be stored to a personal computer, and the computer can also be 
programmed to conduct awakenings at predetermined times with high levels of 
accuracy (Aijole, Stickgold, Rittenhouse & Hobson, 1995; Mamelak & Hobson, 
1989; Pace-Schott, Kaji, Stickgold, & Hobson, 1994). 
While home dream diaries are relatively cheap, collecting dreams in a sleep 
laboratory setting is expensive because of equipment and resource demands. Also the 
anonymity of the participant is compromised, and may affect the willingness to report 
embarrassing dream content. However, immediate dream reporting after controlled 
awakenings minimizes memory bias, and sleep stages can be controlled for. Further, 
it is possible to elicit experimental stimuli to study its effects on dream content, or 
to conduct awakenings at predetermined occasions for all subjects (homogenous 
data sample). The laboratory setting can, nevertheless, have negative impacts on 
the quality of data collected. First, laboratory subjects often report incorporation 
of elements from the experimental setting into dream content (Domhoff, 1996; 
Schredl, 2008). Second, frequent awakenings are taxing for participants, and can 
lead to resisting full awakenings and dream reporting (Domhoff, 2003). Third, 
partial sleep deprivation and sleep inertia due to frequent awakenings may itself 
affect dreaming.
2.3.2.2. Data analysis methods
The most widely used scientific method in describing and analyzing dream content 
is content analysis. The earliest content analysis scales reported date back to the 19th 
century (Calkins, 1893; Weed, Hallam & Phinney, 1896), but in the 1950’s and 60’s, 
content analysis gained a steady foothold in dream research. The goal of content 
analysis is to transform selected aspects of qualitative data (verbal reports) into a 
quantitative form so that statistics can be conducted (Hall & Van de Castle, 1966). 
In content analysis, selected elements present in dream reports are separated and 
classified into categories. The greater the detail with which a category is constructed 
and defined, the less room there is for the judges to impose their own beliefs or 
interpretations on scoring of elements (Antrobus, Fein, Jordan, Ellman & Arkin, 
1991). After the scoring process is finished, specific proportions, frequencies, and 
percentages of different elements can be calculated and statistically analyzed. 
The originally qualitative data can then also be contrasted against various other 
variables, such as age, sex or cultural background of participants, length of dream 
reports as measured by word count, order effects (the first vs. later reports in 
home journals or laboratory awakenings), the effects of sleep stages, or personality 
measures (Antrobus et al., 1991).   
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The categories in a content analysis system of classification may be either descriptive 
or theoretical. Descriptive categories are created by reading numerous dream reports 
and devising, by trial-and-error, a scale that accurately reflects the content of dreams 
(Domhoff, 1996; Hall & Van de castle, 1966). In published dream research on the 
content analysis of dreams, mainly descriptive content scales have been utilized, 
such as the famous Hall and Van de Castle (1966) system. In contrast, theoretical 
scales are formulated to measure a specific construct derived from a theory. The 
earliest theoretical scale, based on psychoanalytic theory, was devised by Alexander 
and Wilson (1935), soon followed by others (for review, see Hall & Van de castle, 
1966). Also Hall and Van de Castle (1966) constructed some categories based 
on psychoanalytic theory, but later it was found that results on these scales were 
inconsistent (Domhoff, 1996), and furthermore in contradiction with the predictions 
derived from psychoanalytic theory (Nathan, 1981). 
The formulation of theoretically based content analysis system requires careful 
planning. First, the investigators must be aware of the details of the theory they wish 
to test, and second, even the advocates of the theory may disagree as to which dream 
elements reflect the propositions of the theory (Domhoff, 1996). Nevertheless, 
theoretical scales are valuable tools not only in testing theoretical claims, but in 
increasing knowledge of the phenomenal features of dreams, just as descriptive scales. 
In fact, all theoretical categories are simultaneously also descriptive. Similarly, we 
could say that all descriptive categories are also theoretical, but they are only based 
on implicit theories or folk-psychological beliefs of the most obvious or natural 
categories in human perception and experience.
2.3.2.3. The effect of data collection methods on dream content 
Domhoff (2003) provides an excellent review of findings on representativeness of 
dream collection methods. In a meta-analysis carried out by Domhoff and Schneider 
(1999), dreams reported at home and in the laboratory were found to be to a large 
extent similar. The significant difference that emerged in the meta-analysis involved 
aggression. Home dream diaries were observed to contain a higher percentage of 
dreams including at least one incidence of aggression, a higher rate of aggression 
per character, and higher percentage of physical aggression (defined as physical 
aggression towards characters or personal property). However, the effect sizes were 
found to be small, except for physical aggression. Thus, Domhoff (2003) concludes 
that everyday dream recall provides, in general, a good sample of dream life. I would, 
however, based on the findings of Domhoff and Schneider (1999), suggest caution 
in interpreting the results concerning physical aggression in home dream journals, 
as there seems to be a bias towards reporting more aggressive dreams in home versus 
laboratory setting.  
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2.3.3. The description of dreaming: form and content 
The first task when beginning to assess a phenomenon from a multilevel framework 
is to identify and describe the phenomenon. Although different types of definitions 
of dreaming have been used in dream studies, and this has most likely affected data 
collection methods, data analysis methods, and therefore also results, in this section 
the available descriptions for dreaming are summarized. The aim is to illustrate 
the quality of the phenomenon to the extent possible at the moment. Numerous 
content analysis studies conducted on dreams provide a large body of systematic 
empirical data on the phenomenology of dreams. Furthermore, most of the data 
provides convergent evidence on the major statistically reliably occurring features 
of dreams.
2.3.3.1. Sensory modalities and qualities in dreams
According to many studies, all sensory modalities are present in our dreams, and 
approximately to the same extent as in our waking reality (Calkins, 1893; Weed et 
al., 1896; Snyder, 1970; Strauch & Meier, 1996; Zadra, Nielsen & Donderi, 1998). 
All or most dreams include visual experience, and auditory components are also 
frequent. Bodily sensations, such as kinaesthesia and touch, are less frequently 
reported, and smell, taste, and pain experiences are rare but possible. These sensory 
experiences are less frequent in our daily lives as well, compared to the prevalence of 
visual and auditory sensations. 
The visual qualities of dream experiences were explored in an ingenious experiment 
in the early 1990’s (Rechtschaffen & Buchignani, 1992). The experimenters 
had a selection of more than 100 photographs in which the visual features (for 
example, chromaticity, saturation, illumination) had been altered. Immediately after 
awakening the subjects in a laboratory, the participants selected a photograph that 
most accurately matched the visual quality of their dream. The most often picked 
photograph was the one that had not been altered in any way, and the next ones 
chosen presented only slight variations from normal. Furthermore, Rechtschaffen 
and Buchignani (1992) noticed that most, but not all, dreams are perceived in color. 
Approximately 20% of dreams lack color, and are perceived achromatically, in black 
and white. An explanation for this might be that visual perception in low levels of 
illumination during wakefulness is achromatic; we only detect shades of grey, not 
chromatic colors. In sum, the visual qualities of dreams closely resemble the way we 
perceive the world while we are awake. 
The quality of sensations in dreams is also remarkably realistic. What we see, 
hear, taste, smell and touch, feels so realistic that we cannot usually distinguish 
between a dream sensation and a comparable sensation in the waking state. For 
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example, although pain sensations as such are quite infrequent in dreams (for 
example, Strach & Meier, 1996), in a study by Zadra et al. (1998) in the 0.5% of 
dreams in which pain was described, it was reported to be realistic. The pain was 
localized in a specific area of the body, and often followed from an injury when 
engaged in violent encounter with other dream characters. In sum, the idea that 
dreams are perceptually realistic has received considerable empirical support.
2.3.3.2. The dream self
An element present in almost every dream is the dream self (Snyder, 1970; Strauch 
& Meier, 1996). Usually, we experience our dreams from the embodied first person 
perspective, in a similar fashion that we experience our waking reality (Foulkes & 
Kerr, 1994). The dream self most often possesses a body-image much like the one we 
have while awake, and we are positioned in the centre of the dream world, actively 
part-taking the dream events. In this respect, the dream self is not all that different 
from the waking self. Sometimes, however, we can have a camera-like perspective 
on dream events, and observe the dream and even ourselves from a third person’s 
point-of-view (Snyder, 1970; Strauch & Meier, 1996). 
What is different between the waking self and the dream self are memory lapses, 
confabulation, and lack of insight into one’s own deficient cognition (Revonsuo, 
2005). The dream self often has a limited access to his or her autobiographical memory, 
suffers from transient amnesia, and is disoriented to time and place. Although the 
dream self in most dreams appears much the same as during wakefulness, there are 
a small proportion of dreams in which the self appears in an altered form (Revonsuo 
& Salmivalli, 1995). The milder variations include cases in which the dreamer is 
the same person, but appears in strange clothing or is of a different age. In a more 
distorted form, the dreamer can appear as a completely different person, sometimes 
of the opposite sex or different race, or even an animal. While the dreamer may 
remember some facts concerning his or her life correctly when dreaming, often 
the dreamer loses the ability to contemplate whether the events, persons, places, or 
objects in the dreams are possible. The dream self can also create false memories, 
such as friends or relatives that do not exist in the waking reality. In fact, the dream 
self is often totally unable to reflect upon the credibility of his or her beliefs within 
the dream. 
2.3.3.3. Emotions
Dreams include a full range of emotional experiences, but negative emotions 
seem to be more frequently experienced in dreams than positive emotions. In the 
classic Hall and Van de Castle (1966) study of home-reported dreams, of the over 
29
THE MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO DREAMING
700 emotions explicitly mentioned in the one thousand dream reports of college 
students, 80% were negative and only 20% positive. This was the case for the dream 
self as well as for the other dream characters. Schredl and Doll (1998) replicated 
the results in home dream diaries, although the ratio was more balanced. However, 
they calculated the ratios for the total number of dream reports, not for the total 
number of emotions as Hall and Van de Castle (1966). Schredl and Doll (1998) 
report that 56.4% of dream reports included predominantly negative, and 21.1% 
predominantly positive emotions when rated by external judges. Snyder (1970), and 
Strauch and Meier (1996) have studied REM dreams collected in laboratory, and 
their results indicate that two thirds of emotions in dreams are negative. They also 
found that the most commonly reported negative emotions are fear and anger. 
Some discrepancies in the results remain, however, concerning dream emotions. 
For example, Schredl and Doll (1998) found that self-ratings of dream emotions 
were more positive than ratings by external judges, and that external judges 
tended to underestimate the occurrence of positive emotions. Fosse, Stickgold 
and Hobson (2001) and Strauch and Meier (1996) reported that the single most 
frequently reported emotion in dreams is joy or elation, although the frequency 
of one positive emotion is concealed by the combined overall ratio of positive vs. 
negative emotions. Regardless, dream emotions have been found to be almost 
always appropriate to the dreamed situations (Foulkes, Sullivan, Kerr & Brown, 
1988; Revonsuo & Salmivalli, 1995). 
2.3.3.4. Other dream characters and social interactions
The dream self is not alone or passive in the dream world, but surrounded by other 
dream characters, actively taking part in events and social interactions (Strauch & 
Meier, 1996). On average, in addition to dream self dreams contain three other animate 
characters, which are usually human, but sometimes animals or fantastic or fictional 
characters (Domhoff, 1996). Approximately half of the humans in dreams are persons 
known to us, and the other half consists of strangers, undetermined people, occupational 
or fictional characters (Revonsuo & Tarkko, 2001; Strauch & Meier, 1996)
The dream self is also an active participant in approximately four out of five dreams, 
and an uninvolved observer only occasionally (Strauch & Meier, 1996). The dream 
self interacts with other dream characters, and various social interactions take place 
in dreams. Interactions with other characters are more often aggressive than friendly. 
Almost half of the dreams include an aggressive component, and the dreamer is 
personally involved in most of these, more often being the victim than the aggressor 
(Domhoff, 1996). Males dream more often of direct physical aggression than females, 
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and females of friendly interactions. Sometimes the positive interactions take on an 
erotic tone, although more often in male’s than in female’s dreams (Domhoff, 1996).
2.3.3.5. Dream themes and events
The themes people around the world dream about share many commonalities, 
independent of the culture the people come from. Typical dream themes are dreams 
that contain the same general form over and over again across large numbers of people, 
even though the details of the dream may vary considerably. In questionnaire studies, 
people have been presented with a list of various dream themes, and asked: “Have you 
ever dreamed of..?”. These surveys reveal that by far the most typical dream theme 
around the world is that of the dream self being chased or attacked (Domhoff, 1996; 
Garfield, 2001; Griffith, Miyagi & Tago, 1958; Hartmann, 1984; Nielsen, Zadra & 
Fukuda, 1999; Nielsen, Zadra, Germain & Montplaisir, 1998; 1999; Nielsen, Zadra, 
Simard, Saucier, Stenstrom, Smith, et al., 2003; Robbins & Houshi, 1983; Schredl, 
Ciric, Götz & Wittmann, 2004; Zadra & Nielsen, 1997; 1999). 
Other most typical universal dream themes are also mainly composed of negatively 
toned events, such as falling or being on the verge of falling, drowning, being lost or 
trapped, being naked or inappropriately dressed in public, being accidentally injured, 
ill or dying, being in a man-made or natural disaster, having trouble taking a test or 
other poor performance, and having trouble with car or other transport (Garfield, 
2001; Nielsen et al., 2003). Sexual experiences or being naked in public are another 
well remembered, although less frequently reported dream content, and many recall 
dreams about being late, or of school, teachers or studying (Garfield, 2001; Nielsen 
et al., 2003). Flying dreams or dreams with the dream self soaring through the air 
are also universally reported, and in contrast to the previously mentioned themes, 
these kinds of dreams are usually positive (Garfield, 2001). 
Detailed content analysis studies have also shown that dreams often contain negative 
events. Events in which a bad outcome occurs to a dream character independent of 
anything the character does are called misfortunes (Domhoff, 1996; Hall & Van de 
Castle, 1966). These are, by definition, negative events consisting of mishaps, dangers, 
accidents, loss of possession, injuries and illnesses, falling and death. Misfortunes 
are seven times more frequent in dreams than the opposite type of events, good 
fortunes (Domhoff, 1996; Hall & Van de Castle, 1966). Moreover, the dreamer is 
personally involved in almost three quarters of misfortunes (Domhoff, 1996; Hall 
& Van de Castle, 1966). 
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2.3.3.6. Reflection
Reflective consciousness involves the ability to focus on some particular aspect of 
the content of consciousness and pass a judgement over it (Revonsuo, 2006). The 
traditional view has it that dreams are devoid of reflective consciousness and self-
awareness (for example, Snyder, 1970). This traditional view may now be changing. 
During dreaming our ability to critically reflect upon the events we witness 
is diminished, but it is not completely wiped out. Already in the early 1980’s 
McCarley and Hoffman (1981) found that in 16% of 104 REM dreams the 
dreamer explicitly noticed some bizarre feature of the dream. That is, reflective 
thinking of something not being quite right was present, at least for a fleeting 
moment. Later, more detailed analyses of reflection in drams have been carried 
out, for instance, by Kahan (1994), Kahan and LaBerge (1994), Kahan, LaBerge, 
Levitan and Zimbardo (1997), and Purcell, Moffit, and Hoffmann (1993). It 
seems that self-reflection is not a dichotomous variable, that is, either present 
or absent in dreams, but can be activated to various degrees during dreaming 
(Purcell et al., 1993). Self-reflection occurs naturally and substantially in dreams, 
and it seems to be normally distributed. In fact, in a majority of spontaneous 
dreams, the dreamer is moderately self-reflective (Purcell et al., 1993). 
More recently, Kahn and Hobson (2005) divided reflective thinking in dreams 
into two distinct components. The first component, reflecting on the dream event 
itself, that is, thinking about the event, is fundamentally deficient, and very different 
from waking state thinking (Kahn & Hobson, 2005). The dream event is taken for 
granted, and the dream self does not question whether the event is likely or even 
possible in the waking realm. The second cognitive component, however, thinking 
and reflecting within the event, within the dream scenario, is similar to thinking 
while awake (Kahn & Hobson, 2005). Even though the confabulatory dream event 
itself is taken as real, the dream self can think, pass judgments, make decisions and 
guide his or her behavior the way he or she would do while awake. For instance, 
the dreamer can protect her baby in the dream from dangers in appropriate and 
reasonable ways, but fail to realize that she does not have a child in waking reality. 
2.3.3.7. Bizarreness 
Our sleeping brain combines dream elements in a novel, creative, odd, sometimes 
absurd way that is impossible or highly improbable in the waking realm. These dream 
oddities are referred to as bizarreness. Hobson, Hoffman, Helfand and Kostner (1987) 
categorized dream bizarreness into three distinct forms: incongruity, discontinuity 
and vagueness. Incongruities are inappropriate syntheses of mismatching elements. 
In other words, incongruity refers to mismatching dream features appearing together, 
for example, meeting the president of the United States of America in your kitchen. 
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Discontinuities are interruptions in orientational stability, and comprise the sudden 
appearance, disappearance or transformation of dream elements. Vagueness or 
uncertainty are confusions of distinct conceptions and refer to ambiguity of a dream 
element, for instance, recognizing the dream character as a familiar person but not 
being able to specify who exactly the person is.
Bizarreness is an essential feature that any theory or explanation of dreaming has 
to account for. Therefore, a detailed and accurate description of how bizarre dreams 
really are, which dream features are most vulnerable to bizarreness, and what type 
of bizarre phenomena dreams include, is called for. The descriptions available thus 
far, however, seem to be mixed.
A few content analysis studies on bizarreness have been conducted (for example, 
Revonsuo & Salmivalli, 1995; Revonsuo & Tarkko, 2001; Snyder, 1970; Strauch 
& Meier, 1996). While Strauch and Meier (1996) report that three quarters of 
REM dreams include bizarre elements, Snyder (1970) states that most dreams are 
lacking bizarre qualities. These ambiguities may well follow from conceptual and 
definitional differences that affect measurements. For instance, how to draw a line 
between what is bizarre and what is not? What is an adequate baseline for what is 
considered to be bizarre?
In a detailed content analysis study by Revosuo and Salmivalli (1995), they used as 
a baseline for what is bizarre in dreams the subject’s personal waking reality, and 
calculated the proportion of bizarreness in relation to the amount of comparable 
nonbizarre dream elements. They found that most dream elements are non-bizarre, 
not distorted in any manner. The results also showed that bizarreness is not randomly 
distributed across different dream contents. For example, the dream self was extremely 
rarely bizarre whereas dream language and cognition were more often distorted. 
Distinct types of bizarreness showed a similar pattern of distribution. Incongruity was 
found to be the most common form of bizarreness, and vagueness the least frequent. 
In another content analysis study on bizarreness, Revonsuo and Tarkko (2002) 
investigated the representation of human dream characters in dreams, excluding 
the dream self. Of human characters in dreams, approximately half were found 
to be bizarre. Revonsuo and Tarkko (2002) also coded whether the characters are 
contextually or internally bizarre, and found that contextual bizarreness is more 
common than internal bizarreness. They interpreted the results in the context of the 
binding problem and cognitive neuroscience: the greater the number of modules 
that need to be engaged in creating a unified phenomenal experience, the more 
likely bizarreness is because when the number of independent dream elements 
increases, also the probability of incorrect combinations of the elements increases. 
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As a person appearing in the correct context requires more modules to be involved 
than producing a mere internally consistent representation of the person, contextual 
bizarreness is likely to be more frequent than internal bizarreness. 
Bizarreness is, in fact, an intriguing phenomenon from the perspective of 
consciousness research, as it reveals how the unity of consciousness is disrupted in 
dreams (Revonsuo, 1999; 2006). If we were to figure out what are the underlying 
mechanisms in how the brain fails to bind together information during dreaming, 
we might learn about how the unity of consciousness is created by the waking 
brain (Revonsuo, 1999; 2006; Revonsuo & Tarkko, 2002). The binding problem 
is one of the most fundamental problems in consciousness research as well as in 
cognitive neuroscience, and on this respect, using the dreaming brain as a model 
system, bizarre dream phenomena might help in revealing the neural constituents 
of successful binding (Revonsuo, 1999; 2006). 
2.3.3.8. Absent dream content 
Self-awareness and the ability to reflect on the nature of dream events are flawed 
during dreaming to varying degrees. Apart from lucid dreams, we usually lack 
insight, that is, we take for granted the reality of dreams and fail to understand its 
hallucinatory characteristic. This may be explained by the specific pattern of brain 
activation during REM sleep: the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) where 
neurocognitive mechanisms crucial for reflective consciousness and self-awareness 
are  believed to reside is very active during wakefulness, but deactivated in REM 
sleep (Braun, Balkin, Wesensten, Carson, Varga, Baldwin, et al., 1997; Maquet, 
2000; Maquet, Peters, Aerts, Delfiore, Degueldre, Luxen, et al., 1996; Maquet, Ruby, 
Schwartz, Laureys, Albouy, Dang-Vu, et al., 2004; Nofzinger, Mintun, Wiseman, 
Kupfer & Moore, 1997). 
There are also some specific dream contents that are almost non-existent or at least 
very rare. These include such activities as reading, writing, calculating, and using 
a computer (Hartmann, 2000; Schredl, 2000; Schredl & Hofmann, 2003). The 
absence of these dream contents seem striking, as they are activities that we engage 
in daily, sometimes several hours a day. 
Thus far, there is no all-exclusive explanation as to why elements so frequent in our 
waking lives do not enter our dreams. Some theories accept constitutive neural level 
explanations for the absence or lack of certain elements. The random activation theories 
(for example, Hobson & McCarley, 1977; Hobson et al., 2000) (to be reviewed in more 
detail in section 2.4.1.), for instance, seem to accept that as the DLPFC is deactivated 
in REM sleep, it automatically follows that the tasks normally executed by DLPFC 
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are also absent in dreams. Thus, the absence of higher level cognitive functions such 
as self-awareness, or reading and writing, is explained by underlying neural activation 
patterns. However, the constitutive explanation is not a full explanation, because it 
does not tell us why the DLPFC is deactivated; to account for that we may need 
an etiological or a contextual explanation. Also psychological function theories (for 
example, Hartmann, 1996; 1998; reviewed in section 2.4.5.) may accept constitutive 
level explanations for the absence of specific dream elements. 
In contrast, the Threat Simulation Theory (see section 2.4.6.6.) offers an etiological 
explanation: dreaming is an evolutionarily ancient form of consciousness, and thus, 
the world simulations in dreams do not reflect, or are not capable of simulating, 
novel cognitive accomplishments, such as reading and writing. Disabling self-
awareness and enhancing emotionality may reflect an ancient form of waking 
consciousness, and disabling motor activity and reflective consciousness may be 
necessary in order to run a realistic simulation at all without immediate motor or 
cognitive interruptions.
2.3.4. The relationship between sleep and dreaming
The currently available functional imaging methods in cognitive neuroscience, 
for example, single cell recordings, electroencephalography (EEG), 
magnetoencephalography (MEG), positron emission tomography (PET) and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), are producing increasingly detailed 
functional maps of the brain. Nevertheless, these maps seem only to illustrate which 
parts of the brain are active or inactive during a conscious experience. Thus, even 
though these methods have revealed which specific areas are somehow involved in 
particular task involving phenomenal consciousness, they have not explicated how 
these areas accomplish the task of creating phenomenal consciousness or what these 
activated areas are, in fact, doing that relates to the specific task. 
The neural correlates of sleep, including REM sleep, have been relatively well 
established, but the neural correlates of dreaming (or the mechanisms of the neural 
‘dream generator’ independent of sleep stages) are less clear. In the very first EEG 
studies on dreaming in the 1950’s, dreaming was identified with REM stage of 
sleep (Aserinsky & Kleitman, 1953; 1955; Dement, 1955; Dement & Kleitman, 
1957). Quite soon, however, the dissociation between sleep stages and dreaming 
was reliably established (Foulkes, 1962; for a review, see Nielsen, 2000). After 
that, all attempts to identify the neural correlates of dreaming seem to have 
failed, although in recent studies (for example, Esposito, Nielsen & Paquette, 
2004; Takeuchi, Ogilvie, Murphy & Ferrelli, 2003) appropriate experimental 
paradigms and new EEG analysis methods have been used. Regardless, no 
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systematic, replicable EEG correlates for dreaming per se (activity of the dream 
generator) have yet been reliably established.
More recently, fMRI and PET have been used to study brain activation during REM 
and different stages of NREM sleep. In different subjects and across several studies, a 
constant pattern of activated or deactivated brain areas during NREM and REM sleep 
have been observed, and these patterns differ significantly between NREM and REM 
sleep (Braun et al., 1997; Dang-Vu, Desseilles, Albouy, Darsaud, Gais, Rauchs, et al., 
2005; Hamann, Ely, Grafton & Kilts, 1999; Maquet, 2000; Maquet et al., 1996; 2004; 
Nofzinger et al., 1997). In only one of these studies, however, dreaming was controlled 
for (Maquet et al., 1996). Based on that, the functions performed by the activated/
deactivated brain areas during wakefulness have been suggested to correlate with the 
major dream content features (Schwartz, Dang-Vu, Ponz, Duhoux & Maquet, 2005; 
Schwartz & Maquet, 2002). Although the explanation seems intuitively appealing, 
and the matches between brain maps of REM sleep and dreaming are promising, these 
correlations may actually tell us very little about the neural constitutive mechanisms 
of dreaming. Quite the contrary, they may make the puzzle even more demanding to 
solve, as highlighted in the following. 
Even though dreaming is tightly coupled to REM stage of sleep, as the contents 
of dream consciousness are most vivid and clear in REM sleep dreams, REM 
sleep should not be confused with dreaming. Dreaming may occur independent 
of REM sleep, and REM sleep independent of dreaming (for example, Nielsen, 
2000). Solms (2000) has established that specific brain lesions can even selectively 
obliterate dreaming but preserve REM sleep (lesions to parieto-temporo-occipital 
junction and to ventro-mesial quadrant of frontal lobe), or preserve dreaming but 
obliterate REM sleep (brainstem lesions).Therefore, the neural mechanisms of the 
dream generator cannot be identical to the neural mechanisms of REM sleep, and 
thus brain maps corresponding to REM sleep may not correspond with brain maps 
of dreaming. Moreover, as dreaming can be present also in NREM sleep, and brain 
activation as measured by EEG, fMRI, and PET differs significantly between REM 
and NREM sleep, how can different types of brain activation patterns lead to similar 
phenomenal contents of consciousness?
Another question is whether dreaming is quantitatively and qualitatively similar 
in REM and NREM sleep. Dream recall in NREM awakenings is less frequent 
than in REM awakenings (Nielsen, 2000). Further, NREM dreams are usually 
significantly shorter than REM dreams, have less continuity between dream 
elements and are composed of fewer elements (Hobson et al., 2000; Strauch & 
Meier, 1996). NREM dreams are also more thought-like, while REM dreams 
include more hallucinatory characteristics (Fosse, Stickgold & Hobson, 2001; 
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Hobson et al., 2000). Nielsen (2000) suggests that in many studies addressing 
dreaming in NREM sleep, also simple and static sleep mentation reports have 
been interpreted as dreaming. He estimates that possibly only one tenth of 
NREM reports fulfil the criteria for dreaming. 
Nevertheless, when dream report length is controlled for, differences in the content 
of REM and NREM dreams largely disappear (Cavallero & Cicogna, 1993; 
Cavallero, Foulkes, Hollifield & Terry, 1990; Foulkes & Schmidt, 1983). Similarly, 
Fosse, Stickgold, and Hobson (2004) found that in successive NREM periods the 
hallucinatory characteristics of dreams increase while thought-likeness decreases, 
and on these characteristics the late night NREM dreams bear close resemblance 
to early night REM dreams. Thus, the debate whether or not REM and NREM 
dreams are qualitatively different, and thus produced by two separate dream 
generator mechanisms working independently in REM and NREM sleep, is still 
ongoing. This issue is, however, too extensive to be reviewed here. (For thorough 
reviews, see Hobson et al., 2000; Nielsen, 2000).
2.3.5. Summary
Dream research has, at least partially, accomplished the task of identifying and 
describing the statistically reliably occurring dream contents. In the present thesis, 
the definition of dreaming as formulated by Snyder (1970) and Revonsuo (2006) has 
been adopted. Dreaming is defined as multimodal, temporally progressing, complex, 
and organized contents of phenomenal consciousness during sleep that amount to a 
world simulation. This definition has been used in Studies I – VI, and thus, simple, 
static, and unimodal sleep mentation reports have not been investigated.
Although each dream experience is unique, dreams do generally share similar 
elements and themes. The author of the present thesis accepts that the form of dream 
experience is organized along the same lines as perceptual waking consciousness 
(Foulkes, 1985; Foulkes & Cavallero, 1993; Rechtschaffen & Buchignani, 1992; 
Strauch & Meier, 1996; Zadra et al., 1998), and the coherent dream world functions 
as a ‘credible multimodal world analog’ (Foulkes, 1985), or ‘a realistic facsimile’ 
(Snyder, 1970). Thus, I adopt the view that dreams are usually experienced, 
during dreaming, as real life (Revonsuo, 2000a; 2006). I have also described the 
relationship between sleep and dreaming to some extent, mainly to illustrate 
that constitutive level explanations (sleep physiology) cannot alone account as 
an explanation for dreaming. Etiological level and contextual level explanations 
need to be involved as well.
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2.4. Dreaming as the phenomenon under investigation: explanations for dream phenomena
There are many competing explanations for dreaming in cognitive neuroscience and 
psychology, such as the random activation theories, the continuity hypothesis, and 
the psychological, cognitive and neurocognitive theories. In addition, recent interest 
in evolutionary psychology has given rise to several explanations in the evolutionary 
context, such as the psychological problem solving and creativity function, costly 
signaling function, dreaming as play, and the various social simulation hypotheses. 
Some explanations focus on a single explanatory level, such as on the neural 
correlates or constituents of dreaming, while others focus on the etiological or the 
contextual levels. In this section, I will present the strengths and weaknesses of these 
alternative explanations for dreaming in the light of empirical evidence.
2.4.1. Random activation theories
 In random activation theories (RATs)1, dreaming is seen as a mere side-effect of the 
neurophysiological processes going on during REM sleep, having no independent 
function on its own (for example, Antrobus, 2000; Crick & Mitchison, 1983; 1995; 
Flanagan, 1995; 2000; Hobson, 1988; Hobson & McCarley, 1977; Hobson et al., 
2000). These theories include the following central claims; first, the neurophysiological 
processes operating during REM sleep are seen as functional; second, dreaming is 
an epiphenomenon, brought about by the random neurophysiological activity in 
REM sleep; and third, thus dreaming in itself serves no function. Dreaming, as a 
biological process, is seen as a selectively neutral side effect of “what the brain is 
doing, the function(s) it is performing during sleep” (Flanagan, 1995, p. 10). The 
phenomenal dream experience does not have adaptive significance and therefore it 
was not selected for, but as it has no maladaptive consequences either, it has survived 
(Antrobus, 1993; Flanagan, 1995). 
The RAT’s explain the process of dreaming as a result of the random activation 
of emotional and memory networks. The mechanisms that actively generate 
the sleep state are located in the brainstem, and the sleep related activation (for 
example, the activation of REM- on and REM-off cells, ponto-geniculo-occipital 
(PGO) -waves) leaks over to the emotional and memory networks, resulting in 
the random activation of these systems. This random activation is then bound into 
dream narratives by the forebrain, as it is trying to interpret the brain activation as 
it normally does while awake.
The narrative and meaningful nature of dream experience follows from the 
forebrain’s attempt to make sense of the random activation (Hobson, 1988; Hobson 
& McCarley, 1977; Hobson et al., 2000), and thus it is argued that random activation 
1  The term random activation theory is adopted from Revonsuo (2000b).
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can lead to organized phenomenal experience. First, as the most recent memory 
traces encoded into the long term memory are high in saliency, and thus primed 
in the network, the random activation of the networks leads to the activation of 
most recent memories. Therefore, day residues and recent events are more often 
represented in dreams than events long past. Second, the random activation 
explains high levels of bizarreness in dreams. As memories are randomly activated, 
the forebrain has difficulties in making sense of the mixed material and weaving 
together a coherent narrative. In addition, as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is 
deactivated during REM sleep, the forebrain runs into difficulties in binding the 
randomly activated memories together (Hobson, 1988; Hobson & McCarley, 1977; 
Hobson et al., 2000). Third, most of the basic human emotions are negative, and 
as the emotional networks are randomly activated, the stimulation is more likely 
to lead to the activation of negative than positive memory traces (Flanagan, 2000). 
Consequently, dream content is emotionally negatively toned. 
The random activation theories cannot, however, explain the most prominent 
features of dreaming. Dream content has a predictable and well-organized form 
that consists of a realistic visuo-spatial world full of objects, persons and events that 
interact with each other and the dream self. The production of such an organized 
conscious experience requires coordinated interaction between several cognitive 
modules in the brain that are in charge of orientation to three dimensional visuo-
spatial environment, emotion processing, motor coordination, as well as perception 
of, for example, objects, faces, places, and motion. The brain activation studies (Braun 
et al., 1997; Dang-Vu et al., 2005; Maquet, 1999; 2000; Maquet et al., 1996; 2004; 
Nofzinger et al., 1997) confirm that multiple brain areas involved in such functions 
are active during REM sleep. 
As Revonsuo (2000b) has pointed out, other forms of random brain activation, 
for instance, epileptic seizures ( Johanson, Revonsuo, Chaplin & Wedlund, 2003; 
Johanson, Valli, Revonsuo & Wedlund, 2008; Johanson, Valli, Revonsuo, Chaplin & 
Wedlund, 2008), migraine (Morrison, 1990), and random artificial brain stimulation 
(Gloor, 1990) do not cause complexly structured, organized and narratively coherent 
subjective experiences, but result in reports of random phenomenology. Truly random 
brain activation seems to elicit most of the time no experiences at all, or only a 
mixture of static images or quickly passing affective states. Why would the brain 
make sense of random activation patterns during sleep by constructing complex 
multimodal dream experiences, but not manage to do this during wakefulness? More 
plausibly, in the case of dreams the brain activation is not random to begin with, but 
organized, and therefore results in well-structured and organized phenomenology. 
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The random activation theorists also seem to overemphasize the bizarre nature of 
dreams, and regard bizarreness as evidence that dreams are disorganized. The high 
level of bizarreness and disorganization in dreams is, however, taken for granted, 
and the assumption is not based on empirical evidence acquired through detailed 
quantitative studies assessing the frequency and nature of bizarre elements. Most 
dream elements seem to be, in fact, in harmony with comparable waking perceptions, 
whereas only 20% deviate from or contradict with waking perception (Revonsuo & 
Salmivalli, 1995). Thus, even though bizarreness is a regular and striking feature 
of dreams, it is a mild deviation from otherwise well-organized experience. 
Consequently, RAT’s can explain the bizarre nature of dreams as a consequence 
of random activation, but fail to explain the well-organized and coherent nature of 
dreaming.   
In sum, the random activation theories offer an explanation for how dreams are 
generated, and how dream content is constructed, that is, an explanation belonging 
to the constitutive level, and proximate etiological level. However, dreaming and its 
qualitative features are considered to be spandrels, haphazard by-products of brain 
activation during REM sleep. Thus, there is no need to evoke any developmental 
or ultimate level etiological explanations or contextual level explanations regarding 
why dreams are generated and why dreams have the qualitative features they have.
2.4.2. Continuity hypothesis
The continuity hypothesis (CH) (Domhoff, 2003; Schredl, 2000; Schredl & 
Hofmann, 2003) states that there is a continuum between waking experiences and 
experiences within dreams in a way that dreaming reflects waking life experiences, 
but no specific function for dreaming is assigned. Several studies actually demonstrate 
that waking events are reflected in dream content. Up to 65% of dream elements 
can be linked to waking experiences, and isolated spatial or temporal features of 
memories have been found to occur in approximately one third of dream reports 
(Fosse, Fosse, Hobson & Stickgold, 2003). However, exact episodic memory replays 
are present only in about 1% of dream reports. It has also been demonstrated that 
episodic memories are depicted in dreams most likely on the subsequent night, and 
again about a week later (the so-called dream lag effect) (Nielsen, Kuiken, Alain, 
Stenstrom & Powell, 2004; Nielsen & Powell, 1989; Nielsen & Stenstrom, 2005; 
Powell, Cheung, Nielsen & Cervenka, 1995). 
The most general form of CH seems to predict that the frequency and nature of 
any real events will be correlated with the frequency and nature of similar dream 
events in subsequent dream content. As CH assumes a direct relationship between 
waking and dreaming experiences, it runs into difficulties in failing to explain why 
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certain elements frequently present in waking life are mainly absent from dreams, 
such as reading, writing and using a computer (Hartmann, 2000; Schredl, 2000; 
Schredl & Hofmann, 2003). The CH cannot explain the negativity bias of dream 
emotions, either. Negative emotions are more frequent than positive emotions in 
dreams, but the ratio of positive and negative affect in waking life has been reported 
to be exactly the opposite (for a review, see Diener & Diener, 1996). Similarly, 
the continuity hypothesis cannot account for why incorporation of infrequent life 
events, such as trauma, occurs repetitively (for example, Barrett, 1996; Hartmann, 
1984; 1996; Nader, Pynoos, Fairbanks & Frederick, 1990; Pynoos & Nader, 1988; 
Pynoos et al., 1987; Terr, 1979; 1983; 1990; Wilmer, 1996). 
In fact, the specific predictions and hypotheses of CH have not been described in a 
clear manner. Furthermore, CH does not claim anything about the possible function 
of the continuity between dreaming and waking, but, as it has been demonstrated 
that some waking life experiences are incorporated into dream content, rather states 
the obvious. What is lacking here is the specification for why some autobiographical 
memory elements are more likely to be incorporated into dream content than others.
To summarize, the continuity hypothesis does not explicate any constitutive level or 
contextual level explanations for dreaming, but offers a proximate level etiological 
explanation. Waking experiences are stored into long term memory, and then 
activated semi-randomly during sleep. By semi-randomly I refer to the fact that 
CH assumes that the ratio of specific dream experiences is equal to the ratio of 
comparable waking experiences, although the emotional concerns of the dreamer 
may to some degree affect the activation of memory traces. This semi-random 
activation, nevertheless, leads to an organized and coherent dream experience 
which is not plagued by inherent bizarreness. The CH does not imply that dreaming 
has any effects on or interacts with other mental or cognitive phenomena (such 
as memory) or overt behaviour. Thus, the CH cannot be considered including a 
contextual level explanation for dreaming, as contextual level explanations require a 
causal relationship between dreaming and other mental or cognitive phenomena so 
that the organism somehow benefits from this causal interaction. 
2.4.3. The cognitive theory of dreaming 
Foulkes’s (1985; 1999) cognitive theory on dreaming states that dreaming is 
instigated by random and diffuse memory activation. First, a variety of different 
memory elements are activated from long term memory in a random or semi-random 
manner. Second, a specific dream production system organizes the activated memory 
elements into a comprehensible, coherent dream narrative. The dream production 
system is composed of subsystems. One system utilizes our knowledge of narratives 
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or scripts, that is, information of typical sequences of events, and arranges memory 
elements accordingly. Another system, the visuo-spatial component, is in charge of 
constructing recognizable kinematic mental images. 
Foulkes (1985; 1999) acknowledges that during sleep internal brain activation is 
the primary source of memory activation. Thus, Foulkes’s (1985; 1999) model is 
compatible with the RATs in the sense that dream content is constructed from 
randomly activated memories. The cognitive theory is also in accordance with the 
CH in that waking life events (typical sequences of events) are reflected in dreams. 
Similarly, Foulkes (1985; 1999) does not assign any meaningful function for dream 
content, although acknowledges that dreams may be meaningful for the person 
having the dreams. Regardless, dreaming did not evolve to serve any adaptive 
function, but is rather a reflection of the activation of normal memory and thought 
processes during sleep. 
The cognitive theory of dreaming (Foulkes, 1982; 1985; 1999) implies that children’s 
dreaming is different from adults’ dreaming, because it is dependent on memory and 
thought processes which develop with age. In fact, Foulkes conducted numerous 
laboratory studies with child participants of varying ages, awakening them from 
both NREM and REM sleep stages. The conclusions of Foulkes (1982; 1985; 1999) 
indicate developmental trends in dreaming. First, the younger the children were, the 
less dreams they could recall and the shorter the dream reports were. Second, as the 
children matured, the more complex the dreams became. Self-involvement, activity 
and emotional content became more frequent. At the same time, measures on 
visuo-spatial performance correlated with dream reporting, and Foulkes suggested 
(1982) that visuo- spatial skills are utilized in dream construction, and correlate 
with complexity of dream content. Thus, memory, thought and language processes 
affect how organized and frequent dream experiences are.
The cognitive theory of dreaming utilizes constitutive level, proximate and 
developmental etiological level, and contextual level explanations. Although it 
provides no analysis of the constitutive level mechanisms, it seems to accept the 
mechanisms proposed in random activation theories. The activation of memory 
sources leads to cognitive processing, binding the activated memory information 
together in the sleeping brain. Thus, proximate level etiological explanations are 
included in the cognitive theory. The cognitive theory also addresses questions such as 
how dreaming develops during ontogeny, and how dreaming relates to other mental 
phenomena, offering developmental level etiological explanations and contextual 
level explanations for dreaming. The only level of explanation missing in Foulkes’s 
(1985; 1999) theory is the ultimate etiological level, that is, the evolutionary causal 
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explanation for why the brain produces dreams. Foulkes (1985; 1999), in fact, claims 
that such an explanation does not apply to dreaming.
The cognitive theory of dreaming is partially subject to the same criticism as 
random activation theories. If memory elements are activated in a random or 
semi-random manner, how does a coherent dream narrative follow? In addition, 
why are some autobiographical memory elements, such as misfortunes, more 
frequently selected from long term memory than other types of events? The 
cognitive theory does not, however, need to be greatly modified to account for 
selective dream content. A postulation that the memory activation process is 
not random would suffice.
2.4.4. The neurocognitive model of dreaming
The neurocognitive model presented by Domhoff (2003) is built on the previously 
reviewed theories on dreaming. The model takes for granted that constitutive level 
mechanisms, both neural and cognitive, explain how dreaming is constructed. It 
states that dreaming occurs when specific neural networks, mainly limbic, paralimbic 
and associative area of the forebrain, are activated in the absence of external stimuli. 
Apparently this activation is not regarded as random, as Domhoff (2003) accepts 
that dream content is coherent. 
Dream content is constructed from the same memory systems as waking thoughts, 
and dream elements are continuous with waking experiences (Domhoff, 2003). The 
neurocognitive model also acknowledges that dreaming is a cognitive achievement 
that is gradually attained during ontogeny. What the neurocognitive model does 
not accept is that dreams have any purpose or function beyond being possibly 
psychologically meaningful to the person having the dreams. Rather, dreaming is 
seen as a spandrel of two evolutionary adaptations, sleep and consciousness. 
The neurocognitive model integrates previous theories, and aims to explain dreaming 
on constitutive, proximate and developmental etiological, and contextual levels. The 
neurocognitive model seems to avoid many pitfalls present in previous theories, as 
it is, in fact, a novel combination of the theories presented by other theorists. What 
is valuable in the neurocognitive approach is that Domhoff (2003) emphasizes that 
a theory of dreaming should take into account the detailed information provided by 
content analysis studies on dreams. Many previous theories have ignored the nature 
of the phenomenon to be explained.
The downside of the neurocognitive theory, as presented by Domhoff (2003), is 
that no new, complete theory is actually formulated. Consequently, no specific 
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predictions are outlined, and no new experiments are described to test them. The 
neurocognitive model is rather a description of where dream research stands at the 
moment, a demonstration of the shortcomings of previous theories, and a suggestion 
how a neurocognitive perspective should be incorporated into future theories. 
2.4.5. Psychological function theories
2.4.5.1. Dreams as protectors of sleep
Freud’s (1900/1965) theory of dreams has been one of the most influential dream 
theories in psychology, affecting subsequent theory formation and clinical practice. 
Freud (1900/1965) suggested that dreams relieve the psychological tension that 
builds up during the preceding day. The function of dreams is to protect sleep by 
disguising unconscious wishes, often of infantile sexual or aggressive nature, that 
undisguised would provoke anxiety and awaken the dreamer. Dreams, by offering 
an outlet for undesired wishes in a veiled form, thus function as a psychological 
tension release mechanism, and allow the dreamer to continue sleep in the shadow 
of manifest dream content.
Dreams also function as wish-fulfilment, but the wishes, the latent dream content, 
need to be disguised for their anxiety provoking effects. This is accomplished by 
dream work that transforms the undesired wishes to manifest dream content using 
dream symbols. The latent dream content can then only be accessed by interpreting 
the symbols of the manifest content, and thereof revealing the true meaning of 
dreams. Freud (1900/1965) acknowledged that dreams need to be interpreted case 
by case, but assumed also that perhaps there are universal symbols that remain the 
same from dream to dream and dreamer to dreamer.
Freud’s dream theory has proven to be problematic. First, it includes numerous 
methodological problems and is empirically untestable. Second, many of the 
assumptions of his theory have proven to be false, in contradiction with accumulated 
empirical evidence (for a review, see Domhoff, 2003). Nevertheless, Freud has 
not been forgotten. Not only is dream interpretation still widely used in the 
psychoanalytic paradigm, but recently Solms (1997; 2000; 2003), the founder of 
neuro-psychoanalysis, has defended Freud’s theoretical claims. 
Solms (1997; 2003) advocates Freud’s idea that dreams are protectors of sleep. He 
presents convincing evidence that dreaming is controlled by dopaminergic forebrain 
mechanisms (1997; 2000). As the dopaminergic forebrain system is seen as the basis 
for the appetitive system, involved in goal-seeking behavior and pleasure (for example, 
as a site of action of stimulants such as amphetamine and cocaine), Solms draws the 
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conclusion that Freud’s psychological concept ‘libido’ corresponds neurobiologically to 
the brain’s seeking system. Because dreaming is controlled by the appetitive ‘curiosity-
interest-expectancy’ system, the activation of this system, inhibited during sleep from 
leading to motor behavior, can be compared to Freud’s idea of wish-fulfilment dreams 
that protect sleep (Solms, 1997; 2003). There is, however, very little evidence that 
nondreamers sleep worse than dreamers; that dreams have wish-fulfilment content; 
or that dreams disguise anything (Domhoff, 2003). Thus, Freud’s and Solms’ views do 
not seem to be sound explanations for dreaming.
2.4.5.2. Psychotherapeutic function of dreams
In dream psychology the most popular suggestion at the moment is that dreaming 
serves a psychotherapeutic function and maintains our psychological well-being 
by helping us adjust to current life stress and recover after traumatic experiences 
(Cartwright, 1996; Hartmann, 1995; 1996; 1998). In the psychological theories of the 
function of dreaming the emphasis is on the individual’s psychological adaptation to 
his current waking life. Dreaming is seen as psychologically functional if it somehow 
enhances the individual’s coping capabilities to his current waking concerns, solves 
current waking life problems and promotes psychological well-being, even helps 
to recover from traumatic experiences (for example, Adler, 1927; Hartmann, 1995, 
1996, 1998; Jung, 1933; Kramer, 1991; 1993). Thus, an emotional problem-solving 
function is attributed to dreams. Empirical evidence does indeed show that dream 
content reflects the current emotional problems of the dreamer (Hartmann, 1998; 
Kramer, 1993), and the incorporation of waking stressors, in a form of posttraumatic 
nightmares, is especially strong after exposure to a life-threatening event (for example, 
Barrett, 1996; Hartmann, 1984; 1996; Nader et al., 1990; Pynoos & Nader, 1988; 
Pynoos et al., 1987; Terr, 1979; 1983; 1990; Wilmer, 1996). 
In psychological theories the findings that we dream of stressful and traumatic real 
life events have been taken as evidence that dreams fulfil psychological healing 
functions. The logic behind psychological theories on dream function seems to 
be the following: Continuity exists between dream content and waking thoughts 
(for example, Foulkes, 1985; Domhoff, 1996; 2003; Hartmann, 1995; 1996; 1998). 
Dream production mechanism automatically selects memory traces form long term 
memory and these memories are then depicted in dream content. The memory 
traces most recently encoded or activated and the ones with highest emotional 
saliency are primed in memory networks and become selected for dream production. 
Consequently, stressful and emotionally occupying memory traces are repeated in 
dreams. During dreaming, these memory traces are integrated with other material 
in the memory networks (“making connections in a safe place”; Hartmann, 1995) 
to make the dreamer better adapted to the experience, and to diminish the saliency 
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of the memory trace. Dreaming thus works as an internal psychotherapist, helping 
to adjust to current stressors and promoting well-being. 
The continuity principle and the repetition dimension (Domhoff, 2003) of dreams 
are especially evident after exposure to traumatic event (Hartmann, 1995; 1996; 
1998). First, the traumatic event is depicted in dreams in a similar fashion as it 
occurred in reality, as those memory traces are of highest saliency for the dream 
production system. Gradually the traumatic experience is integrated with other 
material in the memory networks, and the saliency of the memory trace diminishes. 
As a consequence of successful integration of traumatic memories, posttraumatic 
dreams decrease and dream content gradually normalizes. Therefore, dreaming 
about the trauma aids the recovery process, and is functional. If dreams fail to 
make any useful or new connections in the memory networks and the integration 
process is not successful, the saliency of the traumatic memory does not diminish 
and the healing process does not proceed. Repetitive posttraumatic nightmares may 
follow. As posttraumatic nightmares disrupt sleep and cause psychological distress 
in themselves, especially if they continue for a long time after the original trauma 
(as in Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, PTSD), posttraumatic nightmares have been 
interpreted as a failure in dream function (Kramer, 1993). 
The psychological healing function theories try to explain dreaming on constitutive, 
etiological, and contextual levels. The theories assume that dream content is not 
randomly constructed, but is based on specific activation patterns of most salient 
memory traces. Although the theories do not explicate how exactly memory 
activation occurs on a constitutive level, they must assume neural level processes 
behind dream phenomena, and that specifically the emotional concerns of the 
dreamer guide memory activation. Similarly, the theories do not explicitly describe 
how proximate and developmental level etiological processes contribute to dreaming, 
but trust that the reason why the specific activation patterns have developed lies in 
the usefulness of dream imagery for the psychological well-being of the individual. 
Contextual level explanations are included in the psychological benefit theories, as 
dreaming is tied to psychological well-being and other mental phenomena. What 
is missing in psychological healing theories is the ultimate level explanation (except 
for Hartmann, 1996; 1998; see section 2.4.6.2.), and also, more detailed descriptions 
of constitutive, proximate and developmental causes.  
The central logic of psychological healing function theories seems to be misguided, 
however. This misconception follows from the assumption that dreaming somehow 
causes recovery. In contrast, equally conceivable explanation is that dreaming about 
the traumatic event only reflects the recovery process and therefore correlates with 
dreaming content. Second, psychological theories face a dilemma in stating that 
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dreaming about stressful and traumatic events is important in order to cope with 
them, but that the emotional problem solving function of dreams may fail if the 
integration process is not successful, leading to recurrent posttraumatic nightmares. 
To begin with, where can we draw the line between functional and dysfunctional 
dreaming? Moreover, does not the healing function of dreams fail too often, as any 
severe enough trauma probably will lead to persisting posttraumatic nightmares 
in almost any person? Furthermore, even after successful recovery from trauma, 
posttraumatic nightmares, that is, dysfunctional dreaming may be re-triggered by 
any stimulus reminding the person about the traumatic event. If the true function 
of dreams is to promote psychological well-being, why the process has to be labeled 
dysfunctional so regularly? 
In addition, psychological theories face problems in defining testable empirical 
predictions. The exact predictions derived from these theories have not been put 
forward in sufficient detail, and consequently empirical scientists are in trouble 
when trying to prove the psychological theories either true or false. Without precise 
predictions and hypotheses, one does not know what kind of evidence would be 
needed to confirm or falsify these theories. 
A related problem is that these theories do not differentiate whether it is the process 
of dreaming (the ability to hallucinate during sleep), or the dream content (what is 
being hallucinated), that is functional. Thus far, most studies based on the assumption 
about the emotional problem solving function of dreaming have concentrated on 
testing whether dream content, that is, dreaming about certain types of occurrences 
enhances psychological well-being. Consequently, testable hypotheses should be 
formulated about what kind of dream content is functional and aids adjustment to 
current life stressors. Nonetheless, studies on dream content can only tell us about 
the functionality of dream content, not about the functionality of the capacity to 
dream. The functionality of the capacity to dream can only be established in studies 
comparing people who are unable to dream or at least very poor recallers (indicating 
low frequency of dreaming) vs. frequent dreamers to test whether frequent dreamers 
are better adjusted to comparable life situations, regardless of their dream content. 
Regardless of the theoretical problems discussed above, some studies have been 
conducted on the emotional problem solving capacity of dreams. Thus far, the 
results on the possible mental health functions of dreaming are unclear about 
whether frequent dreaming or dreaming about certain types of occurrences reduces 
the negative psychological consequences induced by real life concerns and traumas. 
Cartwright (1996) studied the dreams of depressed and nondepressed women 
undergoing a divorce, and found that the depressed women’s dream content 
was emotionally more negative, and that the depressed group was more likely to 
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incorporate their spouse as a character in dreams. In a follow-up study a year later, 
those depressed women who had dreamt about their spouse were better adjusted 
to the divorce situation than those whose dreams did not incorporate the spouse 
(Cartwright, 1996). This study does not, however, offer a causal explanation for the 
possible mental health effect of dreaming about the spouse, only a correlation. 
Punamäki (1997) has studied the role of dreaming in protecting mental health in a 
sample of Palestinian children. The sample was the same as in Study V of the present 
thesis. Generally, traumatized children recalled more dreams than nontraumatized 
children, and their dreams were less bizarre and included more emotionally negative 
themes. Both frequent and infrequent dream recall was associated with psychological 
symptoms: high recall was related to depressive symptoms while low recall to somatic 
and anxiety symptoms (Punamäki, 1997). Furthermore, exposure to traumatic events 
was more important factor in predicting psychological symptoms than dream recall 
frequency. In sum, the study did not allow any conclusion about whether frequent 
dreaming (as measured by dream recall) would serve a positive mental health function 
in the recovery from trauma. It did, however, reveal that trauma leads to increased 
dream recall, and to more realistic and negatively toned dream content.
In a more recent study, Punamäki, Ali, Ismail and Nuutinen (2005) explored the 
mental health function of dreaming in a sample of severely traumatized and less 
traumatized Kurdish children (the same sample as in Study IV of the present 
thesis). The less traumatized children had more pleasant dreams, and these appeared 
to have a possible protective mental health function, as less severe psychopathology 
was associated with pleasant atmosphere, complete narrative and happy endings in 
dreams. In contrast, the severely traumatized children’s dreams were characterized 
by unpleasant atmosphere, lack of bizarreness, low narrative quality and vividness. 
These children also reported more nightmares. Poorer mental health adjustment to 
the traumatic events was associated with dreams including mundane death themes, 
realistic horror scenes, active participation by the dreamer and unhappy endings 
(Punamäki et al., 2005). Consequently, dreaming after traumatic experience 
(mostly consisting of negative and unpleasant themes) did not seem to improve the 
psychological well-being of the children, quite the contrary. 
Altogether, the suggestion that working through traumatic material in dreams is 
beneficial for mental health seems to be misleading. Rather, after acute trauma 
pleasant and consoling dreams would be needed to diminish psychological distress. 
As posttraumatic dreams rarely offer such pleasant themes, while displaying 
repetitive and realistic simulations of the original life threatening and terrifying 
events, the theories about of the protective mental heath function of dreams appear 
unsupported by empirical evidence derived from systematic dream content studies. 
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Furthermore, the view that dreams help us adapt to real-life problems and traumas 
seems to include the misguided biological assumption that life should be free of 
pain and psychological suffering. Quite the contrary, these responses (for instance, 
fear, anxiety, distress, posttraumatic nightmares) can be seen as biologically adaptive 
responses to dangerous events in the environment that guide us to avoid such events 
in the future. Any theory attributing a function for dreaming should thus be able to 
account for all forms of dreaming, including posttraumatic nightmares.
2.4.6. The evolutionary function of dreams
The theories put forth to explain the form, content, and function of dreaming 
from an evolutionary biological or psychological perspective all involve an ultimate 
etiological or backward-looking dimension of explanation for dreaming. Different 
evolutionary theories include constitutive and contextual level explanations, as well 
as proximate and developmental level explanations, to varying degrees. This section 
deals exclusively with the various evolutionary theories that have been suggested 
for the function of dreaming. Majority of these theories have also been reviewed in 
Valli and Revonsuo (2007).  
2.4.6.1. The sentinel function
Perhaps the first theory to explicitly present an evolutionary biological approach 
to sleep and dreaming was presented already in the 1960’s (Snyder, 1966). Snyder 
(1966) had noticed that REM sleep is unique only for mammals, and suggested that 
REM sleep provided early mammals with a selective advantage over the reptiles 
that dominated the planet when mammals evolved. While long periods of sleep 
allowed early mammals to minimize metabolic requirements, it also rendered them 
vulnerable to predators. The selective advantage of REM sleep was to guard the 
safety of the sleeping animal. 
Snyder’s (1966) theory is based on the findings that the REM stage of sleep is 
energetically costly, and that natural selection does not retain costly characteristics 
unless they provide advantages. REM sleep increases the activity level of the brain 
and prepares the animal for a brief awakening that takes place after each REM 
period. If during the awakening danger is detected, the activity level of the brain is 
already high, and the animal is prepared for immediate fight or flight. Snyder (1966) 
called this the sentinel function of REM sleep. 
The sentinel theory as such does not state anything about dreaming, but Snyder 
(1966) also proposed that non-human mammals dream during REM sleep. The 
nature of their dream imagery is modulated by the latest estimate of expected danger 
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at the time of waking up. If the available evidence from the environment predicts 
approaching danger, the dream will prepare the animal for fight or flight. If no 
dangers are in sight, then the dreams will preserve continuity of sleep with pleasant 
dreams. Thus, the evolutionary function of dream content is to be predictive of and 
preparatory for the situation where the animal finds itself immediately after the 
currently ongoing REM dream.
The sentinel function theory includes constitutive, proximate and ultimate 
etiological, and contextual level explanations, but not developmental level etiological 
explanations. REM sleep physiology is seen as the neural correlate or constituent 
of dreaming, which is affected by the environmental cues surrounding the sleeping 
animal. The sentinel theory also places dreaming in the context of fight-or-flight 
–behavior, that is, explains how constitutive level neural mechanisms affect behavior 
(contextual level) through phenomenal consciousness. Finally, the sentinel theory 
assigns an adaptive function for dreaming, an explanation of why dreaming was 
beneficial for early mammals. 
Just because Snyder’s (1966) sentinel function theory places the function of dreaming 
to the context of REM sleep evolution, it makes the theory difficult to test, as 
we know nothing of what ancient mammals dreamed about, not even whether 
they dreamed at all. This, of course, applies to modern mammalian species as well. 
What we do know from human studies is that external stimuli, such as sounds, 
smells, or tactile experiences are detected by the sleeping brain as activity in specific 
sensory cortices increases when stimuli are presented. However, these stimuli are 
not easily incorporated into dream content (Farthing, 1992). Thus, if incorporation 
is infrequent, how would the animal brain be able to predict approaching danger 
from external environmental cues?
2.4.6.2. The psychological problem solving and creativity function
Hartmann, who has suggested a psychological healing function for dreams, has also 
proposed that the capacity of dreaming to form new connections within the neural 
networks of the brain might have served two functions useful for our ancestors 
(1996; 1998). Hartmann’s first evolutionary argument concerns the idea that 
dreaming, as a process making new connections, has a kind of psychotherapeutic 
function, especially in handling traumatic experiences: 
 “....one hundred thousand years or so ago, when the human brain was gradually 
developing to its present form, our lives were considerably more traumatic; the 
after-effects of trauma may well have been an everyday reality and the resolving 
of trauma a constant necessity....”  (Hartmann, 1996, p. 158)
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Hartmann’s second evolutionary proposal is that the making of broader and wider 
associations during dreaming might have helped in bringing material together in 
new ways and this would have been beneficial to our ancestors in their waking lives 
(1998). Dreams might have provided new innovations in exploiting resources and 
solving problems related to everyday life. This particular argument emphasizes the 
creative and problem solving nature of dreams.
“….the functions of dreaming… may have been especially important for us at earlier 
times in our species’ development…Only our dreams gave us a chance to do this – to 
make broader and wider connections…. and also to bring material together in new 
ways that occasionally might have been useful to us in our waking lives.” 
(Hartmann, 1998, p. 209) 
In sum, Hartmann suggests, at least indirectly, that the evolutionary origin of the 
function(s) of dreaming is in the ancestral environment where life was dangerous, 
trauma resolution was required on a daily basis, and creative new ideas could have 
provided valuable selective advantage. Individuals who were able to regain emotional 
balance and well-being after trauma were better off than those who did not, and 
therefore the psychotherapeutic function of dreaming was selected for and became 
a universal feature of the human mind. Similarly, individuals with creative problem 
solving dreams were better adapted to their environment and consequently left 
more offspring than individuals not having extra help from their dreams. 
The psychological adaptation and creativity function assigned for dreaming carries 
all the same strengths as psychological function theories presented in section 
2.4.5. Moreover, the ultimate level etiological explanations offered by Hartmann 
(1996; 1998) give an account, in fact two accounts, for why dreaming might have 
evolved and been selected for. In traditional psychology, the term adaptive is 
used in a sense referring to the capability of the individual to psychologically 
adjust to current life situations. In contrast, in evolutionary psychology the term 
adaptive refers to whether the design enhances fitness in interaction with current 
environment, and the term adaptation to whether the design was adaptive in the 
ancestral environment and thus selected for. Hartmann (1996, 1998) seems to be 
thus far the only advocate of psychological dream function theories who implies, 
although indirectly, that the emotional problem solving function of dreams might 
have also fulfilled biological functions in the ancestral environment, and would 
therefore be an adaptation. 
Nevertheless, the same problems that plague psychological dream function theories 
apply also to psychological adaptation theory. Dreaming does not seem to be adaptive 
in the sense that it would maintain psychological well-being, or aid in recovery 
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after experiencing traumatic events. Neither does dreaming seem to be equipped to 
provide us new insightful solutions to everyday problems (Blagrove, 1992). 
2.4.6.3. Costly signaling theory
McNamara (2004) has put forth a distinct evolutionary hypothesis about the 
function of dreaming, the costly signaling theory (CST). The CST builds on the 
concept of costly signaling which first emerged in the context of sexual selection 
theory presented by Trivers (1972). Sexual selection theory suggests that some 
traits have evolved because they signal the fitness of the bearer to members of the 
opposite sex. The more resources the organism has to allocate for the production of 
a particular trait, that is, the higher the costs of producing that trait, the more honest 
is the advertisement of “having good genes”. When members of the opposite sex 
can enhance their own fitness by selecting mates who possess good genes, they will 
favor individuals displaying costly, and thus honest and hard to fake -signals. 
McNamara’s (2004) hypothesis of the function of REM sleep and dreaming is 
grounded on the fact that REM sleep involves high metabolic costs for the organism. 
The costs result from such physiological changes taking place during REM as 
high levels of brain activation (especially in limbic and amygdaloid areas involved in 
emotional information processing), increases in cardiac and respiratory rates, paralysis 
of skeletal muscles, rapid eye movements and limb twitches, thermoregulatory lapses, 
changes in growth hormone release and penile erections. Furthermore, during REM 
sleep, the most vivid and emotionally salient, often unpleasant dreams, are experienced. 
McNamara argues that these features are not just side-effects of other REM functions, 
but REM sleep was particularly selected for these properties as they are costly traits and 
offer fitness benefits that justify the costs. 
According to McNamara (2004), REM features influence dream content and affect 
the mood states and emotional displays of the individual during following wake 
periods, regardless of whether specific dream content is remembered or not. The 
individual is, in fact, emotionally “handicapped” by his dreams the subsequent day, 
especially when dream content has been negative or unpleasant. The emotional 
burden is the greatest after having a highly memorable negative dream that has 
already placed the dreamer into an emotionally awkward position, such as finding 
one self naked in public or being chased or attacked. 
As dream content affects subsequent emotional tone and thereof behavioral displays, 
the emotional signals emitted by the individual during wakefulness are honest and 
hard to fake. The emotional signals, in turn, affect how the individual engages in 
communicative interchanges and social interactions. If the individual is able to 
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display appropriate and functional behavior despite of the emotional burden that is 
carried into waking realm, that is, exhibit behaviors that act as fitness cues, he or she 
is more likely to be favored by other group members, for example, selected as a mate 
or preferred over others in cooperative alliances. 
In sum, McNamara (2004) suggests that costly REM features affect dream content, 
and, through producing hard to fake emotional signals, increase fitness by facilitating 
cooperative social interactions or courtship displays. Thus, if REM sleep and 
dreams are the primary source for the production of costly emotional signals that 
are difficult to fake, then REM sleep and dreaming are essential for all human 
communication and social behavior. The costly signaling theory therefore offers 
constitutive level (REM sleep), etiological level (fitness benefit), and contextual 
level (behaviour) explanations for dreaming, although it does not explicate any 
developmental level explanation.
The problem is that the CST does not specify how exactly behavior is affected 
by REM sleep and dreaming. What is needed here is the definition of what 
the external behavioral cues are, supposedly modulated by preceding REM 
sleep and dreaming, that the other group members can monitor and evaluate. 
Unlike typical costly features that play a role in mate selection (for example, the 
peacock’s tail), the costly features of REM sleep and dreaming might not be as 
such directly observable. Nevertheless, some directly observable characteristics 
must be highly and reliably correlated with REM sleep and dreaming so that 
by preferring the observable features, the costly features of REM sleep and 
dreaming would consequently be selected for, albeit indirectly. Furthermore, we 
should be able to verify that other group members actually find these behavioral 
cues desirable and that the cues affect favorably the selection of the individual 
as a mate or cooperative party. 
2.4.6.4. Dreaming as play
A common theme in most of the evolutionary psychological theories is that 
dreaming is regarded as an off-line simulation of the sensory-perceptual, motor, 
and social space that we experience during wakefulness. Dreams have been regarded 
similar to play behavior (Bulkeley, 2004; Cheyne, 2000; Humphrey, 2000; Peterson 
& DeYoung, 2000), and there are indeed several similarities between dreams and 
play, but also a number of dissimilarities (for a review, see McNamara, 2004). Both 
are limited (in their clearest forms) to mammals only. Both can simulate reality 
and rehearse real situations and interactions in a safe context. Both may exaggerate, 
transform, and display an enormous variation of behaviors that are originally 
related to other contexts outside play. Both are energetically costly, biologically 
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programmed behaviors that should therefore be in some way useful. In sum, the 
view that dreaming equals to play rehearsal include ultimate etiological, as well 
as contextual, level explanations, but do not address constitutive or proximate or 
developmental level explanations.
Although there are several similarities between dreams and play, (Bulkeley, 2004; 
Cheyne, 2000; Humphrey, 2000; Peterson & DeYoung, 2000), the problem arises 
that the adaptive functions of play are not entirely clear (Spinka, Newberry & Bekoff, 
2001). Thus, it is not possible to explain the functions of dreaming by saying that 
they are similar to the functions of play behavior. Most likely play may have multiple 
functions, such as rehearsal of hunting behavior, aggressive encounters or predator 
avoidance. Thus, playing and dreaming might have complementary functions in the 
rehearsal of behaviors: dreaming is perceptually more realistic than play, whereas 
play is motorically more realistic, involving actual execution of motor programs, 
muscular movements, and physical exhaustion.
2.4.6.5. Dreaming as social simulation
A recent popular evolutionary psychological view is that dreaming simulates human 
social interactions with other people and rehearses social perception and social skills. 
Recently, several slightly different versions of the ‘Social simulation hypothesis’ have 
been proposed. Brereton’s (2000) ‘Social mapping hypothesis’ suggests that dreaming 
allows simulation of self, location, and awareness of others, including awareness 
of their internal mental states. Dreaming is thus suggested to have rehearsed the 
perceptual and emotional features required by successful social mapping in human 
evolutionary history, eventually leading to the emergence of self-awareness. This view 
offers an ultimate etiological level and contextual level explanations for dreaming, 
but dismisses questions regarding constitutive, and proximate and developmental 
level etiological questions. 
Humphrey (2000), and Nielsen and Germain (2000) have proposed that as many 
of the selection pressures faced by ancestral humans were posed by complex human 
social life, modeling human relationships and interpersonal bonds (for instance, 
family politics, attachment, love affairs, status battles) might have had adaptive value. 
Strong family and group cohesion would have enabled organized defences against 
predators and other enemies and enhanced survival and health of group members. 
Also McNamara (2004) acknowledges that interacting with other members of the 
group was an important selection pressure in the ancestral environment, and that 
simulation of skills such as how to find a mate, build coalitions, and avoid conflict 
would have been useful. Franklin and Zyphur’s (2005) argument is organized along 
the same lines; they see that via dreaming it is possible to practice dealing with 
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complex social situations, because those most adept in their social environment 
were likely to have the best access to resources in their social group, such as mates. 
These social simulation views include, as the social mapping hypothesis, ultimate 
etiological level and contextual level explanations for dreaming, but lack constitutive, 
and proximate and developmental level etiological questions. 
David Kahn and Allan Hobson (2005) emphasize that awareness of what others 
are thinking and feeling is a robust aspect of human consciousness, and this aspect 
is maintained during dreaming despite the changes in chemistry and activation 
patterns of the brain during sleep. Thus, even though they do not explicitly express 
it, they imply that awareness of the minds of others (“Theory of Mind”) during 
dreaming might have contributed to the ability to anticipate the intentions of 
others while awake. Kahn and Hobson (2005) thus offer ultimate etiological and 
contextual level explanations, as well as account for constitutive explanations (REM 
physiology as explicated in random activation theories). However, they do not 
discuss any proximate and developmental level explanations.
Although several slightly different versions of the ‘Social simulation hypothesis’ 
have been proposed, none of them has been subjected to detailed evolutionary 
psychological cost-benefit analysis. The social simulation hypothesis is, however, to 
some extent compatible with what we know about the form and content of dreams. 
About half of the human characters in our dreams are persons familiar to us, and 
appearance, behavior exhibited by the character, and feelings evoked by the character 
in the dreamer are regularly used in the identification of the person (Kahn, Stickgold, 
Pace-Schott & Hobson, 2000). More than 80% of known dream characters evoke 
some kind of emotional response in the dreamer, most often affection or joy (Kahn, 
Pace-Schott & Hobson, 2002). A significant amount of time in dreams is spent 
wondering what other dream characters are thinking or planning (Kahn & Hobson, 
2005). Thus, our dreams often represent human characters and give plenty of space 
for opportunities to practice social interactions. 
Even though the social simulation hypothesis is consistent with the fact that other 
people and multiple social interactions are frequently present in our dreams, the 
hypothesis has some problems as an evolutionary psychological account of the 
function of dreaming. First, we get a lot of practice in (non-threatening) social 
interactions during our waking lives, and this practice during waking hours does 
not yield high costs to us. Thus, it remains unclear why it would be advantageous to 
practice or simulate something like that further in our dreams. Furthermore, there is 
a lack of studies on the detailed nature of the social interactions in dreams, and the 
ones conducted reveal the often aggressive nature of social encounters (Domhoff, 
1996; Hall & Van de Castle, 1966). Aggression is a more common type of social 
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interaction than friendliness, while sexual interactions are relatively rare in dreams. 
Thus, we get less practice in forming positive social bonds, such as making friends 
and allies, than in dealing with negatively toned social interactions. Even less 
time in dreams is devoted to mate selection and practicing how to form romantic 
relationships. Do we, in fact, interact with other dream characters in reasonable 
ways that might be considered useful simulations of or rehearsals for real life social 
interactions? To back up an evolutionary hypothesis, a detailed description of the 
type of dream content and the conditions under which it occurs is required, as well 
as a cost-benefit analysis that should show why the dream simulation is likely to be 
useful for us (or was likely to be useful for our ancestors). It remains open whether 
the social simulation hypothesis will receive support from the more detailed analyses 
of dream interactions and cost-benefit considerations.
2.4.6.6. Dreaming as threat simulation
The Threat Simulation Theory presents yet another evolutionary function for 
dreaming (TST) (Revonsuo, 2000a). As the TST is specifically tested in the present 
thesis, it is reviewed more thoroughly than the theories summarized previously. The 
main predictions derived from the TST are also outlined. 
The TST suggest that dream consciousness evolved as an off-line model of the world 
that is specialized in the simulation of various threatening events encountered in 
the human ancestral environment. In human EEA (Environment of Evolutionary 
Adaptedness; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992), a threat simulation system that selected 
memory traces representing life threatening experiences from long term memory, 
and constructed frequent threat simulations based on them, could have provided 
our ancestors with a selective advantage in practising threat recognition and 
avoidance skills. During dreaming, threat coping skills could have been maintained 
and rehearsed without the risks of hazardous consequences that accompany threats 
in real situations. This kind of a mechanism would have provided our ancestors 
an additional survival and reproductive advantage. Due to its beneficial effects in 
enhancing survival and reproductive success, the threat simulation mechanism was 
selected for, thus propagating its own existence in the ancestral environment. 
The TST was originally presented in a form of six propositions, each of them 
leading to several empirically testable predictions (Revonsuo, 2000a). Consequently, 
the central claims of the theory are open for supportive or falsifying evidence. Most 
of the TST’s predictions can be tested with the currently available methods in 
dream research, while some belong more to the scope of cognitive neuroscience and 
neurophysiology. Next, the six original propositions of the theory as well as its main 
predictions will be briefly presented. 
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The first proposition of the TST is that dream consciousness is an organized and 
selective simulation of the perceptual world (Revonsuo, 2000a). To begin with, 
the TST accepts, based on current empirical evidence, that the form of dream 
experience is organized along the same lines as perceptual waking consciousness that 
is experienced, during dreaming, as real life (Revonsuo, 2000a; 2006). Consequently, 
the TST claims that the well-organized dream experience is functionally constructed 
to resemble waking experiences, and therefore shows clear design features for a 
world simulation function.
Second, the TST claims that dream consciousness is specialized in the simulation of 
threatening events (Revonsuo, 2000a). Thus, the TST directly predicts that, in order 
for nocturnal threat rehearsal to be efficient, threatening events should occur in dreams 
more frequently than in waking life, and that the content of dream threats should 
reflect the original function of dream consciousness as a threat simulator. Therefore, 
threatening events in dreams should focus on simulating dangerous events critical for 
the future survival of the individual, and the threats should mainly endanger the well-
being of the dream self and persons significant for the self (close kin and allies). The 
threats should be relatively realistic portrayals of real threatening events, not based on 
fantasy, fiction or folk-lore. The dream self should be able to participate in the course 
of the threatening events, and defend itself with appropriate and reasonable actions 
that would be relevant in a comparable waking situation.
Third, the TST states that only real threatening events can fully activate the threat 
simulation system (Revonsuo, 2000a). Encounters with real threats in the environment 
are stored into “hot” emotional memory, and when asleep, the dream production 
system automatically selects those memory traces with the highest saliency for 
dream construction. Consequently, memory representations encoding for fearful 
and threatening events, containing the highest negative emotional charge, should be 
selected over and over again for simulation. Thus, real life threat experiences trigger on 
the threat simulation system by offering raw materials to it. Moreover, the activation 
of the threat simulation system after exposure to life-threatening trauma should be 
a universal phenomenon, not dependent on any specific culture, and the intensity of 
the simulations (frequency and persistence) should be directly related to the degree of 
personal threat experienced when the event was encountered in reality. 
The fourth proposition of the TST states that threat simulations are perceptually 
and behaviorally realistic rehearsals of real threatening events (Revonsuo, 2000a). 
While dreaming, the off-line world simulation seems perfectly real to us, and we are 
unaware that what we currently experience is nothing but a hallucination (except very 
rarely in so-called lucid dreams). The TST assumes that, in general, covert actions are 
actual actions relying on the same brain regions, except for the fact that they are not 
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executed. In other words, the sleeping brain is capable of simulating the planning and 
execution of motor commands, but muscular atonia during REM sleep prevents us 
from carrying out the planned behaviors. If the muscular atonia during REM sleep 
is removed, we should observe that the body of the dreamer carries out isomorphic 
behaviors at the same time when they happen in the dream. 
Fifth, the TST claims that perceptually and behaviorally realistic simulation and 
rehearsal of any skills (in this case threat recognition, avoidance, and coping skills) 
should lead to enhanced performance, regardless of whether the training episodes 
are explicitly remembered (Revonsuo, 2000a). This assumption is based on evidence 
that simulation training and mental training have been shown to lead to enhanced 
performance, that is, implicit procedural learning occurs when behaviors are repeatedly 
practiced in non-real situations. Furthermore, learning occurs also in amnesics, 
showing that performance enhancement can be attained without conscious access to 
memory of training episodes (Glisky, 1992; Glisky & Schacter, 1988; 1989; Glisky, 
Schacter & Tulving, 1986; Schacter, 1996).
Finally, the sixth proposition of the TST states that the original human evolutionary 
environment included frequent dangerous events which imposed severe selection 
pressures upon ancestral populations, and that the ecologically valid threat cues in 
the environment fully activated the threat simulation system (Revonsuo, 2000a). 
Thus, we can predict that children old enough to implement threat recognition and 
avoidance skills during wakefulness should be capable of simulating threatening 
events in their dreams, especially when exposed to real valid threat cues. Moreover, 
ontogenetically early exposure to real threat cues should lead to earlier, more frequent 
and more intensive threat simulation dreams whereas lack of exposure should lead 
to slower development of the dream production system and less frequent and milder 
threat simulation dreams. 
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3. THE PRESENT THESIS
According to Revonsuo (2000b), to study the biological function of dreams we are 
required to make a systematic, detailed analysis of the content of dreams across 
a wide range of large data samples. This includes the “normal” population, cross-
cultural samples, and various special populations, especially hunter-gatherers, 
children, frequent nightmare sufferers, and traumatized people. If in this analysis 
some dream content characteristics tend to pop out here and there, again and again, 
those features probably are traces of the original biological function of dreams. Thus, 
the present thesis included many different participant populations.
In order to test any evolutionary psychological theory in any dream sample, the first 
requirement is the specification of predictions that are explicated in or implied by 
the theory. Therefore, the predictions of the TST were explicated in the previous 
section. The second requisition is a clear definition of the phenomenon under 
investigation, for example, what types of descriptions in dream reports constitute 
a social interaction or a threatening event. Then, a theoretically motivated content 
analysis scale that reliably captures and partitions the specific phenomenon under 
study needs to be devised. In order to test the TST, a detailed content analysis scale 
for identifying and classifying threatening events was constructed for the studies 
included in the present thesis.
3.1. The aims of the present thesis
The main aims of the present thesis were to study the biological function of dreaming 
as outlined in the Threat simulation theory (Revonsuo, 2000a), with the guidelines 
listed above. If TST’s predictions hold in this type of systematic analysis, the theory 
receives support, whereas contradictory evidence will weaken or even falsify the 
theory. Thus, the specific goals were the following:  
1)  To define exact criteria for what is a ‘threatening event’ in dreams  
2)  To develop a detailed and reliable content analysis scale and theoretical 
categories with which it is possible to empirically explore and quantify 
threatening events in dreams 
3) To empirically test some of the predictions derived from TST, using systematic, 
detailed analysis of the content of dreams in varying participant samples. The 
specific questions and hypotheses investigated were:
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a. How frequent are threatening events in dreams: The TST predicts that 
threatening events should be more frequent in dreams than in the waking 
life
b. What kind of qualities do threatening events in dreams have: The TST 
predicts that the threatening events should be severe, realistic, targeted 
against the dream self and significant others, and include simulations of 
relevant and appropriate defensive actions
c. How do threatening events present in dreams relate to the most recently 
encoded or the most salient memory traces of threatening events 
experienced in waking life: The TST predicts that dream content is 
modulated by the activation of long term memory traces with highest 
negative saliency, that is, dream simulations are based on memories of 
events representing the most severe threats ever encountered  
d. What are the effects of severe waking life threatening events, trauma, on 
dream threats: The TST predicts that real threat experiences uniquely 
activate the threat simulation system, leading to more frequent and more 





For Studies I-III, altogether 141 healthy young Finnish and Swedish university 
students were recruited (Table 1). In Study IV, the participants were 117 severely 
or less traumatized Kurdish children, and 70 nontraumatized Finnish children 
(Table 1.). The participants in Study V were 356 traumatized or nontraumatized 
Palestinian children (Table 1).  


























Data collection method Dream diary  
(4 wks)
Dream diary  
(2-4 wks)






















Mean age of subjects (yrs) 23.3 26.8 24.1 12.9/12.8/9.5 10.8/11.3




Mean number of dream 
reports per subject 
11.4 5.0 10.7 5.2/4.1/3.1 4.2/3.0
Mean number of dream 
reports per subject/ week
2.9 2.5 5.3 5.2/4.1/3.1 4.2/3.0
Mean length of dream 
reports (words) 
141.5 261.6 144.5 54.5/29.2/24.7 41.5/31.6
* T = Trauma group; C = Control group; F = Finnish children
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4.2. Procedure and data analysis
All participants wrote home-based dream diaries for one week (children) or two to 
four weeks (adults), according to detailed instructions. In Study III, the participants 
also kept logs of daily events during the diary period, and were later interviewed 
about specific threatening life-events. The dream diaries, and in Study III also daily 
logs and interview transcripts, were then typed, and in the case of Kurdish and 
Palestinian children, translated into English. 
4.2.1. The Dream Threat Scale
For data analysis, a definition of a ‘threatening event’ was first developed, and then, 
a detailed content analysis scale that can be reliably used to distinguish threatening 
events in dreams from other events, and to classify the threatening events according 
to their specific qualities, was devised. The definition of a threatening event and the 
categories in the classification system were thoroughly tested in several pilot studies, 
and modified until they seemed to grasp all relevant threatening events and allow the 
coding of all the relevant aspects of the threatening events. As a reliability criterion, 
the interrater agreement levels for identification and classification of threats were 
constantly monitored in various pilot studies. Those items, that is, parts or categories 
of the scale, that showed low interrater agreement levels were either omitted from 
the classification system or revised until sufficient agreement levels were reached. 
The final version of the scale was named the Dream Threat Scale (DTS), and is 
presented in Table 2. 
The threat criteria adopted in the DTS distinguishes between objective and 
subjective threats. Objective threats are events in a dream where the physical 
or mental well-being of any person would be endangered or where any person’s 
physical resources or territory would be jeopardized. Subjective threats, on the 
other hand, were defined as events experienced or emotionally interpreted by the 
dreamer to be threatening in the absence of an objective threat. Originally, the 
aim in distinguishing between objective and subjective was the quantification 
and comparison of their frequency and quality. It could be argued that subjective 
threats may be rehearsal for a state of heightened threat detection and vigilance 
in an environment where there are subtle threat cues but no direct evidence of an 
upcoming threat. For example, walking alone in a dark alley and being scared of 
possible attackers or pursuers would be scored as a subjective threat. 
All types of harmful events were included into DTS (see category I, Table 2.), 
also failures and minor mishaps, for important theoretical reasons. In the light 
of the TST, the overall quantity and quality of threatening content in dreams 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































this falls somewhere in a continuum from very low to extremely high. Thus, by 
using a broad definition of threat, it is possible to capture all the different levels 
of activation of the system, from low levels (where simulated threats tend to be 
infrequent and mild) to high (where simulated threats tend to be frequent and 
severe). This, in turn, allows the testing of hypotheses directly derived from the 
theory, if only they can be formulated in terms of differences in the activation 
level of the threat simulation system. For example, it is possible to compare 
the dream content of different populations, or the effect of different stimulus 
environments, or the content of daytime experiences and dreams, as to the 
quantity and quality of overall threat content. 
Thus, the broad definition of threat is essential for the testability of the TST 
in populations where the threat simulation system is not expected to be fully 
activated. A full activation of the threat simulation system (very frequent, very 
realistic, and very severe dream threats) can be expected only in an ideal model 
population where people have been exposed to frequent ecologically valid 
ancestral threats throughout their lives (Revonsuo, 2000a). In such a population, 
the threat simulation system is both fully developed and fully activated by the 
appropriate input (as it is an induced biological defence mechanism), and the 
predictions of the theory should be fulfilled nearly perfectly. As it cannot be 
expected that the threat simulation system is in this kind of state in any of 
the actual populations we are able to study, the more subtle differences in the 
activation levels of the system would be missed if confining to a narrow definition 
of threat - that would allow us to see only the tip of the iceberg.
In the DTS, threats merely witnessed by the dreamer, that is, threats directed 
at other characters were also included (category II, Table 2.). The logic behind 
this is that threats directed at other dream characters can directly influence the 
future survival or reproductive success of the dreamer, in the case the threat is 
directed at significant others (inclusive fitness). For example, young mothers 
often dream of their newborn child being in danger, instead of themselves 
(Hartmann, 1998). And young children, especially those who have lost a parent 
in violent conditions, dream of dangers directed at their parents (Punamäki, 
1997). In both of these cases, the future reproductive success or survival of the 
individual is severely endangered, and would have been also in the ancestral 
environment. Thus, it is evolutionarily efficient to dream of threats directed at 
close relatives, allies or friends, affecting the inclusive fitness of the individual.
Even in the case the threat is directed at insignificant strangers, the dreamer 
can learn of the possibility of such threats in his or her environment when he/
she witnesses the event with own eyes. In addition, there is now new evidence 
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from cognitive neuroscience supporting the view that when we observe another 
person performing an action, our own brain perceives this action by mirroring 
it, that is, by activating the same brain mechanisms as if we were ourselves 
carrying out those acts (for example, Rizzolatti & Graighero, 2004). In fact, 
the mirror neurons are suggested to be the neural basis of action understanding 
and imitation learning. Thus, observation of threat avoidance behaviors may be 
functional and enhance a kind of vicarious learning. Although it may not be as 
efficient as being the target of the threat oneself, it certainly is better for the 
maintenance of our threat avoidance skills to observe how other people handle 
threatening events than to dream about something totally unrelated. Thus, 
while witnessing threats does not give particularly strong support to the TST, 
it hardly can be used as evidence against it, either. Furthermore, we all learn of 
the occurrence different types of threats that have happened to insignificant 
strangers through social interaction. We hear stories about threats that have 
killed or injured friends of friends or relatives of friends, and probably ancestral 
humans told stories as well, this way teaching other members of the group, 
especially young ones, to avoid dangerous situations. Thus, including threats 
only witnessed by the dreamer into the coding system reflect events that serve 
as efficient threat avoidance rehearsal. 
Threats that are not directly physical, but endanger the ‘mental well-being of self ’ 
in the dream were also included in the DTS, and scored as psychological, social 
or financial threats (category III, Table 2.). Even though these threats do not 
directly threaten the physical well-being of the dreamer, they still can severely 
affect the fitness of the individual. For instance, an example of a psychologically 
severe threat is a situation where the life or physical well-being of a close 
relative, a parent, a spouse, or a child, is at stake. An example of social threat 
is a situation where the dreamer’s status in the community is threatened, and an 
example of financially severe threat an event where the dreamer’s valuable property 
is lost or destroyed. All these types of events would have indirectly endangered the 
future reproductive success of the ancestral humans. Thus, threats endangering “the 
mental well-being of the dreamer” reflect situations that threaten the survival or 
reproductive success, that is, fitness, of the individual, although not as directly as 
life-threatening events. 
The DTS includes two categories for coding the participation of the dreamer in 
the threatening event, as the TST predicts frequent participation and appropriate 
defensive reactions from behalf of the dream self. Category IV addresses whether 
it is possible, in the first place, to take part in the event, and category V is used to 
code for the specific types of reactions the dream self engages in in the situation. 
We also included categories for classifying the resolution and consequences of the 
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threatening events to the dream self to investigate what happens after the actual 
situation is over. The last, but nevertheless an important category ‘the source of the 
threatening event’ was designed to measure the prediction of the TST that threats 
in dreams should be realistic in nature. 
4.2.2. Data analysis
All the dream reports (and daily log and interview descriptions in Study III) were 
independently content analyzed with the Dream Threat Scale by two (Studies II-V) 
or three (Study I) judges. The content analysis occurred in two separate stages. In 
the first stage, the threatening events were identified according to the DTS threat 
definition criteria. Based on the unanimous or majority identifications, threats 
were then selected for the second stage. In the second stage, threatening events 
were further classified based on the quality of the threats, according to the DTS 
categories I-VIII. 
4.3. Statistical analyses
In all studies, the DTS interrater agreement levels were evaluated with simple percent 
agreement (identification stage), and Cohen’s Kappa Coefficient ( ) (classification 
stage). The within-study groups (male – female; traumatized – nontraumatized) 
were compared with nonparametric Mann Whitney U test (U), while Pearson’s Chi 
Square test ( 2) was used to assess differences in the quality distribution of threats. 
In Studies II and III, Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient (r) was utilized to investigate 
whether the frequency of threats in dream reports was associated with the number 
or length of dream reports. In Study III, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test was used 
for determining whether the frequency of threats in different report types (dream 
reports, daily logs and autobiographical interview reports) were associated within 
subjects, and repeated measurements logistic regression analyses with Generalized 
Estimating Equation (GEE) method was utilized in comparing the similarities and 
differences in the nature of current dream threats, current real threats and past real 
threats. Additionally, in Study III Spearman’s Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient 
(rs) was calculated to determine whether the mean frequency of current or past real 




5.1. The reliability of the Dream Threat Scale
Each study in the present thesis was designed to test a specific prediction or 
predictions of the TST. The participant populations varied accordingly and 
consequently, in some studies the Dream Threat Scale was modified to fit the 
unique research problem or participant sample. Nonetheless, the utilized DTS 
threat identification criteria were the same in each and every study. Also, highly 
similar content scales were used in these studies; some categories always remained 
identical or almost identical while some were further modified. Importantly, 
the whole data sets were always scored by at least two judges which allows us 
to compare results and give estimates about the reliability of the DTS. Note, 
however, that neither the participant samples nor the content analysis method 
are in every case directly comparable between studies, but rather reflect the fact 
that the TST has been and should be studied in diverse populations, and the 
method has been fine-tuned accordingly. 
In Study I, three judges identified and classified the threatening events, and the 
strength of agreement between judges varied from fair to strong (Table 3). As 
two of the judges (AR, KV) had developed the DTS, their pair-wise agreement 
was much stronger than between either of these two and the third judge. 
Nevertheless, all the agreement levels were strong enough to render the results 
reliable. Important for the evaluation of the reliability of the DTS, a different 
pair of judges (OM, SL) who had not participated in the development of the 
scale identified and classified the threats in Study II. The new judges reached 
identification and classification agreement levels that were mostly stronger than 
in the original Study I (Table 3). 
In Studies III, IV, and V, two judges identified and classified the threats, and 
the first judge had participated in the development of the scale while the other 
was newly trained to apply the method. The agreement levels were very strong 
for the identification and coding of dream threats (Table 3). In Study III, also 
agreement on the coding of the most recent threats in the daily logs and the 
threats encoded into long term autobiographical memory, acquired through 
interview reports (see original publication for agreement levels of waking 
events), were strong. 
In Studies IV and V, the analyzed material differed significantly f rom previous 
studies, as it was composed of children’s dreams that were translated from 
Kurdish dialects (Study IV ) and Arabic (Study V ) into English. The DTS 
was modified in these studies to better suit the analysis of children’s dreams 
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collected from different cultural groups. The agreement levels ranged from 
good to strong (Table 3).
In sum, in all of these studies the DTS has proven to be a reliable tool for 
identifying and classifying threatening events in written reports. Reliability was 
independent of source of data (dreams vs. real life experiences), age of subjects 
(children vs. adults), life-experiences of subjects (traumatized vs. nontraumatized) 
or the cultural background of participants (Finnish, Swedish, Kurdish, and 
Palestinian). We therefore recommend the use of the Dream Threat Scale in 
future studies on threatening dream events or empirical tests of the TST.  







Study Study I 
 
Study II Study III Study IV Study V
Judges AR, KV, VO OM, SL KV, TS KV, OP KV, OP
Threat identification agreement % 76-84 83.7 84.7/92.9 86.3/95.5 85.7/94.2
Threat classification 
Kappa Coefficient ( ) values
Nature of threat 0.70-0.74 0.94 0.87 0.92 0.94
Target of threat  0.52-0.79 0.88-0.94 0.84-0.93 0.64-0.93 0.83-0.94
Severity of threat 0.53-0.62 0.89 0.87 0.87 0.89
Participation to threat 0.67-0.73 0.99 0.86 0.83 0.87
Reaction to threat 0.64-0.65 0.95  #  #  #
Consequences of threat 0.43-0.73 0.97 0.85 0.88 0.88
Resolution of threat 0.53-0.59 0.96 0.88 - -
Source of threat/ Realism 0.52-0.62 0.92 0.88 - -
 According to Fleiss (1981),  values < 0.4 indicate weak agreement, 0.4-0.75 fair to good agreement, and > 0.75 strong agreement. 
 Three judges identified and classified the threats, thus the range of pair-wise agreement is reported here
 Both complete threat identification agreement % and partially overlapping threat identification agreement % are reported
 A range of  values is reported: a single threat can have several targets and Kappa can be computed only to separate subcategories 
# = Not applicable; in the study, categories ‘Participation to threat’ and ‘Reaction to threat’ were combined
-  = Not reported in the original study
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5.2. The frequency of threatening events
5.2.1. University student samples
 In Study I, Revonsuo and Valli (2000) found that threatening events are relatively 
frequent in the dreams of ordinary young adults. Approximately two thirds of all 
dream reports included a description of a threat, and many dreams included several 
threatening events (Table 4). On average, there was more than one threat per dream. 
In those dream reports including threatening events, 34% of words (total recall count, 
TRC; Antrobus, 1983) were used for describing threatening events whereas two 
thirds of words depicted other types of events. There were no subjects whose dream 
reports did not include threatening events, even though the frequency of threats per 
dream report varied largely between subjects (0.23-3.75). In a comparable Swedish 
student sample (Study II; Table 4), threatening events were slightly more frequent, 
averaging 1.7 threats per dream. More than three quarters of all dream reports 
contained at least one threatening event, and all subjects, even those who managed 
to report only one dream, had threatening events in their dreams. 
Study III was specifically designed for not only to measure threat frequency 
in dreams but also in waking life to investigate whether threatening events are 
truly more frequent in dreams. Waking state threat frequency was assessed by 
systematic daily logs (most recent threats) and by interviewing the subjects about 
all the threat experiences they could recollect from their long term episodic 
memory (that is, threatening events that have been so salient that they have left 
a permanent memory trace). 
In Study III, the threat simulation frequency results were highly similar to other 
student samples (Table 4). Further, the results indicated that current dream 
threats are far more frequent than the most recent threats experienced during the 
preceding days, or the past real threats retrievable from autobiographical memory. 
Of the students’ dream reports, almost three quarters included threatening events as 
compared to less than one fifth of daily logs. In the interviews the students recalled, 
on average, eighteen real threats from their lives, whereas during the two week diary 
period they had experienced, on average, fifteen dream threat simulations (Table 5). 
Thus, it seems that threat simulations in dreams are experienced on a nightly basis, 
most recent real threats on a weekly basis, and the most memorable threats in our 
lives occur with the frequency of less than one per year. Also the quality of threats 
varied in these three samples, in a pattern predicted by the TST (see section 5.3.). 
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Number of  threatening 
events




% of dream reports 
including threats
66.4 77.0 72.8 79.5/55.6/31.0 58.7/47.8
Mean number of threats per 
dream report
1.2 1.7 1.4 1.2/0.7/0.4 1/0.7
Threat description % of 
words
34.1 - 37.1 61.1/42.1/20.1 45.7/38.0
* T = Trauma group; C = Control group; F = Finnish children
-  = Not reported in the original study
Table 5. The overall characteristics of dream reports, daily logs, and autobiographical interviews in Study III
The number of 
reports





Threats per report Words per report
Study III N (M, SD) N (M, SD) M (SD) M M (SD)
Dream reports 419 (10.7, 6.6) 581 (14.9, 9.5) 72.8 (20.1) 1.4 144.5 (66.9)
Daily logs 490 (12.6, 5.3) 103 (2.6, 2.9)  15.2 (15.6) 0.2 52.2 (44.8)
Autobiographical reports 714 (18.2, 8.0) 714 (18.2, 8.0) 100* ( - ) 1 -  ( - )




Studies IV and V addressed the effect of traumatic life experiences on dream content. 
In general, in nontraumatized children’s dreams the threat simulation frequency was 
somewhat lower than in adults’ dreams (Table 4). By far the lowest threat frequency 
of any sample was found in the dreams of Finnish children who had lived all their 
lives in the most peaceful and stable environment of the studied children. Threat 
simulations occurred in approximately one third of the dream reports of the Finnish 
children, and the average number of threats per dream report was 0.4 (Study IV). 
Nontraumatized Palestinian children, who had also led relatively safe lives but almost 
certainly had heard about the restless situation in the Gaza district, had an average 
threat simulation frequency of 0.7 per dream report (Study VI). In nontraumatized 
samples, the threat description percentages of words varied between 20% and 40%. 
In contrast, exposure to traumatic events significantly increased the frequency of threat 
simulations in dreams (Studies IV and V, Table 4). The more severe the trauma, the 
higher number of dreams included threat simulations, equalling to or surpassing the 
threat simulation frequencies of ordinary young adults. Of the severely traumatized 
Kurdish children’s dreams, approximately 80% included threatening events (highest 
of any sample), and on average, there were 1.2 threatening events per dream report. 
Similarly, the percentages of words used for describing threats exceeded the values 
seen in any other sample (61.1% vs. adult average 35.6%) indicating that in the 
traumatized children the content of dreams is more focused on threat simulation. 
5.3. The quality of threatening events
Although the distribution of specific types of threatening events varies from study 
to study, and slightly different versions of the DTS have been used in different 
studies, certain regularities clearly emerge from the results.
5.3.1. The nature of threatening events 
In the university student samples, threats including aggressive components (that is, 
non-physical aggression, escape and pursuit situations, and direct physical aggression) 
are the most prominent type of threatening event, accounting for approximately 
40% of all threatening events (Table 6). Failures, varying between 26% to 36% of 
all threats, and accidents and misfortunes (approximately 20% of threats) are the 
second and the third most common type of threat, whereas catastrophic events (3% 
of threats) and disease and illness (3% to 8% of threats) are rare. 
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II Target of threat
1. Self 
2. Significant others 
3. Sig.resources





















III Severity of threat
1. Life-threatening  
2. Otherwise severe 




































1. Relevant action** 
2. Impossible action** 
3. Irrelevant action**























1. Threat resolved 
























1. No losses 
2. Minor losses 






















VIII Source of threat
1. Realistic threat























* T = Trauma group; C = Control group; F = Finnish children
** Type of reaction (relevant, impossible, irrelevant) calculated only from those cases where reaction was reported, and cases where there is no 
reaction, reaction is not possible, or reaction is not reported are presented separately.  
# = Not applicable; category not used in the study
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In Study III where the nature of the dream threats was compared to the nature of 
the most recent threats and to the nature of the most salient threats encoded into 
and retrievable from long term memory, the results revealed that the dream threats 
much more closely resemble the old but most salient than the new most recent 
threats (Figure 3). Failures 
were most frequently reported 
in the daily logs, whereas 
aggressive events as well as 
accidents and misfortunes 
were prominent types of dream 
threats and the most salient 
real autobiographical threats. 
Thus, the themes of dream 
threats seem to be constructed 
from the old memory traces 
of the most threatening events 
ever encountered rather than 
from the new minor threats 
experienced during the 
preceding days. 
Studies IV and V on dreams of traumatized and nontraumatized children show 
that aggression is very prevalent in children’s dreams, ranging from 53% of all 
threats in Finnish children’s dreams to 76% in traumatized Palestinian children’s 
dreams (Table 6). This result is consistent with previous findings on the high 
levels of aggression in children’s dreams (Hall & Domhoff, 1963). Furthermore, 
the traumatized children had significantly more aggressive threats in their dreams 
than the nontraumatized children or ordinary young adults, on the expense 
of Accidents and Misfortunes, and Failures. The threat simulation system 
of traumatized children thus seems to be more active in constructing threat 
simulations including aggressive components than that of the nontraumatized 
children or nontraumatized adults.
5.3.2. The targets of the threatening events 
In all studies, the threatening events were targeted mainly against the dream self, 
followed by persons significant for the future success and inclusive fitness of the 
dream self, that is close kin, friends and allies (Table 6). Insignificant persons 
were less frequently threatened, but altogether, threats were more people- than 
resource –centred. Both resources significant for the dream self, such as physical 
property or territory, and insignificant resources, such as property of insignificant 
Fig. 3. The nature of the Current Dream Threats closely resembled 
the nature of the Past Real Threats while Current Real Threats and 




strangers, were seldom targeted in the threatening events. In Study III, the 
distribution of the targets of threats was similar in the current dream threats, 
most recent threats, and most salient threats, indicating that dream threats 
reflect the waking life threats when it comes to targets of threats (Figure 4).
Fig.  4. The distribution of the targets of 
threats is statistically similar in the Current 
Dream Threats, the Current Real Threats 
in daily logs, and the Past Real Threats in 
autobiographical reports.
5.3.3. The severity of threatening events 
In the dreams of ordinary young adults 18% to 22% of all threatening situations 
were life-threatening to the dreamer (Table 6). On average, one third of threats 
simulated situations where the physical or psychological well-being of the self, or 
the social or financial resources of the dreamer were threatened. The rest, one to 
two thirds of threats (depending on the study) represented minor everyday mishaps 
that did not threaten the future survival of the self, but nevertheless, presented the 
dreamer with situations that required attention and actions aimed at dealing with 
the event. 
Compared to the most recent and to the most salient real life threats (Study 
III), dream threats were significantly more severe (Figure 5 a.). Severe threats 
are composed of life-threatening events, socially, psychologically, or financially 
significant threats, and threats endangering the physical well-being of the 
dream self, that is, all other threats apart from events categorized as minor. 
While the most recent threats consisted mainly of minor everyday mishaps 
(no life-threatening events were reported in the daily logs), almost half of the 
dream threats simulated severe events (Figures 5 a. and 5 b.). In general, the 
dream threats more closely resembled the most salient autobiographical threats 
in severity than the most recent threats reported in the daily logs, although the 
dream threats were more often life threatening or socially, psychologically, or 
financially severe (Figures 5 a. and 5 b.) Taken into account that most of the 
participants had experienced a life-threatening event only once (some a few 
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Fig. 5 a. The Current Dream Threats were 
significantly more severe than the Past Real 
Threats in autobiographical reports, or the 
Current Real Threats in daily logs.
Fig. 5 b. The Current Dream Threats 
resembled the Past Real Threats in the 
amount of severe versus minor threats, and 
both differed significantly from the Current 
Real Threats reported in the daily logs. 
times) in their lives, in their dreams they were forced to face life-endangering 
situations on a weekly basis. Thus, in our dreams we more frequently experience 
life-threatening and other severe events than in our waking lives, and our 
dreams exaggerate the dangerousness of those threatening events that we have 
experienced during the waking hours. 
 
Figure 5 b. 
 
 
Study III. Severe vs. Minor Threats in Dreams, Autobiographical 
Reports and Daily Logs

















  *** = a significant difference between the Current Dream Threats and the Past Real Threats versus the 
Current Real Threats, p < .001 
 
 
 In contrast, repeated personal exposure to life-threatening events increases the 
amount of life-threatening and other severe types of dream threat simulations 
(Studies IV and V; Table 6). Not only did the traumatized children simulate 
threatening events more frequently in their dreams, the simulated threats 
were significantly more severe (that is, life threatening events, socially, 
psychologically or financially significant events, and physically harmful events 
vs. minor events) in their dreams than in the nontraumatized children’s or the 
nontraumatized young adults’ dreams (Table 6). In fact, when the much higher 
overall threat simulation frequency for the traumatized children is accounted 
for (Table 4), life-threatening and other severe threats were experienced by the 
severely traumatized Kurdish children twice as often as by the less traumatized 




5.3.4. The participation and reactions of the dream self in the threatening events
In Studies I and II, a slightly different participation and reactions coding scales 
were used than in Studies III, IV, and V. In Studies I and II, a separate scale 
was used for the possibility of participation and for the specific type of reactions 
(Table 6), whereas in Studies III, IV, and V the scales were combined to code 
for occasions of: Self reacts, someone else reacts, no one reacts, and reactions are 
not reported.
In adults’ dreams, the dreamer could and did actively participate in the course of 
the threatening events in 46% to 60% of cases (Table 6). Thus, in approximately 
half of the threatening events the dreamer could not or did not actively partake in 
the events. Even though reacting to the threat was not always possible in dreams, 
when reactions occurred, they were almost without exception relevant, reasonable 
and appropriate to the dreamed situation (Table 6). Only rarely did the dreamer 
engage in actions that are impossible in the physical realm but efficient within the 
dream (for example, flying away from an attacking animal), or physically possible 
but inappropriate in a comparable waking situation (for example, jumping off a cliff 
to escape an attacking animal). 
Participation rates were lower in children’s than in adults’ dreams. Thus, 
participation in children’s dreams is not as often possible, the children do not 
take an advantage of the opportunity, or participation is not reported. Children’s 
and adults’ dreams are not, however, directly comparable (Foulkes, 1982). For 
example, the younger the child, the less the dream self is involved or active in 
the dreams. The degree of trauma did not have an effect on the participation 
rates, and in fact, when a threatening dream event arose, the nontraumatized 
children participated in the event with a slightly higher probability than the 
traumatized children. Nevertheless, as the absolute threat simulation rates 
were as much as three times more frequent in severely traumatized than in 
nontraumatized children’s dreams (Table 4), the traumatized children got 
altogether more frequent practice in dealing with threatening events. In other 
words, participation frequencies reported in percentages do not reveal the whole 
truth, but the actual simulation rates also need to be accounted for. 
The main reason for why participation rates remain relatively low both in adults’ 
and in children’s dreams seems to be that participation cannot be coded for 
due to lack of information in the dream report, mainly because of disruption 
of or discontinuity within the dream. Surprisingly, in Study III we noticed that 
descriptions of participation were also lacking from many daily logs and interview 
reports concerning the most recent and the most salient real-life threats (Figure 6). 
In fact, descriptions were more often absent in daily logs and interview reports than 
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in dream reports. Thus, people “participated” in dream threats more actively than in 
real-life threats. We suspect that people may have the tendency not to report aspects 
of their own actions, unless specifically inquired. 
Fig. 6.  The reported reactions to the 
Current Dream Threats, Current Real 
Threats in the daily logs, and the Past Real 
Threats in the autobiographical reports.
.
5.3.5. The resolution and consequences of the threatening event 
The threatening events more often became fully realized (37% to 54%) than dissolved 
(22% to 32%) (Table 6). By fully realized threats, we refer to events than ran their 
course, and could not be prevented regardless of the actions of dream characters 
(so-called unhappy ends). Dissolved threats refer to cases were the resolution of the 
event was positive, and the threat did not become realized (so-called happy ends). 
As mentioned above, discontinuity within the dream and disruption of the dream 
were also quite frequent. Interestingly, though, in all studies in which the statistics 
could be conducted, the threatening events were significantly more often resolved 
than realized when the dream self actively participated in the course of the events 
than when the dreamer remained passive (Study I: 2 (3, n = 638) = 54.69, p < .001; 
Study II: 2 (3, N = 381) = 27.94, p < .001; Study III: 2 (12, N = 581) = 46.15, p 
< .001). Thus, the activity of the dream self positively affected the outcome of the 
situation. 
More contradictory results were found concerning the effect of life-threatening 
events on the dreamer’s activity. In Study I ( 2 (1, n = 643) = 18.58, p < .001), and 
Study III ( 2 (9, n = 581) = 18.37, p < .05), the dreamer was more likely to react to 
the threat when it was life-threatening than to other, less severe events. Similarly, 
in Study V, traumatized children’s dream threats showed this connection ( 2 (1, n 
= 948) = 42.81, p < .001), but not the nontraumatized children’s dream threats. In 
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contrast, no significant connection between severity of threats and activity of the 
dream self were observed in Studies II, and IV. 
As to consequences of threats, they often go unreported or there are no consequences 
at all (Table 6). Severe consequences were, in general, very rarely experienced, although 
they were more frequent in the dreams of the traumatized than the nontraumatized 
children. The threat simulation mechanism therefore does not seem to be interested 
in simulating what happens after the threat has been recognized, encountered and 
appropriate actions have been taken to avert the threat.
5.3.6. The source of threatening events 
A majority of threats in the student samples, 60% to 68%, were based on information 
about events that are realistic and possible in the living environment of the subject 
(Table 6). That is to say, the person has likely heard about such threats occurring 
to someone in that environment, or possibly has been in contact with somebody 
who has experienced such a threat, or may have personally been exposed to such an 
event in his or her life. Threats that are realistic in some parts of the world, but are 
highly unlikely to occur in the lives of Finnish or Swedish university students in 
their normal environment formed 21% to 33% of all threats. These types of threats 
usually come to our knowledge through the mass media, and include elements such 
as exotic animals, war, floods and other natural catastrophes. In contrast, threatening 
events based on fantasy, fiction, or folk-lore were rare in student samples, ranging 
from 4% to 8% of all threats. 
We did not code for the source of threats in the samples of children’s dreams due to 
cultural differences that made the coding procedure complicated. Punamäki (1997) 
and Punamäki, Ali, Ismahil and Nuutinen (2005) have found in the same dream 
samples that the dreams of traumatized children are less bizarre and more realistic 
than the dreams of nontraumatized children. Exposure to real life threats thus seems 
to yield threat simulations more realistic. 
5.4. Reanalysis of data: repetitive training and threat simulation rates
As in the learning or maintenance of any skill, repetition is the key to improved 
performance. If repetition is essential in improving performance, then this must also 
be the case in threat simulation. But how much practice in dealing with threatening 
situations do we actually get? 
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5.4.1. Threat simulation rates in spontaneously recalled dreams
Based on the data from Studies I, II, and III, weekly (seven days), monthly (30 days) 
and annual (365 days) threat simulation rates were calculated (Table 7)2. The aim 
here is to explicate how often threat simulations occur in the population, on average, 
and what types of threatening events we frequently have to deal with in our dreams. 
Based on averaging the results of Studies I, II, and III, the subjects recalled 3.6 dreams 
per week (SD = 1.5, range = 2.5 – 5.3) (Table 7). Of these, 72.1% (SD = 5.3, range 
66.4% – 77.0%), that is, 2.6 dreams included at least one threatening event, while the 
average threat simulation frequency per dream was 1.4 (SD = 0.3, range = 1.2 – 1.7). 
Consequently, in the dreams of young adults, threat simulations occur, on average, five 
times per week. Thus, the monthly threat simulation repetition rate is approximately 
twenty, and the annual simulation rate more than two hundred and fifty threatening 
events per year. Note, however, that these rates are based only on spontaneously recalled 
dreams, reported after the morning awakening. Indirect evidence suggests that we 
experience several dreams per night, but are usually unable to recall all of them. 
5.4.2. Estimated threat simulation rates in REM dreams
In addition to spontaneously recalled threat simulation rates, weekly, monthly and 
annual threat simulation frequencies were also estimated, based on what is currently 
known about the frequency of dreaming (Table 7)3. The most optimal stage of sleep 
2  Similar calculations have been presented in Study VI (Valli & Revonsuo, in press), but with larger participant and dream samples.
3  Similar calculations have been presented in Study VI (Valli & Revonsuo, in press), but with larger participant and dream samples.
Table 7. Estimated dreaming and threat repetition rates in young adults






Dream recall rate 3.6 15.4 187.7
Dreams including at least one threatening event 2.6 11.1 135.6
Threat repetition rate 5.0 21.4 260.7
Estimated threat repetition 
rate in REM dreams **
REM dreaming rate 23.1 99.0 1 204.5
REM dreams including at least one threatening event 16.7 71.4 868.4
REM dream threat repetition rate 32.3 138.6 1 686.3
* Figures based on results of Studies I, II, and III. On average, 72.1% include at least one threatening event, and on average, there are 1.4 threatening 
events per dream
** Figures based on estimation that people have, on average, 3.3 REM dreams per night, of which 72.1% include at least one threatening event, and 
on average, there are 1.4 threatening events per dream
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for dreaming to occur is REM sleep (Pivik, 1991). In a review by Nielsen (2000), 
laboratory awakenings from REM phase of sleep yielded, on average, a dream report 
in 81.9% of awakenings (SD = 9.0, range 60% - 93%). Similarly, Strauch and Meier 
(1996) managed to collect nearly 1 000 REM dreams from more than 100 subjects 
during approximately 300 laboratory nights. 
Second, depending on sleep length, humans normally have three to five REM 
periods per night, and this amounts to approximately 20%-25% of total sleep time 
(Roffwarg, Muzio & Dement, 1966). Thus, if we experienced one dream per each 
REM period, and would be able to remember them, we could recall on average 
2.5 – 4.1 REM sleep dreams per night (recall rate being 81.9%). In 2002, mean 
sleep length for Americans aged 18 to 29 years was 6.9 hours on weekdays and 7.8 
hours on weekends (The National Sleep Foundation, 2002). On workdays, 35% 
slept more than 8 hours per night, whereas on weekends 60% of subjects slept over 
8 hours. Six years later, the average amount of sleep on workdays was 6.6 hours, 
and 7.5 hours on weekends (The National Sleep Foundation, 2008). In Finnish 
health survey conducted on year 2000, the average sleep length for 18 to 29 year old 
males was 7.6 hours and 7.9 hours for females (Kronholm, Härmä, Hublin, Aro & 
Partonen, 2006). In Croatian university students (mean age 20.8 yrs), average sleep 
length on weekdays was 7 hours 37 minutes, and on weekends 8 hours 15 minutes 
(Bakotic, Radosevic-Vidacek & Koscek, 2005). No comparable data could be found 
for Finnish or Swedish university students. 
Regardless, if we estimate that ordinary young adults in Scandinavia sleep 7 to 8 
hours per night, they consequently have four REM periods per night (if sleep is 
not disrupted). If they have one dream per each REM period, and dream recall in 
REM awakenings is 81.9%, they experience on average 3.3 REM dreams per night. 
If we also assume that threat simulation rate remains stable over sleep cycles and 
is therefore similar to spontaneously recalled dreams, we can calculate estimates 
of threat simulation frequencies in REM dreams. As indicated in Table 7, weekly, 
monthly, and annual threat simulation rates then become remarkably high compared 
to spontaneously recalled dreams. Nevertheless, the actual average threat simulation 
rate in different sleep stages (Sleep onset/REM/NREM) and over sleep cycles is thus 
far unknown.
5.4.3. Rates of specific types of threat simulations
The threat simulation frequency estimates and information about the specific 
quality of threatening events allow us also to calculate how often young adults are 
exposed to particular types of threat simulations in their dreams. Based on the threat 
simulation frequency estimates (Table 7), and the specific quality of threatening 
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events in Studies I, II, and III (Table 6), we calculated monthly and annual exposure 
rates for specific types of threatening events. Similarly, based on estimated 
threat repetition rates in REM dreams, we reckoned the monthly and annual 
Table 8. Estimated frequencies of simulation of specific threat content 
University student samples Estimated TRR in REM dreams 
Threat content 
category















































II Target of threat
1. Self 
2. Significant others 
3. Sig. resources






















III Severity of threat
1. Life-threatening  
2. Otherwise severe 





































1. Relevant action 
2. Impossible action 
3. Irrelevant action
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VIII Source of threat
1. Realistic threat























 Based on weekly, monthly and annual threat frequency estimates (Table 6), and percentages of specific content of threatening events in  
Studies I, II, III. 
 Based on weekly, monthly and annual REM dream threat repetition rate (Table 6) and percentages of specific content of threatening events in 
Studies I, II, and III. 
** Type of reaction (relevant, impossible, irrelevant action) calculated only from those cases where a reaction was reported 
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frequencies of specific types of threat simulations. The specific threat repetition 
rates are depicted in Table 8.
Rehearsal of threats including aggression (escape situations and non-physical and 
direct physical aggression) is the most prominent type of threat practice (41.7%), 
averaging altogether to a conservative estimate of more than one hundred annual 
simulations (Table 8). In addition, the estimated liberal repetition rate of aggressive 
threats in REM dreams amounts to seven hundred annual simulations (based on 
1 686/year). Failures to achieve a set goal are the second most common topic of 
threat simulations (29.7%), averaging to a liberal estimate of five hundred REM 
dream simulations per year. Dealing with accidents is also frequently practiced 
(20.0%) whereas catastrophic events and illnesses are rarely encountered. The 
threats are mostly targeted against the dream self, the self being the target of the 
threat in approximately two hundred (conservative estimate) or one thousand 
and two hundred times per year (liberal estimate). Significant and insignificant 
people are also frequently in focus while significant and insignificant resources are 
seldom endangered. 
About half of the threats in normative dreams are of minor importance to the 
dream self (although might be severe to insignificant people), and therefore do not 
threaten the future survival of the self in any significant way. Threats endangering 
the future success of the self (life-threatening events, psychologically, socially or 
financially severe events, and situations compromising the physical well-being 
of the self ) are, however, altogether slightly more frequent than minor mishaps 
(annual conservative estimate 155 vs. 122; annual liberal estimate 1 002 vs. 787) 
(Table 8). The dream self participates in the course of the threatening events more 
often than not, although discontinuities within dreams and disruption of dreams 
frequently prevent the dream self from reacting to the threats. Whenever specific 
reactions to threats are reported in dreams, they are almost always relevant in 
the dreamed situation and would also be adequate in a comparable situation in 
waking life (93.5%). According to a conservative estimate, relevant reactions to 
the threats are practiced 244 times per year, and according to liberal estimate, 
more than one thousand five hundred times per year (Table 8). Furthermore, 
majority of threatening events are either completely realistic and possible in the 
dreamer’s waking life (63.7%) or realistic but unlikely to occur to the person in 
reality (29.0%). Altogether, realistic, and realistic but unlikely, threats may be 
simulated even up to 1 500 times per year (liberal estimate) (Table 8). In contrast, 
only six or seven threats out of one hundred are based on fantastic or fictitious 
sources, and these unrealistic threats are simulated approximately one hundred 
times per year (in nontraumatized subjects who have not been exposed to severe 




The first aim in empirically exploring the Threat Simulation Theory was to define 
an exact criteria for what is a ‘threatening event’ in dreams, and to develop a 
detailed and reliable content analysis scale and theoretical categories with which 
it is possible to empirically explore and quantify threatening events in dreams. The 
second aim was to empirically test some of the predictions derived from TST, using 
the developed threat criteria and systematic, detailed content analysis of the content 
of dreams in varying participant samples. The specific hypotheses tested in this thesis 
were: threatening events should be more frequent in dreams than in the waking lives 
of subjects; the threatening events should be severe, realistic, targeted against the 
dream self and significant others, and include simulations of relevant and appropriate 
defensive actions; dream content should be modulated by the activation of long term 
memory traces with highest negative saliency, that is, dream simulations should be 
based on memories of events representing the most severe threats ever encountered, 
and; real threat experiences should activate the threat simulation system in a unique 
manner, leading to more frequent and more severe threat simulation dreams.
6.1. The Dream Threat Scale
The threat criteria and the Dream Threat Scale (DTS) developed in Revonsuo 
and Valli (2000) was used in all studies included the present thesis. The DTS was 
proven to be a reliable tool for identifying and classifying threatening events in 
written reports, independent of source of data (dreams vs. real life experiences), 
age of subjects (children vs. adults), life-experiences of subjects (traumatized vs. 
nontraumatized) or the cultural background of participants (Finnish, Swedish, 
Kurdish, and Palestinian). Nevertheless, the data was mostly analyzed by raters who 
were not blind to the TST or to the predictions derived from the TST. Thus, data 
samples analyzed by different judges, preferably ones with no prior knowledge of 
the TST, are needed before making any definitive conclusion about the reliability 
of the DTS. In fact, two studies where the DTS was used by different judges have 
been recently published (Desjardins & Zadra, 2004; Zadra, Desjardins & Marcotte, 
2006), and in these, the interrater agreement levels varied from moderate to strong. 
I do not, however, have information whether these raters were blind to the TST or 
not. I would, nevertheless, recommend the use of the Dream Threat Scale in future 
studies on threatening dream events or empirical tests of the TST. 
One modification to the DTS, however, can be made without compromising the 
results. This modification is the exclusion of subjective threats from the threat 
identification criteria. At the time Study I was conducted, we had no idea how 
frequent subjective threats might be in the data, so they were included in the 
definition. For studies I and II the number of subjective versus objective threats 
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was not available, but in Study III, only 6 threats out of 581 (= 1%) were subjective. 
In a later unpublished study, 3% of threats were found to be subjective (Aitta-aho, 
2006). Thus, the results show that subjective threats form only a minor proportion 
of all threats. Furthermore, in addition to being rare, subjective threats are often 
very difficult to code (often being unscorable), and it seems that they cannot be used 
to test any predictions derived from the TST. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the 
inclusion of subjective threats into threat content analysis affects the results in any 
way, and they can thus be omitted. 
6.2. The TST in the light of evidence from the present thesis
The content analysis results reveal that threatening events are relatively frequent in 
the dreams of ordinary young adults (Studies I, II, and III), very frequent in dreams 
of traumatized children, and least frequent in the dreams of nontraumatized children 
(Studies IV and V). Approximately two thirds of nontraumatized adults’ dream 
reports include a description of a threat, and, on average, more than one threatening 
event per dream is simulated. Up to four out of five dreams of traumatized children 
include threats, whereas majority of dreams reported by nontraumatized children 
include no threat simulations. Thus, exposure to traumatic events significantly 
increases the frequency of threat simulations in dreams. The more severe the trauma, 
the higher number of dreams includes threat simulations.
In Study III, current dream threats were found to be far more frequent than the 
most recent threats experienced during the preceding days, or the past real threats 
retrievable from autobiographical memory. Almost three quarters of the students’ 
dream reports included threatening events as compared to less than one fifth of daily 
logs. In the interviews the students recalled, on average, eighteen real threats from 
their lives, whereas during the two week diary period they had experienced, on average, 
fifteen dream threat simulations. Thus, it seems that threat simulations in dreams are 
experienced on a nightly basis, most recent real threats on a weekly basis, and the most 
memorable threats in our lives occur with the frequency of less than once per year. 
Threats including aggressive components are the most prominent type of threatening 
event in dreams of both adults and children. Aggression is very prevalent in all 
children’s dreams, but the traumatized children simulated aggressive and severe 
threats significantly more often in their dreams than did nontraumatized children 
or nontraumatized young adults. Failures, and accidents and misfortunes are also 
common, whereas catastrophic events and disease and illness are rare. 
In all studies, the threatening events were targeted mainly against the dream self, 
followed by persons significant for the future success of the dream self. Insignificant 
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persons were less frequently threatened, and altogether, threats were more people- 
than resource –centred. In student samples, one fifth of threats were life-threatening 
for the dream self, one third of threats simulated situations where the physical 
or psychological well-being of the self, or the social status or financial resources 
of the dreamer, were threatened. The traumatized children’s dreams included 
proportionally more life-threatening and other types of severe threats than the 
dreams of nontraumatized children or adults. 
The results of Study III revealed that on most aspects the quality of dream 
threats much more closely resembles the old but most salient than the most 
recent threats. Thus, the themes of dream threats seem to be constructed from 
the old memory traces of the most threatening events ever encountered rather 
than from the recent, often minor threats experienced during the preceding 
days. Compared to the most recent and to the most salient real life threats, 
however, dream threats were significantly more severe. Thus, in our dreams we 
more frequently face life-threatening and other severe events than in our waking 
lives, and our dreams exaggerate the dangerousness of those threatening events 
that we have experienced during the waking hours.
Even though reaction to the threat was not always possible in dreams, or was not 
reported, when reactions occurred, they were almost without exception relevant, 
reasonable and appropriate to the dreamed situation. Only rarely did the dreamer 
engage in actions that are impossible in the physical realm but efficient within 
the dream, or physically possible but inappropriate in a comparable waking 
situation. In Study III, we noticed that descriptions of participation were also 
lacking from many daily logs and interview reports concerning most recent and 
most salient real life threats. We suspect that people may have the tendency not 
to report aspects of their own actions, unless specifically inquired. 
The threatening events more often became fully realized than dissolved. 
However, the threatening events were significantly more often resolved than 
realized when the dream self actively participated in the course of the events 
than when the dreamer remained passive. Thus, the activity of the dream self 
positively affected the outcome of the situation. In addition, in Studies I and III, 
and in traumatized children’s dreams, the dreamer was more likely to react to 
the threat when it was life-threatening than to other, less severe events, but this 
relationship was not found in Study II. As to consequences of threats, they often 
went unreported or there were no consequences at all. The threat simulation 
mechanisms therefore does not seem to simulate what happens after the threat 
has been recognized, encountered and appropriate actions have been taken to 
cope with the threat. 
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A majority of threats in the student samples were based on information about 
events that are realistic and possible in the living environment of the subject. Threats 
that are realistic in some parts of the world, but are highly unlikely to happen to 
Finnish or Swedish university students in their normal environment were also often 
simulated, whereas threatening events based on fantasy, fiction, or folk-lore were rare. 
A comparable analysis could not be carried out in Palestinian or Kurdish children’s 
dreams due to the raters’ lack of information concerning their everyday lives.
To sum up, most of the predictions of the TST tested in this thesis received 
considerable support. For some predictions (such as the participation of the dream 
self in threatening events), the evidence could have been stronger. Regardless, no 
contradictory findings to TST’s predictions were observed. 
6.3. The TST in light of other empirical evidence
Despite that fact that the TST was rather recently proposed, other studies testing the 
predictions of the TST than the ones included in the present thesis have also been 
carried out. In this section, these studies are reviewed, and also findings from other 
studies relevant to the TST are discussed. Next, I will return to the six propositions 
of the TST presented in the original formulation of the theory (Revonsuo, 2000a), 
and summarize what kind of new evidence has been accumulating for or against the 
propositions of the TST. Some of the discussion that follows in this section has also 
been presented in Valli and Revonsuo (in press).
6.3.1. Proposition 1.
Dream consciousness is an organized and selective off-line simulation of the real 
perceptual world
The original idea that overall dream imagery is not organized, but random, chaotic, 
incoherent, bizarre and disorganized was presented in the Activation – Synthesis 
theory (Hobson & McCarley, 1977). This influential view was then accepted in 
all later following random activation theories (for example, Antrobus, 2000; Crick 
& Mitchison, 1983; 1995; Flanagan, 1995; 2000; Hobson, 1988; Hobson et al., 
2000). The original Activation – Synthesis hypothesis was based on animal research 
that revealed that phasic signals, that is, the ponto-geniculo-occipital (PGO) waves, 
arise in the pontine brain stem during REM sleep.  The PGO-waves were thought 
to be chaotic and random rather than organized or carrying some systematic, coded 
information. Furthermore, the PGO waves were assumed to activate the cortex 
and the limbic forebrain in an unpredictable, chaotic, random manner, and lead 
directly to a synthesizing process that in turn creates visual hallucinations, motor 
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imagery, emotions and bizarre dream cognition from the chaotic stimulation. Thus, 
the Activation-Synthesis hypothesis states that chaotic signals originating from 
the brain stem initiate a process that results in random and disorganized dream 
mentation, that is, that the cortex tries to make some sense of and tries to impose a 
narrative structure on the random brain activation (Hobson & McCarley, 1977). 
Nevertheless, the belief that dreams are disorganised and incoherent, as to their form 
and content, is not based on empirical evidence. Dream content studies systematically 
show that perceptual and sensory contents of dreams closely resemble the form and 
content of our waking life experiences (Revonsuo, 2006). At the moment, no new 
evidence has been presented that would contradict previous findings. Consequently, 
almost all researchers accept that dreams are well organized phenomenal experiences.
This does not mean, however, that the occurrence bizarre dream imagery is refuted. 
Bizarreness is rather seen as bringing only some degree of disorganization and 
unpredictability into an overall well-organized dream experience.
Regardless, not all accept that dreams are selective simulations of waking life. For 
example, the Continuity Hypothesis states that dreaming simply reflects waking 
experiences in a passive manner. There is a vast amount of evidence that real life 
events are incorporated into dream content, but not all types of events, however, end 
up being simulated in dreams (Hartmann, 2000; Schredl, 2000, Schredl & Hofmann, 
2003), and other types of content get overrepresented. Therefore, some type of active 
selection process seems to be going on in the brain when dream content is under 
construction. The continuity hypothesis cannot explain these patterns of under- and 
overrepresentation of specific dream content (Revonsuo 2000b).
6.3.2. Proposition 2. 
Dream consciousness is specialized in simulating threatening events
Revonsuo and Valli (2000) developed a content analysis scale to study dream threats 
and to test the predictions of TST. As evident by the results presented in this thesis, 
threat simulations frequently occur in dreams, much more frequently than real 
threatening events are encountered in the waking realm, and the threat simulations 
are severe, realistic and efficient rehearsals of real situations for the dream self. 
Revonsuo and Valli (2000) were not, however, the first ones to explore threatening 
events in dreams4. 
4 Revonsuo and Valli (2000) were not the first to categorize threats in dreams, although at the time they devised their scale, they 
were not aware of the previous work by Framo, Osterweil and Boszormenyi-Nagy (1962). Moreover, also Framo et al. (1962) had 
developed a dream threat coding system, and had named their coding system the Dream Threat Scale!
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6.3.2.1. Dreams of psychotic patients
Framo et al. (1962) studied the incidence of threats in dreams of psychotic 
patients, guided by the psychoanalytic paradigm. They used very similar threat 
identification criteria as were later introduced by Revonsuo and Valli (2000). Of 
the 98 patients enrolled in Framo et al.’s study (1962), 92 (90.2%) reported at least 
one dream in an interview, and all but five patients (80%) reported a threatening 
dream. The self was the main target of the threat in 60% of the dreams, and 
other persons in the remaining 40%. Even though psychotic patients are not an 
ideal sample for studying threatening events in dreams, because nightmares, or 
the reported distress associated with the nightmare experience, are related to 
psychological disturbance (Claridge, Clark & Davis, 1997; Levin & Fireman, 
2002), the findings of Framo et al. (1962) are consistent with results presented 
in this thesis. 
6.3.2.2. Recurrent dreams and nightmares
Zadra et al. (2006) utilized the Dream Threat Scale of Valli and Revonsuo (2000) in 
a Canadian sample to explore threatening events in recurrent dreams. They aimed 
to clarify whether recurrent dreams could be seen as exemplary cases of threat 
simulation dreams, as suggested by Revonsuo (2000b). The data was collected with 
a retrospective questionnaire, from subjects recruited to studies on dreams and 
personality. One dream report was selected from each participant, although some 
of them reported more than one recurrent dream. Desjardins and Zadra (2004) 
also explored with the DTS the extent to which nightmares could be interpreted as 
extreme threat simulation dreams The data was collected using a two- to four-week 
dream diary, and from the diaries, a maximum of two nightmares per subject were 
randomly selected. 
The overall threat frequency in recurrent dreams and nightmares was strikingly 
similar to dreams collected with systematic dream diaries from university students, 
with two thirds of dreams including threats. This indicates that recurrent dreams 
and nightmares simulate threatening events equally often as normal dreams but 
not more frequently. The quality of threats, however, was different in normative 
and recurrent dreams and nightmares. Threatening events including aggressive 
components were more prominent in recurrent dreams and nightmares than in 
normative dreams while accidents and failures are less frequent (Desjardins & 
Zadra, 2004; Zadra et al., 2006). Cases of disease or illness were never simulated in 
these special types of dreams. Recurrent dreams and nightmares concentrated on 
simulating specifically life-threatening situations: sixty-five percent of all threats 
in recurrent dreams, and seventy-two percent in nightmares, were life-threatening 
whereas minor mishaps were seldom the topic of threat simulations. This finding 
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is very specific for recurrent dreams and nightmares, indicating that these special 
dreams seem to focus on very primitive, extreme types of threat simulations.
Zadra et al. (2006) also report interesting findings concerning the reactions of the 
dream self to threatening events. In recurrent dreams, the dreamer actively fought 
the threat in 34% of cases, fled from the event in 39%, or did both (5%). Similarly, 
in nightmares 58% of threatening events were met by fighting or fleeing the 
situation. Zadra et al. (2006) also investigated the factors behind the inactivity of 
the dreamer, and found that in 21% of threats the participation could not be coded 
for due to missing information, in 15% the dreamer did not participate because it 
was impossible (dreamer was not present in the situation, or the threat had already 
taken place), in 5% of cases someone prevented the dream self from participating, 
and in only 2% of cases the dreamer was passive or indifferent to the situation. In 
sum, inactivity of the dreamer most often results from external factors that prevent 
participation, not from passivity on behalf of the dreamer.
Surprisingly, completely realistic threats accounted for only one quarter of all 
threats in recurrent dreams, unlikely but possible threats one third, and fictitious 
threats constituted the majority (40%). Recurrent dreams thus seem to include more 
unrealistic and bizarre threat simulations than normative dreams. Nightmares fall 
somewhere between normative dreams and recurrent dreams, as more than half of 
the threats in nightmares were realistic, a quarter realistic but unlikely, and a quarter 
fantasy- or fiction based.
6.3.2.3. Earliest remembered dreams
Bulkeley, Broughton, Sanchez and Stiller (2005) tested several dream theories in 
a sample of 85 earliest remembered dreams (ERDs). They interviewed people of 
varying ages and collected the first dream the person remembered that he or she 
had ever had. The earliest remembered dreams originated from ages between 3 
and 12, and twenty-two of the reported dreams were described as recurrent (19%). 
The dreams were content analyzed with the classic Hall and Van de Castle (1966) 
method. Physical aggression was strikingly frequent in ERDs when compared to 
Hall and Van de Castle (1966; Domhoff, 1996) norms, and almost all of it was 
directed against the dream self. 
Bulkeley et al. (2005) also studied the motifs and themes in the ERDs from the 
following perspectives: wish-fulfilment dreams, flying dreams, titanic dreams, 
mystical dreams, and threat simulation dreams. A majority of dreams (61%) included 
explicit threat themes, and altogether, three quarters of dreams were considered as 
unpleasant or disturbing. Bulkeley et al. (2005) interpreted the results from theoretical 
89
DISCUSSION
perspectives proposed by Freud (1900/1965), Jung (1965; 1974), Foulkes (1982; 
1999), Domhoff (1996; 2003), and Revonsuo (2000a), and concluded that the threat 
simulation theory received strongest support in the context of ERDs. Nevertheless, 
as the earliest remembered dreams tend to be unpleasant and disturbing, thus more 
comparable to nightmares and recurrent dreams than to normative dreams, they are 
not the most representative sample to test any dream theory. On the other hand, 
ERDs test directly the TST’s prediction that the evolutionary bias to simulate 
threats should be at its strongest early in life (Revonsuo, 2000a), and this prediction 
receives further support from the results of Bulkeley et al. (2005).
6.3.2.4. Most recent dreams
Malcolm-Smith and Solms (2004), and Malcolm-Smith, Solms, Turnbull and 
Tredoux (in press, a) have recently studied the effect of threatening real life events 
on dream content. They have, however, used much narrower threat identification 
criteria than the one used in the present thesis, including only realistic direct physical 
threats to the dream self. Thus, their results are not directly comparable to ours, but 
may be best comparable to our results on life-threatening and physically dangerous 
dream threats. 
Malcolm-Smith and Solms (2004) collected, by applying a questionnaire in the 
classroom, 401 most recent dreams (MRD). The term most recent dream may be 
slightly misleading as the dream the subject happens to recall may, as a matter of 
fact, originate from the previous night or as far as from months ago. In this study, 
the subjects were South-African university students, of whom 44.6% reported an 
exposure to a real life threatening event. In Malcolm-Smith et al.’s (in press, a) 
study, participants were also undergraduate psychology students at the University 
of Cape Town in the Western Cape, South Africa (n = 208), and in addition from 
the University of Wales in Bangor, UK (n = 116). This latter study was designed 
to test differences in threat simulation system activation in these student samples, 
because there is a marked contrast across the regions with high levels of violent 
crime occurring in the Western Cape, and a low level in the Wales. Approximately 
half of South African participants in this sample had experienced a life-threatening 
event during the past four years, compared to one fifth of Welsh participants. Again, 
most recent dreams were collected with a retrospective questionnaire.
In Malcolm-Smith and Solms’s (2004) study, approximately every fifth most 
recent dream (21.2%) included an event threatening the dreamer’s physical well-
being, of which about one third were life-threatening (8.5%). Successful threat 
avoidance responses took place in half of the threats (13% of all threats; 2.7% of 
all dreams). In Malcolm-Smith et al.’s (in press, a) study, the MRD reports of 
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Welsh participants contained more realistic physical threats than those of South 
Africans (18.63% vs. 8.65%). Thus, the students living in the low crime context 
reported a higher proportion of threat dreams.
Malcolm-Smith and Solms (2004) and Malcolm-Smith et al. (in press, a) interpret 
these results as falsifying evidence for the predictions of TST. They regard that 
the TST is incorrect in predicting that threatening events are more frequently 
experienced in dreams than in waking life, and that exposure to real ecologically 
valid threat cues fully activates the threat simulation system. These interpretations 
are, however, open to some criticism. The following critical comments are mainly 
based on Revonsuo and Valli (in press). 
First, in both studies the incidence of dream threats and threats encountered in 
the waking life was measured by collecting 1) only a single most recent dream, 
that is, a report that covered only a few minutes of the subject’s dream life, and 
2) an autobiographical threat incidence history, that is, a report that covered the 
subject’s entire lifetime (Malcolm-Smith & Solms, 2004) or the most recent four 
years (Malcolm-Smith et al., in press, a). Thus, the two sample ranges are inherently 
incomparable, as years of subjective experiences during wakefulness were contrasted 
against maybe five minutes of subjective experiences during sleep (Revonsuo & 
Valli, in press). 
Second, the MRD data collection method delivers an inadequate sample of an 
individual’s dream life to tell us much about the threat-simulation system. In MRD, 
an individual’s entire dream life is represented by one single spontaneously recalled 
dream report. This report is not written down immediately after waking up, but with 
an unknown delay of several hours, days, or even weeks. Furthermore, immediately 
after having had the dream, the subject has not had any intention, motivation, or 
practise, to formulate accurate long-term memories of the dream. The subject only 
finds out that he or she is a participant in dream research when the questionnaire is 
presented to him or her perhaps days or weeks later. Therefore, a sample of dream 
reports collected with this method is biased and too limited compared with more 
systematic data collection methods. MRD is bound to represent only a distorted 
fragment of the richness of an individual’s dream life, including his or her dream 
threats. Consequently, the MRD studies are not methodologically valid tests of the 
prediction of TST that threatening events are overrepresented in dreams (Revonsuo 
& Valli, in press).
Furthermore, when using the MRD method to study dream threats, the results 
do not seem to be reliable or replicable. When we compared the recent results of 
Malcolm-Smith et al. (in press, a) and their previous results reported in Malcolm-
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Smith and Solms (2004), we observed large variation in the results despite identical 
methods and comparable subject samples (Revonsuo & Valli, in press). In the 
previous study, Malcolm-Smith and Solms (2004) report that 21.2% of 401 MRDs 
collected from South-African university students included a threat to physical 
survival of the dream self. In the second sample of 208 MRDs (Malcolm-Smith 
et al., in press, a), also collected from South-African students (that is, the samples 
should be comparable in all respects), the threat inclusion rate was 8.65%. A 
significant difference in the results thus emerged. Malcolm-Smith et al. (in press, 
b) later reported that these samples were independent.  This, in turn, indicates that 
MRD is not the most reliable method for studying dream threat content. 
Third, Malcolm-Smith and Solms (2004), and Malcolm-Smith et al. (in press, a) 
have not measured the graded activity level of the threat-simulation system in any 
way that would allow an estimation of the level of activation of an individual’s 
threat simulation system in terms of the quantity and the quality of the threatening 
events produced by the system (Revonsuo & Valli, in press). In fact, individuals 
and dreams in their samples are represented dichotomously. Each individual has 
contributed only one single dream report to the data set, and that report has been 
classified as either including a “realistic physical threat to survival of dream self ” 
or not. Thus, the chosen measures represent a variable as dichotomous although in 
reality the phenomenon (the graded activity level of threat-simulation system) is 
continuous. This way of measuring the “graded activity level” of the system is invalid, 
as it is incapable of detecting any gradation in the activity level at the individual 
level. What Malcolm-Smith and Solms (2004) and Malcolm-Smith et al. (in press, 
a) actually do report in their studies is the proportion of individuals who, when 
asked to describe a single dream, describe a dream with a “realistic physical threat 
to survival of dream self ”. 
Another issue is that Malcolm-Smith and Solms (2004), and Malcolm-Smith et 
al. (in press, a) use a very narrow definition of dream threat (Revonsuo & Valli, 
in press). Their definition only includes “realistic physical threats targeted against the 
dream self and directly relevant to survival” (in the ancestral environment). While 
this surely is an important category of threats, it does not cover all the different 
kinds of threatening events that potentially endangered the reproductive success of 
our ancestors (that is, that threatened their inclusive fitness). The threat simulation 
theory itself does not imply such a narrow definition of threats, but takes threats to 
be any adverse events that potentially endanger future reproductive success. In the 
ancestral environment, these would have included such things as injury or death 
of close genetic relatives, social isolation or rejection by group members, loss of 
valuable material resources (tools or weapons, hunting grounds, sources of nutrition 
etc.), or loss of social status. Although these threats are not necessarily classified 
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as life-threatening or physical threats, there is little doubt that they were highly 
important for an individual’s fitness in ancestral populations, that is, for future 
reproductive success.
Finally, if we adopt the view that threatening events are repetitively simulated 
in dreams, throughout the night in subsequent REM periods (and most likely 
also during NREM sleep), the data presented by Malcolm-Smith and Solms’s 
(2004) and Malcolm-Smith et al. (in press, a) can be compared with repetition 
rates calculated from other datasets (Valli & Revonsuo, in press). Their data, 
then, turn out to be consistent with ours. If we assume that the students in 
Malcolm-Smith and Solms’s (2004) and Malcolm-Smith et al.’s (in press, a) 
study have 3.3 REM dreams per night (as estimated for Finnish and Swedish 
university students), and as the reported results indicated, 8.7% to 21.2% of 
dreams include either a life-threat or a threat to physical well-being, the subjects 
will consequently encounter, on average, 105 to 255 threatening dream events 
per year. The annual frequency estimations of life-threatening and physically 
dangerous events based on Malcolm-Smith and Solms’s (2004) and Malcolm-
Smith et al.’s (in press, a) data are, in fact, higher than our conservative annual 
threat simulation estimates (80 life threatening and physically dangerous events), 
although lower than our liberal estimates (427 life threatening and physically 
dangerous events). Thus, when the perspective of threat repetition rates is taken, 
Malcolm-Smith and Solms’s (2004) and Malcolm-Smith et al.’s (in press, a) 
data seems to actually support the predictions of the TST approximately to the 
same extent as our data. It would also seem that 105 to 255 severely threatening 
events in dreams per year must vastly outnumber the frequency of threats with 
comparable severity in the real lives of the studied individuals, supporting the 
finding that dream threats are more frequent and more dangerous than real 
threats (Valli et al., 2008).
6.3.3. Proposition 3. 
Real threat experiences trigger the activation of the threat simulation system and 
the material for dream simulations is derived from episodic LTM
The TST claims that the triggering and construction of threat simulations is 
systematically modulated by the negative emotional charge attached to the 
episodic memory traces in the amygdala-centred “hot” emotional memory systems 
(Revonsuo, 2000a). The currently available evidence from both dream content and 
brain imaging studies seems to offer support for these predictions, although more 
direct tests are needed. 
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First, several previous studies on traumatized individuals’ dreams, already 
mentioned in the original publication of the TST (Revonsuo, 2000a) have shown 
that posttraumatic nightmares are commonly reported by both children (Nader, 
1996; Nader, et al., 1990; Pynoos & Nader, 1988; Pynoos, et al., 1987; Terr, 1979; 
1983) and adults (Barrett, 1996; Hartmann, 1984; 1996; 1998; Lavie, 1996; Wilmer, 
1996) who have been exposed to life-threatening events. Other older, and many 
new studies, as well as reviews in the field of trauma and dreams offer confirmatory 
findings (Esposito, Benitez, Barza & Mellman, 1999; Kuch & Cox, 1992; Levin & 
Nielsen, 2007; Schreuder, van Egmond, Kleijn & Visser, 1998; Schreuder, Kleijn & 
Rooijmans, 2000; van der Kolk, Blitz, Burr, Sherry & Hartmann, 1984; Wittmann, 
Schredl & Kramer, 2007; Wood, Bootzin, Rosenhan, Nolen-Hoeksema & Jourden, 
1992). Even simply watching highly traumatic real events on television, such as the 
9/11 attacks, has an impact on dream content (Hartmann & Brezler, 2008; Propper, 
Stickgold, Keeley & Christman, 2007). 
Second, Peterson, Henke and Hayes (2002) recently tested the idea of the TST 
that dreams are an evolutionary mechanism designed to facilitate the rehearsal of 
coping strategies in dangerous situations. Their study was based on the fact that 
the limbic system is active both during times of threat and during REM sleep. 
Consequently, they hypothesized that individuals with relative limbic hyperfunction, 
as indexed by increased scores on the Limbic System Checklist (LSCL-33), would 
report more threatening dream content. They measured threat content in dreams 
by a recollection of the Most Recent Dream. Subjects who received high scores 
on LSCL-33 reported more threatening dream content than subjects with low 
scores in limbic system function (Peterson et al., 2000). In addition, subjects who 
attained low scores in limbic system function reported more pleasant dream content 
(Peterson et al., 2000). Participants with limbic system hyperfunction also reported 
recurrent dreams with more threatening dream content while subjects with low 
limbic system function had more pleasant recurrent dreams (Peterson et al., 2002). 
The results of Peterson et al. (2002) thus support the idea that the limbic system 
plays a role in the generation of threatening dream content. 
Third, the amygdaloid complexes and those brain areas receiving abundant amygdalar 
efferents are highly active during REM sleep and dreaming (Braun et al., 1997; 
Dang-Vu et al., 2005; Hamann et al., 1999; Maquet, 1999; 2000; Maquet et al., 
1996; 2004; Schwartz et al., 2005; Schwartz & Maquet, 2002). This indicates that 
episodic memories paired with emotional stimuli, especially aversive and threatening 
stimuli, are activated and processed during dreaming, thus most likely contributing 
to negatively biased dream content. Amygdaloid activity during REM sleep is also 
highly compatible with the findings of the present thesis that the threat simulations 
are constructed from negative and threatening episodic memory traces (Valli et al., 
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2008), and that the threat simulation system functions more actively in traumatized 
than nontraumatized individuals, producing more frequent and more severe threat 
simulation dreams (Valli et al., 2005; 2006). 
There might, however, be interindividual differences in the sensitivity to produce 
threat simulation dreams. Whether these differences are innate, due to environmental 
factors, or require an interaction between genetic and environmental components 
(as most psychological characteristics do), some people may be more prone to threat 
simulation dreams than others (for example, due to ontogenetically early exposure 
to life threats, or those with limbic hyperfunction as suggested by Peterson et al., 
2002). In fact, an evolutionary hypothesis of the function of dreaming readily 
accepts, even demands, variation within the population in the dream production 
and threat simulation activity. Thus, the findings that some people have high dream 
recall and threat simulation rates whereas other report never having dreamed (Pagel, 
2003) are compatible with an evolutionary approach to dreaming.
6.3.4. Proposition 4. 
Threat simulations are behaviorally and perceptually realistic
As far as the brain mechanisms responsible for the planning and execution of 
motor commands are concerned, mentally simulated actions are equivalent to 
real actions (Decety, 1995; Jeannerod, 1994; 1995). Recent evidence from REM 
dreams supports the notion that dreamed actions are compatible with neural 
simulations of real actions (Erlacher & Schredl, 2008). Moreover, motor skills 
practised during lucid dreams in REM sleep seem to lead to improved skills on 
subsequent real performance (Erlacher, 2005), although the results need to be 
replicated in larger samples. 
Motor commands are created at the cortical level, but their execution is inhibited by 
the brain stem mechanisms producing muscular atonia during REM sleep. The TST 
predicts that if the muscular atonia during REM sleep is removed, we should be 
able to observe, in the physical realm, behaviors that the dreamer is simultaneously 
performing within the dream (Revonsuo, 2000a). Complex behaviors manifesting 
during REM sleep have been studied in cats by surgically removing REM sleep 
atonia. REM sleep without muscle tone leads to species specific behaviors in cats, 
inducing postures and motions typical for visual exploration, orienting, searching, 
stalking, running, hunting, predatory aggression and attacking, but also for fear, 
defence and rage ( Jouvet, 1999; Morrison, 1983). 
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Anecdotal evidence concerning whether the movements performed within the 
dream context are isomorphic to real movements carried out simultaneously in 
the physical realm is available from REM sleep behavior disorder (RBD) patients. 
According to Schenck (1993), there is a very close link between the actions 
performed within the dream experience and the observed enacting behaviors. In 
the very first RBD study by Schenck, Bundlie, Ettiger and Mahowald (1986), three 
of the five studied patients directly linked dreaming with sleep behaviors, and the 
relationship was inferred by the spouses of the two other patients. Similar cases have 
also been reported by Boeve, Silber, Ferman, Kokmen, Smith, Ivnik, et al. (1998), 
Comella, Nardine, Diedrich and Stebbins (1998), and Dyken, Lin-Dyken, Seaba 
and Yamada (1995). Upon awakening after manifested movements, the explanation 
for the taken actions in 87% of the RBD patients is of defence against attack (Olson, 
Boeve & Silber, 2000). Thus, dreamed actions seem to isomorphically correspond 
to real actions, and dream enactment behaviors seem to be elicited especially by 
threatening dream content. 
Nevertheless, only few systematic studies have been conducted on the nocturnal 
movements and dream content of RBD patients. Fantini, Corona, Clerici and 
Ferini-Strambi (2005) compared, in an interview study, the dream content of RBD 
patients to the dream content of age- and sex-matched controls, also accounting 
for levels of daytime aggressiveness. The dreams were analyzed with the Hall and 
Van de Castle system (1996; Domhoff, 1996; 2003). Fantini et al. (2005) found that 
RBD patients’ dream content is characterized by increase in aggressive contents, 
especially in physical aggressiveness, without simultaneous increase in the levels of 
daytime aggressiveness. This study does not, however, provide an answer whether 
nocturnal enactment behaviors are directly linked to dream content, and especially 
to threatening dream content. Fantini et al. (2005) and Fantini and Ferini-Strambi 
(2007) acknowledge, however, that RBD may originate from an inappropriately 
activated threat simulation mechanism, leading to intense threat simulation dreams 
and enacted behavioural responses. This interpretation of RBD was first proposed 
by Revonsuo (2000a), and the data that has emerged seems to support the idea 
that RBD (and some other parasomnias) involve an overactivated threat simulation 
system.
Santamaria, Carrasco, Kumru, Iranzo, Pintor, De Pablo, et al. (2004) also compared, 
in a sleep laboratory study, the dream content of RBD patients to that of healthy 
controls, and found that dreams with violent or highly anxious content were only 
reported by patients. Furthermore, they compared the dream recall frequency and 
dream content to the intensity of nocturnal movements, and discovered that dream 
recall increased with intensity of movements, but that severe movements were not 
always linked to dream recall nor to violent or highly anxious dream content. Thus, 
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the exact relationship between nocturnal enactment behaviors and dream content 
remains unclear. The currently available evidence suggests that dream content and 
nocturnal movements are, at least sometimes, directly causally related to each other, 
although they may also occur independently, dissociated from each other.
6.3.5. Proposition 5. 
Repeated rehearsal leads to improved performance, even in the absence of recall of 
the training episodes
The TST states that through implicit memory, and especially procedural learning, 
simulation training is likely to lead to improved performance in real threat 
avoidance situations (Revonsuo, 2006). Glisky (1992), Glisky, Schacter and Tulving 
(1986), Glisky and Schacter (1988; 1989), and Schacter (1996) have shown that 
enhancement in subsequent performance can be gained even by amnesic patients 
who have no recall of training episodes. Therefore, if people were deprived of 
dreaming, their performance in tasks requiring implicit memory should deteriorate. 
At the moment, in the absence of any physiological marker for dreaming, it is 
impossible to deprive people of dreams without simultaneously preventing them 
from being asleep. Nevertheless, as dreaming is tightly coupled with REM sleep, 
REM sleep deprivation should have a detrimental effect on performance requiring 
implicit or procedural memory or skills rather than on explicit semantic or episodic 
representations.
The role of sleep in learning and memory consolidation is a vastly researched topic, 
and too extensive to be reviewed here in detail, especially as few studies in the 
field are directly related to the TST’s predictions. Although the results have varied, 
and even been contradictory, there now seems to be compelling evidence that sleep 
promotes the long-term consolidation of declarative and procedural memories (for 
recent reviews, see for example Ellenbogen, Payne & Stickgold, 2006; Marshall 
& Born, 2007; Stickgold & Walker, 2007). Smith (1995) found that memory for 
implicit procedural tasks is impaired by REM sleep deprivation, while the memory 
for explicit tasks is not. Hippocampus-dependent declarative memory seems to 
benefit particularly from slow-wave sleep (SWS), whereas REM sleep seems to 
benefit procedural aspects of memory (for example, Marshall & Born, 2007). Thus, 
recent evidence seems to lead to a conclusion that unique neurobiological processes 
within sleep actively enhance memories, thus supporting the idea that REM and 
dream deprivation lead to deficits in implicit learning.
Martinez-Gonzalez, Obermeyer, Fahy, Riboh, Kalin and Benca (2004) studied, in 
rats, the effects of REM deprivation on defensive and coping behaviors elicited by 
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threatening stimuli. They found that REM sleep deprived rats spent more time 
on open fields, had decreased freezing time and exhibited less defensive burying 
behavior, that is, the species-typical threat avoidance and coping behaviors were 
widely affected by REM deprivation. Even the administration of amphetamine to 
compensate for sleep loss did not reverse the harmful effects of REM deprivation, 
and in some cases, the deficits were even exacerbated. Thus, loss of dreaming 
through REM deprivation might result in weakened threat avoidance responses 
also in humans, although dreaming and REM sleep are not identical concepts to 
each other, and should not be confused. 
6.3.6. Proposition 6. 
Ecologically valid threat cues in the ancestral environment fully activated the threat 
simulation system and an active threat simulation mechanism led to enhanced 
reproductive success
Consider that the threat simulation system develops and matures from early 
childhood on, as soon as the child is capable of perceiving and recognizing threats 
in his or her environment. In the ancestral environment, real ecologically valid 
threat cues were ever present, for instance, in the form of encounters with wild 
animals, and fully activated the threat simulation mechanism. Nightmares have 
been reported by children as young as two-year-olds, and are prominent in three 
to six-year-olds (Hartmann, 1998). The themes are often about being chased or 
hurt (Hartmann, 1998). Thus, under ideal ecologically valid conditions, that is, an 
ancestral environment full of threat cues, the threat simulation system was most 
likely activated by the age of six, probably before (Valli & Revonsuo, in press). 
Ontogenetically early activation of the simulation system is essential if the person 
is to be able to respond efficiently to environmental demands as soon as he or she 
faces them. As the mean life expectancy in Pleistocene humans was well below 25 
years (Meindl, 1992), the critical period when an active threat simulation system 
would have yielded survival benefits would have been after the child started to 
explore the world independently and before his or her offspring was old enough 
to survive independent of parental care (Valli & Revonsuo, in press). Thus, in the 
ancestral environment the greatest benefits offered by an active threat simulation 
system would have been approximately between ages six and twenty. Altogether, a 
person who lived long enough to produce offspring, and raise them to the age when 
they were able to provide for themselves, would have been simulating threats in his 
or her dreams for about fifteen years. 
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Threat scenarios are, based on our liberal threat simulation rate estimates, encountered 
several times per night, and up to 1 600 times per year or more, although we only 
remember a small proportion of them. The dreamer engages in hundreds of REM 
dream threat simulations that deal with aggressive situations, failures and accidents, 
which most often threaten the dreamer. The dreamer also repeatedly uses relevant 
and efficient defensive tactics to avoid the threats. Even though about half of 
the REM dream threat simulations in nontraumatized subjects deal with minor 
mishaps in the current western adult populations, the other half, that is almost 
thousand simulations, focuses on mimicking events that would endanger the future 
reproductive success of the individual if experienced during waking hours. 
The liberal threat simulation rate estimate was based on what is currently known 
about dream recall frequency when awakened from REM sleep, assuming that only 
one dream per each REM period takes place. However, as REM periods become 
longer towards the morning, they might include more than one dream experience 
or more than one threat. At least, the dreams experienced in later REM phases 
are longer if not more numerous. Dream report word count and the subjectively 
estimated duration of dreams increase with length of preceding REM stage (Dement 
& Kleitman, 1957; Stickgold, Pace-Schott & Hobson, 1994). We already know that 
the number and length of dream reports (thus probably also the underlying length of 
dream experience) correlates positively with the number of threat simulations: The 
more and the longer the dream reports, the more threatening events they include 
(Aitta-aho, 2006; Valli et al., 2007; 2008). In contrast, the quality of threatening 
events in short vs. long threat descriptions is not statistically significantly different 
(Valli, Suominen & Revonsuo, unpublished result). Thus, we could expect more 
numerous threat simulations in late versus early night REM stages. Consequently, 
the estimated threat repetition rates could well undermine the true simulation 
rates.
Further, threat simulations may not be linked only to length of REM periods, but 
also to intensity of REM sleep. The intensity of REM sleep is measured by the level 
of phasic activation (for example, number of eye movements), and the intensity 
of REM sleep increases progressively across successive REM periods (Takahashi, 
1999). Thus, threat simulation in dreams might be less frequent in early than late 
night REM periods, that is, when REM sleep is less intense. Strauch and Meier 
(1996), however, conclude in their review that more strongly activated REM sleep 
(measured by level of phasic activation) is not necessarily linked to particularly vivid 
and intense dreaming. Consequently, the exact relationship between the intensity 




As mentioned previously, dreaming is not restricted only to REM phase of sleep, 
but also occurs in NREM sleep. Average dream recall rate in NREM awakenings 
is 43% (SD = 20.8, range = 0% - 75%) (Nielsen, 2000), that is, half as frequent as 
in REM awakenings. Although the debate whether REM and NREM dreams are 
qualitatively similar is ongoing (Fosse et al., 2001: Hobson et al., 2000; Nielsen, 
2000; Strauch & Meier, 1996), the conclusion that can be currently made is that 
full-blown off-line world simulations are more likely to be present in REM sleep 
dreams than in NREM sleep dreams, and in late NREM than in early NREM 
dreams. Regardless, full-blown world simulations are present in some proportion 
of NREM dreaming. This suggests that threat simulation is not restricted to REM 
sleep, but occurs whenever the brain manages to produce complex contents of 
phenomenal consciousness that amount to a world simulation. Consequently, the 
combined threat simulation rates from NREM and REM sleep are probably much 
higher than estimated only for REM dreams. 
If the liberal estimation of annual REM dream threat repetition rate is even close 
to the actual minimum threat simulation rate, fifteen years of dreaming in the 
ancestral environment would have amounted to over twenty-five thousand threat 
simulations during an ancestral individual’s most productive years, that is, between 
ages of six and twenty. This estimation is, nonetheless, calculated from the dreams of 
modern day students that have not been frequently exposed to severe threats in their 
environment. Compared to Scandinavian university students, our ancestors lived in 
an environment full of dangers and were much more often exposed to real severe 
threatening situations. Exposure to real threatening events would probably have 
rendered the estimated threat repetition rates higher, and the threat simulations 
more severe, as indicated by the data from traumatized children. Furthermore, sleep 
length seems to have decreased in the modern environment. Although historical 
data is hard to come by, and we have no rates for average sleep duration in ancestral 
environment, in Finland in the past 33 years sleep length has decreased by 18 
minutes (Kronholm, Partonen, Laatikainen, Peltonen, Härmä, Hublin, et al., 2008). 
In the United States, the decrease has been 0.3 hours, that is, 18 minutes, during 
the past six years (The National Sleep Foundation, 2002; 2008). Even though the 
exact decrease in average sleep length from Pleistocene to present is unknown, our 
ancestors most likely slept longer, and children and adolescents slept longer than 
adults (as also nowadays). Thus, ancestral humans between ages of six and twenty most 
likely had one extra REM period per night compared to modern humans. Further, 
the younger the individual, the higher the proportion of REM sleep compared to 
total sleep time (Roffwarg et al., 1966). An extra REM period and proportionally 
more REM sleep probably equals to more dreams and more threat simulations. 
Consequently, twenty-five thousand threat simulations during an individual’s life 
span in the ancestral environment is likely to be an underestimation.
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In the Pleistocene environment, major causes of death included infectious diseases, 
parasites and poor living conditions, exposure to natural elements, risky activities 
in food acquisition, predation by large carnivores, and aggressive encounters with 
conspecifics (Dobson, 1992; Landers, 1992; Meindl, 1992). How are the various 
most likely causes of death reflected in the dream content of modern humans? Is 
the threat simulation system still wired in such a way that it is more sensitive to 
simulating events most critical in the EEA? What exactly were the most critical 
events in the EEA like, in terms of stable and recurrent selection pressures and overt 
threat avoidance responses? After all, threats that cannot be avoided are useless to 
rehearse.  
The matches between the nature of dream threats and the threats most beneficial to 
simulate in the ancestral environment are striking. Aggressive encounters in defence 
of territories or valuable property, both between and within group rivals, were likely 
regular features of the social environment, and the rehearsal of how to deal with such 
threats could have led to better chances of survival. Risky activities during hunting 
and gathering, such as avoiding predators and other harmful animals, or accidental 
injuries or other misfortunes, were probably frequently encountered. Behavioral 
strategies to avoid such dangers were various and could have been rehearsed in 
different combinations in dreams, as indicated in the amount of threats focusing in 
escapes, accidents and misfortunes.   
As we now know, disease and illness are seldom simulated in dreams. Not surprisingly, 
infections and diseases are hard to avoid, and in the absence of medication, difficult 
to cure. Thus, simulating infectious illnesses and how to deal with them would have 
been rather futile in the EEA. The avoidance of macroparasitic agents or poisonous 
animals, detectable with a naked eye, such as Helminth worms or snakes, scorpions 
and spiders, is easier. In fact, we have natural defences, for example, disgust and 
fear reactions, to help us avoid many unhealthy substances (faeces, bloody wounds, 
contaminated foods) or harmful animals. Thus, the simulation of these types of 
dangers in dreams, that is, scary or disgusting animals, might have been useful for our 
ancestors. Insects, spiders and snakes are, in fact, one of the universal dream themes, 
although not on the top of the list (Nielsen et al., 2003). In addition, exposure to 
natural elements, such as cold, drought, or storms, was probably frequent in the 
evolutionary environment, whereas large scale catastrophes were likely rare. Thus, 
rehearsing how to survive a large scale natural disaster would not have been very 
effective, as there were no stable and recurrent selection pressures of such kind to 
begin with, and on the other hand, one could do very little to avoid such perils. 
To summarize, the main components of effective threat simulation, that is, perception 
and recognition of the threatening agent, and the selection and implementation of 
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an efficacious behavioral strategy, are rehearsed frequently in dreams. During an 
individual’s life span threat recognition and avoidance is practiced thousands or tens 
of thousands of times (Valli & Revonsuo, in press). But would the estimated amount 
of threat recognition and avoidance rehearsal have been sufficient in our ancestors’ 
lives to lead to maintained or improved performance in subsequent comparable real 
situations? I argue that even if we assume that the mean threat simulation frequency 
was about the same in our ancestors as in modern day nontraumatized students, 
and there was similar variation in threat simulation frequency in the population, it 
might well have been enough in the original evolutionary environment to result in 
differential reproduction rates between those who frequently simulated threats in 
their dreams and those whose threat simulation mechanism was poorly activated.
6.4. The strengths of the TST
The TST correctly predicts that threatening events are more frequent and severe in 
dreams than in waking life, that the threats are mainly targeted against the dream 
self and significant others, that the threat simulations are largely realistic, and that 
the dream self engages in relevant reactions that would also be adequate and efficient 
in a comparable waking life situation. Furthermore, the threat simulations are 
constructed from episodic memory traces containing the highest negative emotional 
charge, as opposed to recently encoded memory traces representing minor everyday 
mishaps.  Similarly, the prediction that only personal exposure to ecologically valid 
threat cues in the environment fully activates the threat simulation mechanism is 
supported by evidence from dreams of traumatized and nontraumatized children. 
If we rank the dream content studies exploring threatening events in dreams, the 
proportion of dreams containing threatening events is highest in the sample of 
severely traumatized Kurdish children, intermediate in nontraumatized adults and 
lowest in nontraumatized Finnish children who have had very little exposure to any 
threatening events in their environment (Revonsuo & Valli, 2000; Valli et al., 2005; 
2006; 2007; 2008). Even in adulthood, nontraumatized individuals do not reach the 
threat simulation levels present in traumatized children.5 In individuals not exposed 
to ecologically valid threat cues the threat simulation system develops and matures 
slower, and consequently the threat simulation dreams remain less frequent and 
milder, exactly as was predicted by the TST (Revonsuo, 2000a, Note 5, p. 899). 
The severely traumatized children’s dreams also include more severe threat simulations 
than nontraumatized children’s dreams or normative dreams, as postulated by the 
TST. Notably, nontraumatized children’s dreams include a higher proportion of 
5 Note that if we look at the mean number of threat simulations per dream, not the proportion of dreams including at least one 
threat, nontraumatized adults have the highest ratings. Thus, many of their dream reports include more than one threatening 
event, whereas children’s dreams, or at least their relatively short dream reports, focus on simulating single and separate events.
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life-threatening events than nontraumatized adults’ dreams. Similarly, aggressive 
threats are extremely prominent in traumatized children’s dreams, but also frequent 
in nontraumatized children’s dreams compared to nontraumatized adults dreams. 
In contrast, average participation rates are significantly lower for all children than 
for adults. 
A finding posing a problem to the TST is that, although reactions to the threats 
are almost always relevant and adequate, not all threat simulation dreams allow 
the rehearsal of reactions. On average, more than one third of threat simulations 
are interrupted by discontinuity or awakening, or for some other reason the dream 
report lacks a description of a reaction. People, nevertheless, also fail to report their 
reactions when writing daily logs or recalling long term autobiographical threat 
descriptions.
Another finding that partially contradicts TST’s assumption is that children 
traumatized by modern military violence do not react to the threats proportionally 
more often than nontraumatized children. Nevertheless, proportions do not tell 
the whole story. Even though the percentage of reacting to threats is not higher in 
dream reports of traumatized children, they get much more practice in total because 
the absolute threat simulation frequencies in their dreams are significantly higher 
to begin with. 
An explanation for low participation rates may be that exposure to military violence 
may not well model ancestral threats. The children were likely to be helpless and 
overwhelmed in the face of military violence, unable to react to or protect themselves 
from these types of threats. Thus, the finding that reacting to threats is often absent 
in dreams of war-traumatized children may only be a realistic reflection of threats 
they have encountered in their waking lives, and of the possibility to react to these 
kinds of threats.
The proportion of normative dreams including threatening events is about equal 
(Revonsuo & Valli, 2000; Valli et al., 2007; 2008) to the proportion of recurrent 
dreams and nightmares including threats (Desjardins & Zadra, 2004; Zadra et 
al., 2006), although the severity of threats is significantly graver in special than 
normative dreams. Threats including aggression are especially frequent in recurrent 
dreams and nightmares compared to normative dreams. Also the participation 
rates are highest in recurrent dreams and nightmares, and the behavioral strategies 
employed in avoiding the threats consist mainly of fight- or flight –responses. These 
results fit nicely to the predictions of the TST that recurrent dreams and nightmares 
are paradigm cases of intense threat simulation dreams.
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Even though the most prominent themes of recurrent dreams and nightmares are 
that of the dreamer being chased or attacked (Robbins & Houshi, 1983; Zadra, 
1996; Zadra & Donderi, 2000), and the most often experienced affects fear and 
apprehension (Zadra, 1996), in threatening situations the degree of realism is lower 
in nightmares, and especially in recurrent dreams, than in normative dreams. The 
threats in recurrent dreams and nightmares are more often based on fantasy or 
fiction than the threats in normative dreams. An explanation might be that in the 
modern environment fictional threats (such as seen in movies) may well be the most 
emotionally salient and powerful threat cues we are exposed to. In the absence of 
ecologically valid real threat cues, the most intense threat simulations are constructed 
from any memory source containing the highest negative emotional charge, and 
thus fictional threats, based for example on horror films and science fiction movies, 
end up being simulated in our dreams. 
Nevertheless, not all fiction-based threats are necessarily inefficient simulations. 
Rehearsing how to escape from the jaws of a werewolf or a vampire might be just 
as efficient as running away from a regular human character or a wild animal. In 
fact, these types of exaggerated threatening agents may even increase the emotional 
activation level, and consequently make the focusing of attention to the threat more 
intense, and the motivation to escape it or defend oneself stronger, thus rendering the 
threat simulation more efficient. These claims, however, require empirical testing.
To sum up, the TST takes into account the selection pressures most likely present 
in the human ancestral environment. It proposes a plausible explanation for how 
dreaming of negative and threatening events might have provided a slight advantage 
to our ancestors in maintaining and enhancing their threat recognition and avoidance 
skills. By referring to a single threat simulation mechanism it furthermore manages 
to explain a wide variety of dream content data that already exists in the research 
literature, and to predict the overall statistical patterns of threat content in different 
samples of dreams. Moreover, none of the potentially falsifying pieces of evidence, 
as described by Revonsuo (2000b), has emerged in the literature so far.6
6 Adopted from Revonsuo (2000b): 
1.  There is no unique threat simulation response that would be any different from the effects of non-threatening, positive events
2.  There were ancestral threats that posed selection pressures on humans, and for which they had potentially efficient, rehearsable 
behavioral avoidance strategies, but we never dream about such threats.
3.  The dreams of children and adolescents who have been exposed to ancestral-like threats from early on do not simulate threats or 
efficient responses to them in their dreams.
4.  There is a population of hunter-gatherers that are a good model of ancestral humans, but whose dreams infrequently include 
ancestral threats.
5.  There is a culture whose members never simulate threats in their dreams.
6.  Threat simulation in dreams does not support or improve later perceptual or motor performance 
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6.5. The weaknesses of the TST
When the TST was originally published (Revonsuo, 2000a), it received a wide 
range of peer reviewed commentaries, many of them critical. This criticism has 
been handled in the original author’s response (Revonsuo, 2000b), and is thus 
only briefly reviewed here, for the purpose of  bringing forth new evidence or 
arguments unavailable at the time the author’s response was published. The typical 
counterarguments against the TST include the following. 
6.5.1. Memory bias
Conduit, Crewther and Coleman (2000), Mealey (2000), and Montangero (2000) 
have argued that the results of dream research do not reflect the true nature of 
dreaming, but rather a sampling bias: the dreams recalled and reported are the 
emotionally most intense ones, thus a negativity bias is created by selective memory 
for dreams. Consequently, perhaps the high amount of threat-related content is 
only the result of selective memory for emotionally charged content (Bednar, 2000; 
Conduit, Crewther & Coleman, 2000; Mealey, 2000; Montangero, 2000; Thompson, 
2000). They suggest that the dream production system itself may not be selective 
(that is, all types of content, negative, positive and neutral, are represented in dreams), 
but it is our memory for dreams that is distorted. Thus, all dream research relying on 
spontaneously reported dreams is inherently flawed. 
Chapman and Underwood (2000), Conduit et al. (2000), and Mealey (2000), 
however, have also pointed out that the memory bias is not unique to memory for 
dreams, but for all memory processing. Even though emotionally charged dream 
content is easier to recall than mundane content, the same applies for our everyday 
memories (Chapman & Underwood, 2000). We tend to forget the ordinary events 
in our lives, and only remember those that had an emotional impact. When the 
frequency of threatening events experienced during a specific time period in the 
waking life was compared with threats simulated in dreams during the same period, 
it was clear that the dream world contains threats much more frequently than 
the waking life does (Valli et al., 2008). Thus, when a proper baseline is used for 
comparison, the memory bias can be avoided. 
6.5.2. Bizarreness renders simulations unrealistic 
The claim that dreams are so bizarre and disorganized that no realistic simulation of 
reality or real threats can take place was presented by several proponents of random 
activation theories (Ardito, 2000; Antrobus, 2000; Flanagan, 2000; Mealey, 2000; 
Moorcroft, 2000). Nevertheless, as evident in dream content studies, practically all 
dreams are well-organized simulations of a world including the self, other characters, 
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objects, and a setting or an environment where the dream takes place. Bizarreness 
disrupts some parts or features of this otherwise coherent organized world, but 
although dreams include bizarre elements, bizarreness appears to be a relatively 
small deviation in the otherwise coherently organized dream experience (Revonsuo 
& Salmivalli, 1995; Revonsuo & Tarkko, 2001; Snyder, 1970; Strauch & Meier, 
1996). 
In addition, recurrent dreams and nightmares including a high proportion of 
bizarre threats were otherwise exemplary threat simulations (Desjardins & Zadra, 
2004; Zadra et al., 2006), thus indicating that fantasy or fiction -based threats are 
not necessarily inefficient simulations. In fact, the TST predicts that the threat 
simulation system is maximally activated by the most negatively charged emotional 
memory traces, and these traces contain information about the most frightening 
threatening agents ever encountered. In the current environment, memory traces 
containing information about real threats can be substituted with memory traces 
including fictional threats, such as offered by media. These then work as ‘overstimuli’ 
to the dream production system, which builds frequent threat simulations based on 
them, producing fiction-based rehearsals. Nonetheless, an analysis of bizarre dream 
qualities and their effects on threatening events, that is, whether bizarreness renders 
threat simulations more or less efficient, or has no effect at all, should be conducted 
to directly answer this critique. 
6.5.3. Dream rehearsal does not lead to enhanced skills
There is no evidence that dreams simulate defensive actions, and that dream 
practice leads to enhanced threat avoidance skills (Domhoff, 2000; Hunt, 2000; 
Zadra & Donderi, 2000). This criticism that dreams do not simulate defensive 
actions is not, however, supported by empirical evidence. Our results, as well as 
the results of Desjardins & Zadra (2004), and Zadra et al. (2006), clearly point 
out that the dream self reacts to the threats in an appropriate manner in most 
cases when reactions can and take place, although not in all dreams participating 
to the threats is possible or reported. 
The claim that dream practice does not lead to enhanced threat avoidance is far 
more complicated to verify or falsify. Thus far, there is no direct evidence of the 
effect of dream rehearsal (or the lack of it) on performance in threatening situations. 
Erlacher (2005), however, presents initial empirical evidence of the positive effect of 
dream and lucid dream rehearsal on subsequent motor performance. His conclusions, 
nevertheless, are based on laboratory data from single lucid dreamer expert, and 
on data collected via Internet from 18 subjects. Therefore, before it is possible or 
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recommendable to draw any definitive conclusions of the effect of dream training, 
more empirical evidence needs to accumulate. 
Nonetheless, REM sleep and the maintenance of threat avoidance behaviors seem 
to be coupled. The violent, vigorous and powerful behaviors of RBD patients show 
that dream reactions to threatening events during REM sleep are fast, efficient 
and forceful. Moreover, Martinez-Gonzalez et al. (2004) showed that REM sleep 
deprivation (and thus possibly the deprivation of dreaming) led to decrease in 
species-typical threat coping and avoidance behaviors in rats.
In support for a positive effect of mental training during wakefulness, Pascual-Leone, 
Dang, Cohen, Brasil-Neto, Cammarota and Hallett (1995) found that mental 
rehearsal alone results in significant improvement in performance in five-digit piano 
playing exercise compared to the control group. However, the improvement was 
significantly less than produced by physical practice. Interestingly, Pascual-Leone et 
al. (1995) also report that mental training led to similar plastic changes in the cortical 
motor areas controlling finger movements as the actual physical training. Yet, more 
direct studies are needed to test the effects of mental simulation on performance. 
6.5.4. Threat dreams are psychologically dysfunctional
PTSD and frequent nightmares are dysfunctional and disturb sleep, therefore 
they cannot be regarded as good or functional for the individual who suffers from 
them (Kramer, 2000; Levin, 2000; Nielsen & Germain, 2000). While it is true 
that many severely traumatized individuals suffer from sleep disturbances due to 
terrifying nightmares, there are also reasons to believe that ancestral humans did 
not suffer from the effects of posttraumatic stress disorder to the same extent as 
some individuals in the present environment (Revonsuo, 2000b). The threats in 
the ancestral environment were frequent, and the ancestral humans were most 
likely adapted to higher levels of stress and trauma from early childhood on than 
most contemporary humans. Moreover, in the ancestral setting the threats were 
often related to everyday activities and thus predictable. In contrast, the present 
environment is relatively safe for most of us, and thus we are adapted to low levels of 
stress and trauma. Further, many of the threats that we may encounter are not easily 
predictable from preceding cues, and are thus difficult to avoid.
Also the most severe types of threats in the present environment, such as wars, 
differ qualitatively from comparable ancestral events to such a degree that the 
most severe modern threats can be regarded as much more traumatizing than any 
events in the EEA. In fact, an evolutionary psychological theory on PTSD suggests 
that PTSD was non-existent or very rare in the ancestral environment, but in the 
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modern environment follows from the discrepancy between adaptation to low 
levels of stress and rapid, unpredictable exposure to a highly traumatizing event. 
For example, Christopher (2004), Flannelly, Koenig, Galek and Ellison (2007), and 
Nielsen and Levin (2007) suggest that primitive brain mechanisms that evolved 
to assess environmental threats underlie psychiatric disorders, such as PTSD. 
Psychopathology is thus seen as a function of maladaptive modulation of the stress 
response (Christopher, 2004; Flannelly et al., 2007; Nielsen & Levin, 2007). 
6.5.5. Dreams have many simulations functions
Dreaming simulates so many other things too that surely threat simulation cannot 
be the (only) function of dreams (Cheyne, 2000; Clancey, 2000; Humphrey, 
2000; Nielsen & Germain, 2000; Peterson & DeYoung, 2000). Although some 
researchers are willing to accept the idea that dreams are simulations of significant 
selection pressures, they disagree on what types of events are simulated in dreams. 
Rehearsal of skills such as adjustment to novelty, social interactions, interpersonal 
understanding, motor functions and spatial learning has been suggested (Brereton, 
2000; Bulkeley, 2004; Cheyne, 2000; Franklin & Zyphur, 2005; Humphrey, 2000; 
McNamara, 2004; Nielsen & Germain, 2000; Peterson & DeYoung, 2000). Thus 
far, however, none of these suggestions has undergone a similar evolutionary cost-
benefit –analysis as the Threat Simulation Theory. 
The suggested alternative evolutionary functions involve little costs if practiced 
during waking hours, while real threats often result in fatal consequences. Thus, 
fitness benefits for simulating threats during dreaming are higher than for simulating 
situations that yield no or little costs if practiced during wakefulness. The claim that 
dreams have other simulation functions than threats is not evidence either for or 
against TST, and thus irrelevant for the testing of the theory. Still, anyone who puts 
forth a new statement concerning a new simulation function of dreams also has the 
burden of proof to show the evidence for the function in question. The proposed 
alternative simulation function theories await to be empirically tested.
6.5.6. The TST is untestable
Finally, the main concern faced by the Threat Simulation Theory is its empirical 
testability. For example, Hunt (2000) claims that the Threat Simulation Theory is 
in principle untestable, and thus cannot be falsified or verified. This concern is not 
unique only to the TST, but to all evolutionary psychological theories that infer 
cognitive mechanisms from the selection pressures operating in the evolutionary 
environment of the species. We will never be able to acquire data that would tell us 
what our ancestors dreamed about thousands and thousands of years ago. But the 
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more we learn about ancestral life and threats in that environment, the more specific 
hypotheses we can draw concerning what types of events should be simulated in 
dreams, and thus, indirectly test whether contemporary dream content is compatible 
with ancestral selection pressures. 
In fact, this whole thesis is a counter argument to the claim that the TST cannot 
be empirically tested. All of the reported studies in this thesis tested predictions 
derived from the TST. The question is thus not whether the TST can be empirically 
tested at all, but rather how directly can it be tested, and here it shares the same 
weaknesses with other evolutionary and historical hypotheses.
Also, I need to point out that all the predictions of the TST are intended to apply 
fully only to an ideal model population. The theoretically ideal model population 
consists of a group of individuals that would mimic a population living in an 
ancestral environment all their lives. As far as we know, such populations are both 
extremely rare and difficult to reach for research purposes. Thus, we have to rely on 
indirect evidence based on the dreams of available subjects who are more or less 
distant from an ideal sample. 
6.6. How to test TST in the future?
Despite the support offered for the TST by the present thesis and other related 
studies, many of its predictions still remain untested, or require further testing. 
Tooby and Cosmides (1995) have pointed out that adaptations are well-organized 
and represent such a good engineering solution to the specific adaptive problem that 
it would be extremely unlikely for the solution to have arisen by chance. However, 
there are no strict criteria for what kind of evidence can be interpreted as yielding the 
phenomenon under investigation as “extremely unlikely to have arisen by chance”. 
Thus, the decision of whether a certain property or a trait is an adaptation is, in the 
end, based on a probability assessment (Tooby & Cosmides, 1995). This probability 
assessment can only be made after all the evidence for or against the predictions 
under investigation is reviewed. Thus, I cannot state with certainty whether the 
threat simulation system is an adaptation or not, but I can present the currently 
available evidence, and offer a probability assessment of the likelihood that the 
threat simulation system has arisen by chance. 
Here, I present the detailed predictions of the TST, indicate whether a specific 
prediction has been tested or not, and summarize if there is any evidence for or 
against the predictions. These are also summarized in Table 9. In addition, I will 
specify what kind of evidence would pose problems for the TST. This chapter also 
functions as a future guide for testing the TST. 
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6.6.1. Is dream content organized and selective?
In order to test the claim that dream consciousness is an organized and selective 
off-line model of the real world (Revonsuo, 2000a), we need to investigate 1) the 
organization of the phenomenal level itself, 2) whether the neural mechanisms 
directly underlying dream production and threat simulation function in an orderly 
and organized manner rather than randomly, and 3) whether the triggering and 
construction of threat simulations is systematically modulated by the negative 
emotional charge attached to the episodic memory traces in the amygdala-centred 
emotional memory systems. 
The currently available evidence from both dream content and brain imaging 
studies seems to offer support for these predictions, although more direct tests 
are still needed. First, dream content studies confirm the relatively well-organized 
form of the phenomenal level in dreaming. Second, brain activation patterns during 
sleep are highly similar across subjects and experiments (Braun et al., 1997; Dang-
Vu et al., 2005; Maquet, 1999; 2000; Maquet et al., 1996; 2004; Nofzinger et al., 
1997). Third, research on emotionally charged memories indicates that there is a 
separable “hot” amygdala centered emotional memory system distinct from the 
“cool” hippocampally centred episodic memory system, and that these systems serve 
different functions (Metcalfe & Jacobs, 1998; 1999). 
The “hot” memory is the basis of emotionality, and is believed to play a central role 
in releasing species-specific behaviors in response to emotionally charged stimuli. 
Öhman (2005) recently proposed that the specific role of amygdala in human fear 
is the automatic detection of threatening stimuli in the environment. In addition, 
amygdaloid complexes have been implicated in the formation and consolidation 
of memories paired with emotional stimuli, and amygdala activity has been shown 
to be related to enhanced episodic memory for aversive stimuli, and especially to 
emotionally salient aversive stimuli (Hamann et al., 1999). Amygdala mediates 
responses to threatening stimuli or stressful situations (Hamann et al., 1999; LeDoux, 
1996; Metcalfe & Jacobs, 1999), and stimulation of amygdala in humans leads to 
autonomic fear reactions and to reported feelings of fear (Metcalfe & Jacobs, 1999). 
Thus, amygdala activation possibly favors fearful and threatening dream experiences 
(Dang-Vu et al., 2005; Schwartz & Maquet, 2002).  Amygdaloid complexes also 
have reciprocal connections with many cortical areas, and those areas receiving high 
amydaloid input are highly active during REM, whereas regions low in amygdaloid 
efferents are not likely to be activated (Maquet et al., 1996). Thus, active functional 
interactions between amygdaloid complexes, anterior cingulate cortex and various 
posterior areas during REM sleep might lead to reactivation of affective components 
of memories, explaining the emotional nature of REM dreams. 
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The proposition that dreams are well-organized, coherent and selective simulations 
of the real perceptual world, and the three predictions derived from this statement 
of the TST, could be falsified by showing that dream content is random, the neural 
mechanisms underlying dream production function in a random, disorganized 
manner, and that the negative emotional charge of the memory trace, stored in 
amygdala-centred memory systems, does not function as a triggering factor in 
dream content construction.
6.6.2. Is dream content specialized in threat simulation?
The second claim of the TST is that dream consciousness is specialized in the 
simulation of threatening events (Revonsuo, 2000a), thus predicting that 1) if a 
content analysis system for specifying the frequency and quality of threatening 
events in dreams is constructed, we should find that threatening events are 
overrepresented in dreams compared to negative events in real life and to positive 
events in dream life. The positive/negative emotions ratio should be opposite in 
dreams versus waking life. 2) The threatening events should include severe and 
mortally dangerous threats more often than our waking life typically does during 
the same time period. Furthermore, 3) if activated by various kinds of real threats, 
the threat simulation system should be more capable of simulating ancestral threats 
(animal attacks, physical aggression) than modern threats highly unlike ancestral 
ones (traffic accidents, electric shocks, smoking). Because the threat simulation 
system evolved to simulate threats in the ancestral environment, it comes preloaded 
with threat-scripts containing models of most frequent ancestral threats, and is 
only gradually adapting to simulate threats present in the modern environment. As 
evidence for the above listed predictions has already been presented in this thesis, 
the studies are only listed in Table 9.
To disconfirm the proposition that dreams are specialized in the simulation of 
threatening events, one would have to provide evidence that threatening events 
are not overrepresented in dreams during any given time period, that the threats 
in dreams only simulate trivial, everyday mishaps that never endanger the future 
reproductive success of the dream self, and that dream content is more equipped to 
simulate modern threats than ancestral types of threats, especially after exposure to 
real life threatening events.
6.6.3. Do real threat experiences activate the threat simulation system?
The TST predicts that only real threatening events can fully activate the threat 
simulation system (Revonsuo, 2000a). Thus, 1) none of the nonthreatening real-
life events will activate the threat simulation system in a manner comparable to 
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Table 9. The predictions of the TST, the tests conducted thus far, and the nature of evidence.
Prediction Tests Evidence* Study 
I Organization in and selectiveness of 
dreams
1a. Dream content is organized Tested Strong Among others: Calkins, 1893; Domhoff, 1996; Foulkes & Kerr, 
1994; Hall & Van de Castle, 1966; Rechtschaffen & Buchignani, 
1992; Revonsuo & Salmivalli, 1995; Snyder, 1970; Strauch & 
Meier, 1996; Weed et al., 1896
1b. Dream content is selective Tested Strong Among others: Calkins, 1893; Cicogna & Bosinelli, 2001; 
Domhoff, 1996; Foulkes & Kerr, 1994; Foulkes et al., 1988; 
Hall & Van de Castle, 1966; Hartmann, 2000; Kahn & Hobson, 
2005; Kahan, 1994: Kahan & LaBerge, 1996; Kahan et al., 1997; 
McCarley & Hoffman, 1983; Purcell et al., 1993; Schredl, 2000; 
Schredl & Doll, 1998; Schredl & Hofmann, 2003; Snyder, 1970; 
Strauch & Meier, 1996; Revonsuo & Valli, 2000; Valli et al., 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2008; Weed et al., 1896; Zadra et al., 1998.
 2. Brain activation during REM sleep and 
dreaming is organized on neural level
Tested Moderate Dang-Vu et al., 2005; Braun et al., 1997; Maquet, 2000; Maquet 
et al., 1996; 2004; Nofzinger et al., 1997
3. The saliency of episodic memories 
in the amygdala-centred ‘hot’ memory 
systems modulates threat content
Tested Moderate Amaral et al., 1992; Hamann, et al., 1999; Maquet et al., 1996; 
2004; Metcalfe & Jacobs, 1998, 1999; LeDoux, 1996; Schwarzt 
& Maquet, 2002; Öhman, 2005
II Threat are overrepresented in dreams
1. Frequency of dream threats is higher 
than frequency of wake threats
Tested Strong Desjardins & Zadra, 2004; Framo et al., 1962; Malcolm-Smith & 
Solms (2004), Malcolm-Smith et al., in press; Revonsuo & Valli, 
2000; Valli et al., 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008; Zadra et al., 2006




Desjardins & Zadra, 2004; Framo et al., 1962; Malcolm-Smith & 
Solms (2004), Malcolm-Smith et al., in press; Revonsuo & Valli, 
2000; Valli et al., 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008; Zadra et al., 2006
3. Threat simulation system more 




Domhoff, 1996; Garfield, 2001; Griffith et al.,1958; Hartmann, 
1984; Nielsen, et al., 1998, 1999, 2003; Robbins & Houshi, 
1983; Schredl et al., 2004; Zadra & Nielsen, 1997; 1999
III Effect of real threats




Valli et al., 2005, 2006, 2008
2. The activation pattern of threat 
simulation system by real threats is 
universal
Tested Strong Barrett, 1996; Esposito et al.,1999; Hartmann, 1984, 1996; Kuch 
& Cox, 1992; Lavie, 1996; Levin & Nielsen, 2007; Nader, 1996; 
Nader, et al., 1990; Pynoos & Nader, 1988; Pynoos, et al., 1987; 
Terr, 1979; 1983; Schreuder et al., 1998, 2000; Valli et al., 2005, 
2006; van der Kolk et al.,1984; Wilmer, 1996; Wittmann et al., 
2007; Wood et al., 1992
3. Degree of threat simulation system 
activation depends on degree of 
experienced wake threat
Tested Strong and/
or moderate Nader, 1996; Schreuder et al., 1998; Valli et al., 2005, 2006; van 
der Kolk et al.,1984; Wood et al., 1992
IV Threat simulation is realistic
1. Defensive reactions are elicited in 
response to threats
Tested Strong Desjardins & Zadra, 2004; Valli et al., 2005, 2006, 2008; Zadra 
et al., 2006
2. Neural correlates of subjective 




Schwarzt & Maquet, 2002; Maquet et al., 1996; 2004




Boeve et al., 1998; Comella et al., 1998, Dyken et al., 1995; 
Fantini et al., 2005; Olson et al., 2000; Santamaria et al., 2004; 





Prediction Tests Evidence Study
V Threat simulation leads to improved 
performance
1. Perceptual, cognitive, and motor skills 




Erlacher, 2005; Erlacher & Schredl, 2008; Karni et al., 1994; 
Kudrimoti et al., 1999; Louie & Wilson, 2001; Pavlides & Winson, 
1989; Smith, 1995; Wilson & McNaughton, 1994 
2. Recall of rehearsal is not necessary for 
enhanced performance
Tested Strong Glisky, 1992; Glisky et al., 1986; Glisky & Schacter, 1988, 1989; 
Schacter, 1996
VI Threat simulation system activation is 
dependent on ontogenetic development 
1. Threat simulation system activation is 
dependent on cognitive development
Not tested No evidence
2. Threat simulation system activation is 
dependent on exposure to real life threats
Tested Moderate 
and/or weak
Valli et al., 2005, 2006
* The terms strong, moderate, weak, and falsifying evidence are defined as follows: 
1) Strong evidence = many studies have been made and majority or all studies found strong and statistically significant patterns of data in the 
direction predicted by TST
2) Moderate evidence =  a number of studies made and most studies find results to the direction predicted by TST (but some studies may have given 
inconclusive results)
3) Weak evidence = few studies made and/or the studies only indirectly test the hypothesis or the results are only weakly to the direction predicted by TST
4) Indirect evidence = studies have been conducted that find results offering indirect support for TST, but these studies  have not directly tested the 
TST, or have not been linked to dreaming per se, or have been conducted on very small participant samples, or on animals 
5) No evidence = no studies made, or the studies made have found no consistent evidence either for or against the hypothesis
6) Falsifying evidence = some studies made and all or most studies have found results to the opposite direction of TST predictions
real-life threats, that is, a single exposure to any non-threatening event will not 
lead to simulation of such events in dreams so that they would be overrepresented 
in dream content compared to waking life. Moreover, 2) the activation of the 
threat simulation system after exposure to life-threatening trauma is a universal 
phenomenon, not dependent on any specific culture, and 3) the intensity of the 
simulations (frequency and persistence) will be directly related to the degree of 
personal threat experienced when the event was encountered in reality. There seems 
to be ample support for each of these predictions, especially for the second one, but 
the first and the third prediction could be tested in more detail (Table 9).  
In sum, the third prediction of the TST that only real ecologically valid threat cues 
in the environment fully activate the threat simulation system could be falsified by 
finding evidence showing that 1) also nonthreatening situations lead to repeated 
simulations, 2) there is a group of people in whom the threat simulation system 
is never activated after exposure to real life-threatening events, and that 3) the 
higher the personal exposure to the threatening real life event, the less frequent, less 
severe and less persistent are the following threat simulations or simply, the level 
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of exposure has no systematic correlation with the frequency or severity of threat 
simulation (Revonsuo, 2000b).   
6.6.4. Are dream simulations realistic?
The fourth proposition of the TST states that threat simulations are perceptually and 
behaviorally realistic rehearsals of real threatening events (Revonsuo, 2000a). Thus, 
1) when dream self is in mortal danger, he should be more likely than not to display 
appropriate defensive reactions to shield himself from the threat. Furthermore, 2) 
the neural correlates of subjective awareness in dreams should be identical with the 
neural correlates in charge of subjective awareness in waking experience. Last, 3) all 
movements performed by the dreamer within the dream can be externally observed 
if muscular atonia during REM sleep is completely removed. 
To falsify the hypotheses derived from the fourth proposition of TST, one would 
have to show that dream simulations are not behaviorally or perceptually realistic. 
First, evidence should be found that when dream self is facing a life-threatening 
event, he is no more likely to display appropriate defensive reactions to shield himself 
from the threat than in situations irrelevant for future reproductive success. Second, 
one would need to verify that the neural correlates of subjective visual awareness 
in dreams are not identical with the neural correlates in charge of subjective visual 
awareness in waking experience, that is, to show that simulations are not perceptually 
realistic. Last, to determine that threat simulations are not behaviorally realistic, 
one would need to prove that if muscular atonia during REM sleep is completely 
removed, dreamed movements do not isomorphically correspond to movements 
performed by the dreamer in the physical realm. 
6.6.5. Does dream rehearsal lead to improved performance?
The fifth proposition claims that perceptually and behaviorally realistic simulation 
and rehearsal of any skills (in this case threat recognition, avoidance, and coping 
skills) leads to enhanced performance regardless of whether the training episodes 
are explicitly remembered (Revonsuo, 2000a). Thus, we can predict that 1) the threat 
perception and avoidance skills and behaviors employed in threat simulation dreams 
consist of such perceptual, cognitive and motor skill components that became faster 
and more efficient through implicit, procedural learning. In addition, 2) even amnesic 
patients who are not able to explicitly remember the training episodes will become 
faster and more efficient in threat recognition and avoidance tasks when exposed to 
such tasks during wakefulness, thus demonstrating implicit, procedural learning. 
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Only indirect evidence seems to support the notion that those neural circuits 
involved in threat perception and avoidance are active during sleep. In rats, the 
firing patterns of hippocampal neurons, most likely responsible for encoding of 
spatial memory, have been studied under waking behavior and during slow wave 
(SWS) and REM sleep. The hypothesis has been that the spontaneous reactivation 
of these memory traces reflects memory consolidation in neural circuits. 
First, Pavlides and Winson (1989) showed that hippocampal neurons that were 
highly active during waking behavior have increased firing rates during subsequent 
sleep compared to previous sleep. Wilson and McNaughton (1994) recorded, in 
three rats, the short timescale activity of hippocampal “place cells” during behavioral 
spatial task and during subsequent SWS. Those cells that fired together during 
waking behavior had an increased tendency to fire together during subsequent, 
but not preceding, SWS sleep. Wilson and McNaughton (1994) suggested that 
neuronal play-back during SWS is a part of the consolidation process where 
hippocampal information is transferred to neocortex. Similar results for SWS sleep 
neuronal replay were later obtained by Kudrimoti, Barnes and McNaughton (1999), 
but could not be observed during subsequent REM sleep. 
In contrast, when Louie and Wilson (2001) recorded waking hippocampal neural 
activity in four rats during a maze task and compared it to hippocampal activity 
during REM sleep, they found that, in a timescale of tens of seconds to minutes, 
temporally sequenced firing rate patterns are reproduced in subsequent REM 
sleep at an equivalent timescale. Consequently, they believe that they managed to 
demonstrate the reactivation of episodic memory traces related to motor rehearsal 
during subsequent REM sleep. They also suggest that the reactivation of previous 
behavioral episode representations may be important for the learning of procedural 
tasks. The significance of REM sleep in implicit and procedural learning has already 
been demonstrated in animals and humans (Karni, Tanne, Rubenstain, Askenasy & 
Sagi, 1994; Smith, 1995)
To disprove the above predictions of TST, one should be able to demonstrate that the 
threat recognition and avoidance skills and behaviors employed in threat simulation 
dreams do not consist of such perceptual, cognitive and motor skill components 
that became faster and more efficient through implicit, procedural learning, that 
is, threat simulation training is not an efficient way to practise procedural skills. 
Second, one would have to show that a recollection of training episodes is essential 
in improving performance, that is, learning of procedural skills requires intact 




Also, in order to accept the threat simulation theory, many seem to demand an 
experiment that would demonstrate higher survival rates for people with frequent 
versus infrequent threat simulations. Obviously, this kind of a study has not been 
conducted, but the question whether dreams containing threat scenarios exert a real 
effect on the explicit waking responses is to be addressed. Natural selection operates 
only on actual, overtly expressed changes in phenotypal traits, and according to TST, 
during evolutionary history the constant repeated nocturnal training was followed 
by enhanced performance in comparable real life situations, which led to higher 
survival rate and more successful reproduction. According to Tooby and Cosmides 
(1995), a cognitive system is functional in the evolutionary sense if and only if it 
promotes the organism’s (inclusive) fitness. Thus, the ‘evolutionary’ measurements 
we can use for better adaptedness are higher survival rate and ultimately, the number 
of offspring produced by the individual and his kin carrying a set of same genes. 
Consequently, to study whether dreams containing threat scenarios exert a real effect 
on the explicit waking responses and lead to higher survival and reproduction rates 
would require us to examine the effects of threat simulation frequencies on survival 
and reproduction over successive generations, in low versus high simulators. In 
addition, such a study would need to be conducted on participant samples housed in 
an environment closely resembling the ancestral environment because in the modern 
environment the threat simulation system may not be able to simulate threats most 
relevant in the present context. Obviously, the present data are unable provide any 
evidence that people dreaming frequently about threatening events have or have 
had any behavioral advantage in dealing with subsequent future threats, leading to 
higher survival rate and greater number of surviving offspring. 
If it could, however, be shown that threat perception and avoidance behaviors are 
enhanced after dreaming about threats, the TST would gain support. Even though 
there are many practical problems in testing the effect of rehearsal on performance, 
the relation between threat simulation and performance (speed and accuracy) could 
in the future be investigated by exposing subjects to severe threats in a virtual reality 
environment or immersive video game, and by studying the dream rehearsal rates 
and the performance in relation to each other. One other possible option would be 
to conduct a study on animals by exposing them to ecologically valid threat cues, but 
then the problem how to verify the existence and frequency of threat simulations, a 
mental phenomenon, will arise. 
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6.6.6. Is threat simulation dependent on cognitive development and exposure to 
threats?
The sixth proposition of the TST states that the original human evolutionary 
environment included frequent dangerous events which imposed severe selection 
pressures upon ancestral populations, and that the ecologically valid threat cues 
in the environment fully activated the threat simulation system (Revonsuo, 
2000a). Repeated rehearsal of threatening events in dreams led to improved threat 
recognition and avoidance skills, increasing the probability of survival and successful 
reproduction. Thus, 1) children old enough to implement threat recognition and 
avoidance skills during wakefulness should be capable of simulating threatening 
events in their dreams, especially when exposed to real valid threat cues, and 2) 
ontogenetically early exposure to real threat cues will lead to earlier, more frequent 
and more intensive threat simulation dreams whereas lack of exposure will lead to 
slower development of the dream production system and less frequent and milder 
threat simulation dreams. 
To falsify these predictions, one would need to show that threat simulation does 
not take place in children’s dreams, not even after personal exposure to ecologically 
valid threat cues. The TST also predicts that dream content of people who live in 
environments that closely resemble the original human ancestral environment, that 
is, environments that include frequent survival challenges from natural sources, and 
where external threats are similar to the ones present in the ancestral environment, 
should be even more biased towards representing threatening events. When dreams 
(N = 276) collected from Mehinaku men (an aboriginal ethnic group of Brazil) by 
Gregor (1981) were classified as including either objective or subjective threats, or 
reflecting daily peaceful activities, threat-related dreams accounted for 63% of the 
sample, while peaceful daily activities were conducted in only 20.3% (Revonsuo, 
2000a, Note 13). Thus, this prediction of the TST has gained at least preliminary 
support, although further investigations into dream content of people living under 
ancestral-mimicking conditions would be welcome.
6.7. The TST in the multilevel framework
The main theoretical aim and contribution of the present thesis is to integrate 
various disciplines and fields of science to explain dreaming. The multilevel 
framework was chosen as an explanatory model. In this framework, the 
phenomenon under investigation is decomposed into subproblems related to the 
constitutive level underlying the phenomenon, the etiological level preceding 
the phenomenon, and the contextual level linking the phenomenon to other 
phenomena on a higher level. 
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The threat simulation theory was chosen as a starting point, as the TST includes 
constitutive level, proximate, developmental and ultimate level etiological, and 
contextual level explanations for dream phenomena. No other dream theory has thus 
far included explanations from all the levels indicated in the multilevel framework. 
Next, the explanations offered by the TST are outlined briefly. The explanations are 
also presented in Figure 7. 
6.7.1. The constitutive level
The constitutive level explanations for dreaming, according to the TST, include the 
neural activation of the dream generator system. The dream generator system is 
distinct from the REM sleep generator system, as dreaming and REM sleep can 
double dissociate. The dream generator or dream production system actively selects 
emotionally negatively charged memory traces from long term memory, and builds 
dream experiences based on the activated memories. The dream production system 
is, however, creative: the memory traces are combined in novel ways and simulations 
of threatening events are produced in various combinations.
In the constitutive level explanations, the TST runs into the ‘hard and easy problems’ 
of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996). The easy problems concern the neural or cognitive 
correlates or constituents of consciousness. Thus far, they remain largely unexplained. 
This is also the case for dreaming: we know neither how the brain creates dream 
experiences nor where this process takes place. The hard problem of consciousness is 
why we have qualitative phenomenal experiences at all. What makes the hard problem 
so hard, according Chalmers (1996), is that even if we could explain the performance 
of all the relevant neural and cognitive systems and functions underlying phenomenal 
consciousness, we still would not know why physical processes in the brain should 
give rise to the inner presence of mind. The TST in itself cannot, and does not 
even try to, solve either the easy or the hard problems. Rather, it only acknowledges 
that dreaming is created by the brain 
within the confines of the brain. The 
easy and hard problems, however, 
are addressed by biological realism 
(Revonsuo, 2006).




6.7.2. The etiological level
The proximate etiological level explanations that the TST offers for dreaming 
are, of course, also related to the constitutive level explanations. The selective and 
organized neural and cognitive processes are required in order for dreaming to take 
place. Again, the easy and hard problems for explaining phenomenal consciousness 
follow.
The developmental level explanations for dreaming put forth by the TST are that 
dreaming has a genetic basis, and that dreaming is reliably manufactured over the 
developmental life history of the organism according to the specifications contained 
in its genetic code. Moreover, the maturation rate in early childhood and the activity 
level of the threat simulation system is highly dependent on the activity level of the 
dream production mechanisms and the level of ecologically valid threat cue input. 
Even though written records about dreaming go back only a couple of thousands of 
years, humans throughout the history seem to have tried to explain dreaming. Thus, 
it seems that the ability of the human brain to produce hallucinatory experiences 
during sleep is a cross-generationally occurring ancient phenomenon, and a recurring 
characteristic of our phenotype, determined by our common genetic heritage. 
Dreaming seems to be reliably manufactured over the developmental cycle of the 
individual. Though the genetic basis of dreaming has not been widely studied, some 
evidence for hereditary characteristics can be found. Dreaming develops gradually 
as the child matures, and reaches adult level and characteristics between ages nine 
and thirteen (Foulkes, 1982; 1985; 1999). Also the findings that most people can 
recall dreams (Pagel, 2003; Strauch & Meier, 1996) support the idea that that 
dreaming develops in a majority of individuals. Of course, dream recall is not an 
exact measure of whether a person experiences dreams, as non-recallers might just 
have an exceptionally bad memory for dreams. 
Relatedly, the frequency of dream recall varies inter-individually (for example, 
Schredl, 2004; Strauch & Meier, 1996), and the recall rates indicate that dreaming 
is normally distributed in the population. Majority of people are moderate dream 
recallers, some remember dreams frequently, and few report dreaming rarely or 
never (Pagel, 2003; Strauch & Meier, 1996). Moreover, it seems that dream recall 
frequency is related between mothers and their children (Schredl, 2006). This can, 
of course, be due to genetic (tendency to dream) as well as environmental factors 
(attitude towards dreams). 
The best evidence for hereditary characteristics of dreaming is obtained in twin 
studies. Hublin, Kaprio, Partinen and Koskenvuo (1999) quantified the genetic 
influences affecting the liability to nightmares in a sample of 1 298 monozygotic 
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and 2 419 dizygotic twin pairs. They found that having nightmares is a stable trait 
from childhood to middle age, and that there are persistent genetic effects on the 
disposition to nightmares both in childhood and adulthood. In sum, dreaming seems 
to be reliably manufactured in an individual according to instructions contained in 
its genetic specification.
During ontogenetic development, modern children dream more of animals, 
aggression, and aggression by wild animals than modern adults (Domhoff, 1996; 
Hall & Domhoff, 1963). Nightmares are also common in children between ages of 
three and six, and the most common themes consist of the dreamer being chased or 
pursued by strange males, animal or monsters (Domhoff, 1996; Hartmann, 1984; 
1998). As the children mature, the level of aggression and amount of animal figures 
reach adult values, usually by early teenage (Domhoff, 1996). Revonsuo (2000a) 
interprets this as evidence that the threat simulation system has a predisposition to 
produce ancestral-type threat simulations in the relative absence of real threat cues. 
The threat simulation system comes preloaded with threat scripts, that is, default 
values, for simulating ancestral threats. Only when the child’s brain gradually adapts 
to modern environment, that is, is modified by environmental cues present in his 
or her surroundings, the threat simulations start to include situation relevant in the 
present context.
The activity level of the threat simulation system seems to be highly dependent on 
the activity level of the dream production mechanism. If we measure the activity of 
the dream production mechanism with dream recall frequency and dream report 
length, we see that the more and the longer the dreams, the more threat simulations 
they include (Aitta-aho, 2006; Valli et al., 2007; 2008). The ecologically valid threat 
cue input also activates the threat simulation system in manner no other type of 
input seems to do. The more often the individual is exposed to threats in his or her 
waking life, and the more severe threats are, the more likely are subsequent realistic 
threat simulation dreams (Punamäki, 1997; Punamäki et al., 2005; Valli et al., 2005; 
2006). This is also evident from posttraumatic nightmares.
The ultimate etiological level explanation for dreaming, as proposed in the TST 
(Revonsuo, 2000a; 2000b), is that recurring threat simulations of the most relevant 
threatening agents present in the ancestral environment led to enhanced threat 
recognition, avoidance and response skills. Individuals with highly efficient threat 
coping skills were more likely to survive and leave offspring, and as dreaming and the 
threat simulation system are hereditary characteristics, transmit an efficient threat 
simulation system to their children. Gradually, the genetic basis of threat simulation 
system became established and organized in our species over evolutionary time, 
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because the mechanism systematically interacted with stable and recurring selection 
pressures present in the ancestral environment. 
Thus, the TST states that the threat simulation system is an adaptation, regardless 
of whether it originally evolved to serve an adaptive purpose or whether it was first 
a sleep-related spandrel that was later adopted for its beneficial fitness-enhancing 
characteristics. Nevertheless, once the threat simulation system was established as an 
adaptation, it gradually spread in the population. Eventually, the threat simulation 
system reached a fixation point. A fixed psychological adaptation means that all the 
individuals in the population share the same underlying neural and psychological 
structures required for the phenomenon to reliably develop during ontogeny. 
The TST makes no specific claim as to when exactly the threat simulation 
system evolved, or became adopted to, as an adaptation. This feature might have 
been inherited from earlier mammals, in which species-specific survival skills 
were practiced during sleep, and possibly dreaming. The TST only claims that in 
humans those types of threatening events that were present in the evolutionary 
environment of our species are simulated in during dreaming. Thus, the evolution 
of the dream production mechanism may well predate our species, and the species-
specific adaptation in humans may only concern specific threat content and effective 
responses to threats most relevant to us.
6.7.3. The contextual level
Contextual explanations tie dreaming to other subjective and psychological 
phenomena, and also to behavior and interactions with the environment. The TST 
(Revonsuo, 2000a; 2000b) states that repeated threat simulation in dreams causally 
led to enhanced threat recognition and avoidance skills, that is, the individual 
was better equipped on psychological (faster threat recognition and assessment 
of situation) and behavioral (faster responses and implementation of avoidance 
behaviors) levels to survive a subsequent threatening situation. The organism-
environment –interaction was the evolutionary selection criteria for the threat 
simulation mechanism. Thus, the phenomenal level, the dream experience, causally 
contributed to adaptive behavior, via various other mental and cognitive phenomena. 
Consequently, on the contextual level mental phenomenon is one of the etiological 
explanations for observable behavior.
Peterson and DeYoung (2000) suggest also a contextual level explanation for 
dreaming that can be related to the threat simulation theory. They propose that, 
after the advent of language, the capacity to communicate dreams to other group 
members could have been selected for (Peterson & DeYoung, 2000). When a dream 
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is shared, especially a threatening dream, the members of the community can then 
help solve the problem posed in the dream. As a memory bias for negative and 
threatening dreams exists, these types of dreams were likely to be told and shared. 
If I continue the thought, it could even be said that the sharing of threatening dreams 
and nightmares in a social context is a sign that the whole group should prepare for 
the type of threat presented in the dream. In many cultures, it is believed that dreams 
convey information of or foretell the future. Maybe this belief could be interpreted 
as a generalization of the threat detection function of dreams. Simultaneously, the 
original biological threat detection function of dreaming has blurred and become 
more indistinct.
6.8. Dreaming – A spandrel or an adaptation?
The Threat Simulation Theory claims that dreaming originated either as an 
adaptation, or was a sleep-related epiphenomenon that was later co-opted as an 
adaptation for its beneficial fitness effects in the ancestral environment. The idea 
that dreaming is an adaptation has not, thus far, been subjected to evolutionary 
analysis. In order to provide any probability assessment as to whether dreaming is 
an adaptation, we need to show that dreaming as a biological phenomenon fulfils 
the criteria for an adaptation. Similarly, we need to address whether the explanation 
for dreaming as offered by the TST survives the evolutionary functional analysis.
6.8.1 Definition of an adaptation
Tooby and Cosmides (1995) define adaptations as mechanisms crafted by natural 
selection to solve the specific problems posed by the environments encountered 
by ancestral populations during the course of the species’ evolution. One of the 
main criteria for an adaptation is that is shows clear design for a function, that is, 
seems to be specifically engineered to solving a specific adaptive problem. Further, 
as proposed by Tooby and Cosmides (1990; 1992; 1995), an adaptation is 1) a 
cross-generationally recurring set of characteristics of the phenotype, 2) that are 
developmentally manufactured, 3) according to instructions contained in the genetic 
specification or basis of the species, 4) in interaction with stable and recurring 
features of the environment (that is, the characteristic reliably develops normally 
when exposed to normal ontogenetic environments), 5) whose genetic basis became 
established and organized in the species over evolutionary time, because 6) the set 
of characteristics systematically interacted with stable and recurring features of the 
ancestral environment 7) in a way that systematically promoted the propagation 
of the genetic basis of the set of characteristics better than the alternative designs 
existing in the population during the period of selection. 
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In contrast, a set of phenotypic characteristics is not an adaptation if 1) it is transient, 
varying form one individual to the next, and it is not a part of the recurrent design 
of individuals of that genotype, 2) it was absent in the environment of evolutionary 
adaptedness, 3) it did not solve an adaptive problem in the EEA even though might 
be fitness-promoting in current environment, 4) the description of the adaptation 
involves terms and elements for things that were not present in the EEA, and 5) 
the set of characteristics is not species-typical for species with open population 
structure (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990).
6.8.2. Evolutionary functional analysis
The tool that evolutionary psychologist use in investigation of whether a specific 
characteristic is an adaptation or not is called evolutionary functional analysis. This 
analysis involves three steps. First, we must define those recurrent structures of the 
Pleistocene environment that presented the selection pressures for the design in 
question. Second, we need to determine what kind of a behavioral sequence counts 
as a biologically successful outcome in those given situations. Third, we have to be 
able to identify the central features of the proposed design in an organism, and 
to define and to evaluate the performance of the design. Thus, in the context of 
dreaming, we must be able to identify the selection pressures that posed a threat 
to survival. Second, we have to decide what kinds of behaviors would have been 
useful and successful in these threatening situations. Finally, we have to identify the 
central, universal features of phenomenal dream experience, to determine what are 
the biologically successful outcomes dreaming should be able to produce, and to test 
whether dreams are capable of producing such outcomes. Then, we can evaluate how 
well the design performs in producing the set of biologically successful outcomes 
under current conditions, and especially under conditions that are representative of 
ancestral selection pressures that were operational in the EEA.
6.8.3. Probability assessment: Is dreaming an adaptation?
Dreaming itself, as a process capable of producing hallucinations during sleep 
independent of what is being hallucinated, seems to fulfill the first four requirements 
set for an adaptation (see section 6.8.1.), that is, it is a cross-generationally recurring 
set of characteristics of the phenotype that are manufactured in an individual 
according to instructions contained in the genetic code, in interaction with stable 
and recurring features of the environment. The TST (Revonsuo, 2000a; 2000b), in 
addition, presents a rather convincing argument that explains the specific design 
of the dreams, and offers an evolutionary argument for why the design would have 
been selected for (requirements 5 to 7, see section 6.8.1.). The TST offers a plausible 
explanation for why the genetic basis of dreaming would have been selected for, that 
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is, because dreaming interacted with the environment in such a way that enhanced 
fitness. It is compatible with what we know of the central, universal features of 
phenomenal dream experience. What we cannot test directly is whether threat 
simulation dreams are capable of producing biologically successful outcomes, but 
indirect evidence supports this. 
What comes to alternative designs, the TST claims that the benefits carried with 
dreaming and the threat simulation system far outweighed the costs that went into 
producing them. Other threat rehearsal systems than dreaming might have also 
been useful (such as mammalian play), but alternative designs could have come with 
additional costs. If an alternative threat rehearsal mechanism is proposed, it needs 
to be subjected to similar cost-benefit analysis that the TST.  Similarly, the TST 
accepts that dreaming may have other functions besides threat simulation, but the 
explication of these alternative functional designs is beyond the scope of the theory. 
As mentioned previously, any alternative explanation proposed for the biological 
function of dreaming has to be also subjected to cost-benefit –analysis. Nevertheless, 
in the light of the present evidence the TST’s proponents may well have grounds 
to argue that the TST is a plausible explanation for the design and function of 
dreaming. In probability assessment terms; it would be extremely unlikely that the 
design and function of dreaming as presented in the light of the TST would have 
arisen by chance. 
Evolutionary processes also create spandrels, by-products of adaptations (Gould & 
Lewontin, 1979). These by-products are coupled with properties that have adaptive 
functions, but do not contribute to organism’s fitness in themselves (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1990; 1992; 1995). As spandrels are closely linked to adaptations, they 
were dragged along into the species typical architecture. Spandrels are selectively 
neutral, that is, they do not have negative or positive consequences to the organism’s 
fitness, and thus they are functionally arbitrary (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; 1995). 
Occasionally, however, by-products of adaptations can later be co-opted for their 
beneficial effects (Gould & Lewontin, 1979), and some traits that were originally 
spandrels can eventually become adaptively functional. 
A question that we can address, but not solve, in this context, is whether dreaming 
originally evolved as an adaptation or whether it was (and maybe still is) a sleep-
related spandrel. The TST does not claim anything about the origin of dreaming, 
that is, whether dreaming was selected for from the beginning because it had the 
capacity to produce simulated threats to begin with, or whether dreaming was 
originally a spandrel, and was later selected for because at some point along the 
line threats started to be simulated in dreams, and this proved useful. Nevertheless, 
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the TST does not accept the idea that dreaming still is a spandrel, regardless of its 
original nature.   
Finally, what evolutionary psychologists seldom acknowledge is that random factors, 
such as random events in the species’ environment, new mutations, or genetic drift, 
can also change the allele frequencies in a population, and thus contribute to genetic 
polymorphism (Gould & Lewontin, 1979). Genetic drift can, in spite of natural 
selection, lead to fixation of an allele, even a fitness-reducing allele, depending upon 
the product of population size and selection intensity (Gould & Lewontin, 1979). 
EP regards random effects as functional disorders in the design of organisms, and 
assumes that they are recognizable by the lack of coordination they produce within 
the architecture of the species, or between the architecture and the environment, and 
by the fact that they also frequently vary between individuals (Tooby & Cosmides, 
1992; 1995). Dreaming and threat simulation do not seem to resemble random 
effects as defined above.
6.9. The implications of the present thesis 
6.9.1. The loop of 150 years: Putting dreaming back where it belongs
Published in 1859, one-hundred and forty-nine years ago, Darwin’s masterpiece ‘On 
the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured 
Races in the Struggle for Life’7 laid the grounds for evolutionary biology. The book 
was highly controversial because it contradicted widespread religious beliefs at that 
time. Scientific reaction to Darwin’s theory was also mixed, and during Darwin’s 
lifetime cumulative changes and revisions were made to deal with the counter-
arguments. After Darwin, modifications and revisions to the theory of evolution by 
natural selection still continue to be published. Similarly, the creation (or intelligent 
design) and evolution controversy continues to this day
At the time the ‘On the origin of species’ was published, psychology was gradually 
establishing itself as a science. Wilhelm Wundt gave psychology its first definition: 
the study of mental experience, of consciousness, to be studied by introspection, 
aided by the experimental protocols of the natural sciences (Stanford Dictionary of 
Philosophy). William James also defined psychology as a science aiming to describe 
and explain states of consciousness as such.
At the advent of experimental psychology, dream consciousness was also established 
as a topic of scientific study. Ingenious neurocognitive theories of dream formation 
were proposed (Delbouef, 1885/1993; Maury, 1862; de Saint-Denys, 1867/1982), 
7 In the 1872 edition, the name was changed into ‘On the origin of species’
125
DISCUSSION
and the first content analysis on study on dreams, based on introspective dream 
reports, was published (Calkins, 1893). More soon followed (Weed et al., 1896), 
and the focus in research was on the phenomenology of dreams rather than on the 
meanings the dreams might have for a particular dreamer. 
In the beginning of the 20th century, a paradigm shift took place in psychology. 
After the publication of ‘The interpretation of dreams’, dream experience as such 
was discredited, and the focus was turned to the discovery of the hidden meaning of 
dreams (Freud, 1900/1965). Psychoanalytic dream interpretation system discouraged 
all efforts to explain dreaming in neuropsychological or neurocognitive terms, but 
dreaming itself was considered essential in psychology, as a protector of sleep and as 
a ‘royal road to the unconscious’ (Freud, 1900/1965). 
In a concurrently running school of thought in psychology, dreaming was not, however, 
favourably regarded, independent of the approach. In Wittgensteinian philosophy 
and logical behaviorism (Malcolm, 1959; Ryle, 1949), and later in functionalism 
(Dennett, 1976), the importance, and even the existence of dreams was denied. In 
fact, all mental phenomena were considered as unverifiable by empirical means, and 
therefore not empirically real at all. Because of the influence of behaviorism and 
functionalism in psychology, introspection was rejected, and experimental methods 
preferred. In less than fifty years, psychology was transformed from the study of 
mental phenomena, of consciousness, to the objective study of behavior. 
Dreaming, however, was not completely forgotten. In 1953, Calvin S. Hall, who had 
a background both in the psychoanalytic school and behaviorism, published ‘The 
meaning of dreams’. In his book he described the phenomenology of dreams, based 
on thousands of introspective dream reports collected from normal subjects (Hall, 
1953). A decade later, Hall authored together with Robert Van de Castle the classic 
‘The content analysis of dreams’, in which they described a detailed content analysis 
system for the statistical study of dream phenomena (Hall & Van de Castle, 1966). 
The renewed interest in dream phenomenology coincided with a revolutionary 
discovery of REM stage of sleep by Aserinsky and Kleitman in 1953. Moreover, 
as in the early studies REM sleep was considered to be the neurophysiological 
correlate of dreaming (Dement & Kleitman, 1957), the discovery led to numerous 
REM sleep dream studies.
Now that dreaming was back on the map, and intensely studied in conjunction 
with REM sleep, new theories trying to explain the formation of dreams from 
a neurophysiological perspective started to appear. These theories, such as the 
Activation-Synthesis hypothesis (Hobson & McCarley, 1977), show striking 
similarities with the neurocognitive theories presented more than a hundred years 
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earlier (Schwartz, 2000). The psychoanalytic paradigm has not been forgotten, 
either. The views of Freud (1900/1965), Jung (1965; 1974), and Adler (1929) still 
persist in psychological theories on dreaming (Hartmann, 1995; 1996; 1998; Solms, 
2000). What has been largely missing from the science of dreams until recently is 
the evolutionary perspective.
The contribution that evolutionary psychology has offered to dream research 
is the angle of biological functionalism. Evolutionary psychology is founded on 
the view that the function of all psychological phenomena in human evolution, 
including dreaming, is a necessary perspective to their scientific explanation (this 
is the ultimate etiological explanation in Biological Realism). Even studying the 
evolutionary functions of consciousness (originally defined by Wundt and James as 
the explanandum in psychology) is now an active field of study. Not surprisingly, 
evolutionary psychology is based on two classical standpoints: functionalism and 
evolution by natural selection.
Functionalism refers to a school of thought accepting the philosophical view that 
mental states are constituted solely by their functional role. William James was one 
of the leading proponents of functionalism in psychology, and James recognized 
that mental processes, just as physical traits, were subject to the same evolutionary 
processes. Not surprisingly, with a background in medicine, physiology, and biology, 
James had not been blind to Darwin’s theory of natural selection. In fact, Darwin 
himself had already stated in ‘On the origin of species’ that: “Psychology will be 
based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power 
and capacity by gradation.” (Darwin, 1859). To me, it seems that both psychology 
and dream research have found their way back to their roots.
6.9.2. And where does it belong?
The main contribution of the present thesis lies in putting dreaming back where it 
belongs, that is, into the spotlight at the cross-road of various disciplines. The present 
thesis reflects the currently ongoing, more general transition or shift in psychology. 
Mental phenomena and consciousness are, again, in the research core, as originally 
defined by Wundt and James. Consciousness is, again, regarded a biological 
phenomenon, explainable with naturalistic terms. Evolutionary psychology, anew, 
sees biology as an indispensable aid in explaining consciousness and all mental 
phenomena. The tail of the snake has found the way into its mouth. 
Multidisciplinary integration and methodological meticulousness have been in the 
centre of this work. Further, the current thesis has focused on the systematic and 
draconian testing of one of the theories suggested for the function of dreaming. 
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Thus far, the ambiguous formulation of theories has been a significant weakness in 
dream research, and in the absence of well-defined predictions, most dream theories 
have been difficult or impossible to test. The approach this thesis stands for, that 
is, integration of multidisciplinary explanations, theoretical exactness, testability 
of predictions, methodological soundness, and systematic empirical testing of 
hypotheses, are prayed for in future dream studies. These are the requirements 
dream research needs to fulfil to truly become a mainstream science, and to take its 
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